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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Snell, Brandon Charles. M. A., Department of International and Comparative Politics, Wright 
State University, 2009. 
The Origins of Ethno/National Separatist Terrorism: A Cross-National Analysis of the 
Background Conditions of Terrorist Campaigns 
 
 
 
This study measures the influence that multiple social, political, and economic conditions have 
on the development of ethno/national separatist terrorist organizations. It begins by analyzing the 
nationalist theories of primordialism, modernism, and ethnosymbolism, and the terrorist theories 
of strategic logic and psychology. The nationalist theories consider cultural symbols a powerful 
component behind nationalist movements and populations with significant symbolic attachments 
especially prone to react aggressively against perceived threats to those symbols. Proponents of 
strategic logic and psychological theory also view terrorism as reactive but deviate on whether 
this response is conceived rationally. Examining the origins of Basque and Catalan terrorism and 
Roma passivity in Spain assists in identifying background conditions that are evaluated using a 
logit regression model. The logit model assesses two-hundred ninety-seven minority populations 
in one-hundred twenty-six states, primarily between 1945 and 2003. The results show cultural 
identity and sensitivity, violent encounters, political freedom, social unrest, underrepresentation, 
disproportionate economic privation, and stagnant educational systems and other factors of civil 
development correlating significantly with the formation of ethno/national separatist terrorist 
organizations. These findings imply an ability to detect populations and environments with 
increased potential for producing ethno/national separatist terrorism, and that by addressing those 
conditions facilitating its development, it may be possible to reduce the probability of additional 
campaigns developing.  
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1 
Introduction 
This study analyzes the conditions surrounding the creation of ethno/national separatist terrorist 
organizations. It begins by examining contemporary theories of nationalism and terrorism in 
order to identify common background conditions correlating with the development of these 
movements, and then uses a logit regression to test the significance of those correlations among 
various minority populations. The objective is to detect common triggers existing throughout the 
world that influence an aggressive response from specific populations that then leads to the 
initiation of terrorism for gaining national sovereignty. The intent of this paper is to advance the 
study of terrorism by understanding why some groups transition into a terrorist organization and 
attempt to solidify both the theoretical aspects and development of ideas applicable to future 
research in this field. 
One of the first challenges in studying terrorism is defining the term. History shows a 
tendency of opposition movements and their sympathizers to resist the depiction of terroristic 
acts as terrorism to avoid its pejorative connotations, instead preferring to refer to themselves as 
rebels, freedom fighters, or liberators (Hoffman, 1998). The result of this difficulty with labeling 
is an inability to establish a universally acceptable definition of a terrorist organization. To 
provide a common description of these organizations, researchers produce ad hoc explanations 
that utilize common concepts and then periodically introduce subtle nuances to the term. Cooper 
(1997), for example, describes terrorism as opposition to normal society and its structures. 
Hoffman (1998) writes that terrorism is conclusively about power, involving “a planned, 
calculated, and . . . systematic act” of violence, or its threat, “designed to have far-reaching 
psychological effects” (pp. 15, 44). Laqueur (1999) adds to the definition of terrorism by 
describing its political components, and Rimanelli (1992) writes that terrorism is a tactic used by 
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revolutionists for maximizing “systematic and indiscriminate” attacks aimed “at provoking 
generalized political instability and tensions to destroy the traditional psychological bonds 
between state and society” (p. 127). For the purpose of this study, the definition of terrorism 
broadly encapsulates illegitimate hostile acts by oppositionist groups to further their goals and 
which manifest the aforementioned characteristics. In addition, the observations in this analysis 
have previously been defined by other sources as terrorism, predominately by the Global 
Terrorism Database (GTD).  
Terrorism is a broad topic with episodes occurring in several forms that go beyond large-
scale, indiscriminate violence by clandestine groups. These acts range from civil disobedience to 
cyberspace attacks, and a myriad of actions between. Often terrorism is seen as a weapon of the 
weak and of last resort, committed in areas with higher degrees of civil freedom by organizations 
that tend to emerge in authoritarian states with institutional weaknesses or political corruption 
(Fox, 2003; Abadie, 2006; Feldmann & Perälä, 2004; Reinares & Jaime-Jeménez, 2000 Laqueur, 
1999; Fleming, 1982). Moreover, terrorism occurs sporadically or cyclically, is a primary or one 
of several tactics, and is unaided or sponsored, or connected to other movements (Feldmann & 
Perälä, 2004; Fox, 2003; Cook, 1982). Walter Reich (1990), in his own quest to understand 
terrorism, writes how this “subject is so confounded by problems of diversity, complexity, and 
definition that any simplifying approach is bound to tempt one to use it beyond its valid limits” 
(p. 2). This broad research by nature overlooks unique cultures, histories, and circumstances, 
while the nearest to a universal description of terrorism is of a terrorist type as male and seldom 
of a labor class, and for woman terrorists as emotionally driven (Laqueur, 1999). Beyond this, 
concepts of terrorism become multidimensional and generally inapplicable to different cases. 
The examples of Basque and Catalonian terrorism in Spain further illustrates how geographic 
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alignment, resource sharing, and similar hardships are indeterminate predictors of case specific 
aggression. This makes the task of uncovering the roots of terrorism especially difficult, although 
important, since common traits may exist within the various forms of terrorism. As Laqueur 
(1999) explains, there are no typical terrorists, only typical types of terrorism, and by narrowing 
research to these specific types, it may be possible to accumulate knowledge that assists in 
predicting conditions and environments that promote and facilitate its occurrence. Therefore, by 
examining the origins of ethno/national separatist (ENS) terrorist campaigns, this paper seeks to 
contribute to a more precise perspective on the ENS form of terrorism. 
The aspects differentiating ENS terrorism from other forms of terrorism include moderate 
to intense levels of violence in the pursuit of national independence. Hoffman (1998) depicts this 
level of violence as between two extremes, which like Marxist-based terrorism is intrinsically 
revolutionary but more destructive and less discriminate, although less violent than religiously 
motivated groups. Crenshaw (1990) attributes these differences to ENS organizations appealing 
broadly along ethnic lines that helps compensate for indiscriminate aggression, whereas leftists 
relying solely on ideology have to calculate attacks carefully to avoid turning a populace against 
them. Rightwing terrorism, to the contrary, tends to be the least discriminate, which Hoffman 
(1998; 1995) argues operates outside dominant political or cultural paradigms and is uninterested 
in political or social change, striving only to annihilate a perceived ‘ungodly’ enemy. Therefore, 
religious-based terrorism appeals only to those sharing a narrow and extreme ideology, although 
in some cases ENS terrorists also integrate leftist or rightwing ideologies into their movement, 
and as a result exhibit the characteristics common to those beliefs. Furthermore, ENS terrorism 
includes organizations that tend to be the longest lasting and most successful. Most have roots in 
the post World War II anti-colonial movements and became commonplace in Europe during the 
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Cold War, where especially since the 1960s, Europe has remained among the hottest regions for 
terrorist activity (White, 2002; Hoffman, 1998). 
Terrorism in its modern sense has plagued Europe for generations. Pluchinsky (1982) 
writes that since the 1970s, Europe has been “the most active terrorist environment in the world,” 
where Alexander and Myer (1982) note over 200 terrorist organizations have emerged (pp. 68-
9). This neoteric concept of terrorism first arose from the ashes of the French Revolution when 
the regime de la terreur used brutal tactics for maintaining order in the early postwar era. In its 
beginning, the term terrorism had a positive connotation but quickly became synonymous as an 
instrument of torment (Hoffman, 1998). Its meaning later evolved into a method of rebellion in 
Italy during the 1870s as an early theory, propaganda by deed, linked it to anarchy, which Errico 
Malatesta and Carlo Cafiero developed by arguing how direct and aggressive action could bring 
awareness to a struggle. Malatesta and Cafiero promoted developing movements by educating 
masses, and advocated violence as the most effective and efficient mode of communication, ideal 
for affecting change. They subsequently brought their theory to fruition by inciting a riot in 1877 
(Hoffman, 1998; Fleming, 1982). Terrorism again became prominent during the Russian 
Revolution, which redefined it as a tactic for waging violent resistance without open conflict. 
Narodnaya Volya, the People’s Will, was the first to implement Malatesta and Cafiero’s 
propagandist principles, showing that direct action by dispersing information could formulate a 
movement of rebellion (White, 2002; Hoffman, 1998; Fleming, 1982). From that period the 
meaning of terrorism gradually evolved. The assassinations of Tsar Alexander II in Russia and 
Cavendish and Thomas Burke in Ireland further connected terrorism to revolutionist ideology. 
Meanwhile, events over time shifted the perceptions of terrorists from anarchistic and expecting 
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severe repercussions to those of heroic protagonists forced to use violence, and for whom 
punishment would be viewed as unjust (Laqueur, 1999; Hoffman, 1998).  
The origins of ENS terrorism are also considered to have begun in Europe and radiated 
outward through colonialism and, in its development, gained traction as a contemporary tactic of 
resistance. Several European groups including Armenians, Basques, Irish, Kurds, Macedonians, 
and Serbs have used terrorism to pursue national independence in regions where its origins stem 
back generations (Alexander & Meyer, 1982). The Armenians in Turkey and the Inner 
Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) in Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia were 
implementing these tactics as early as the 1880s, while parts of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) 
date back to 1789, following Wolfe Tone’s rebellion (Hoffman, 1998; Crenshaw, 1990). The 
surge of ENS terrorism ceased, however, during both World Wars, while terrorism in the late 
nineteenth century primarily espoused Marxism and after World War I, shifted to rightwing 
movements (Laqueur, 1999; Alexander & Meyer, 1982). Then, ENS terrorism began to resurge 
in the 1940s with anti-colonial revolts around the world that used radical tactics to gain 
independence and international awareness (Hoffman, 1998). Concepts of terrorism burgeoned 
amid marginalized ethnic populations worldwide who saw advantages in clandestine resistance. 
This momentum derived from technological advances and national events such as the birth of 
Israel in 1948 (Laqueur, 1999; Alexander & Meyer, 1982). Though many had Marxist roots, 
which provided an alternative belief system, these movements were not fundamentally grounded 
in communist ideology. Rather, terrorism involves the rejection of mainstream structures and 
ideology, and this was an era confronting Western dominance. Foremost, however, these 
movements structured themselves around ethnic identity and separatism, and eventually 
nationalism grew as their dominant ideology such that by the 1950s, these organizations were 
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almost entirely nationalist based. These movements emerged across the world with notorious 
organizations beginning in Israel, Algeria, and Spain in the 1950s, were revitalized in Ireland in 
the 1960s, erupted in Turkey in the 1970s, and since have continued to upsurge especially as 
Marxist terrorism has declined (Laqueur, 1999; Crenshaw, 1990; Pluchinsky, 1982; Alexander & 
Meyer, 1982). 
In all, the subject of ENS terrorism presents an important topic. ENS terrorism occurs 
worldwide, and transpires under a variety of economic, political, and social systems. Although a 
universal explanation of terrorism may not exist, the task of studying the various forms of 
terrorism, and the conditions in which they occur, may lead to a better understanding of the 
background conditions common to these specific forms. The intent of this study is to strengthen 
the understanding of ENS terrorism by blending literature on nationalist and terrorist movements 
to identify theoretical concepts and measure their significance in relation to the development of 
these organizations. The first chapter provides a discussion of contemporary nationalist and 
terrorist theories. The second chapter discusses the case of ENS terrorism in Spain from an 
historical context, which the literature provides a framework for interpreting and understanding 
how to apply the theoretical concepts. The third chapter operationalizes these concepts in order 
to perform a logit regression assessing the relationship between the background conditions and 
development of ENS terrorist organizations. The final section discusses the overall significance 
of this study, identifies weaknesses, and provides suggestions for future research.  
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Chapter I 
Literature Review 
There are a variety of theories covering nationalism and terrorism, some note patterns that occur 
as reformist groups intensify in aggression, although few address the transitions to terrorism that 
occur within ENS movements. One theory, Gramsci’s war of positions, contends that opposition 
networks develop in areas with conflicting hegemonic beliefs and implacable self-interests, with 
terrorism occurring as contentious beliefs conflict with mainstream descriptions of reality. This 
conflict involves at least one sect feeling victimized while an opposition network exists that is 
able to offer those affected an alternative reality. When that network is unable to bring about 
alternative structures through peaceful measures, and perceives no alternative method for 
affecting change, it resorts to terrorism (Lustick, 1993). Laqueur (1999) finds this is especially 
true of ethno/nationalist groups. Pluchinsky (1982) also observes these groups flourishing in 
areas ripe with high levels of unemployment and inflation, stagnant educational sectors, weak 
judicial and legal systems, entrenched ethnic or religious divisions, or other factionalized 
partisanships, in which failed attempts at peaceful political solutions often contribute to 
radicalization. What is missing, however, is a description of how these conditions influence the 
conversions from nonviolence to terrorism, which the examination of literature on this topic 
provides an approach for analyzing. 
Theories of Nationalism 
Theories of nationalism are important to consider when studying ENS terrorism. 
Nationalist ideology is the foundation upon which ENS terrorist campaigns emerge. Though only 
a portion of nationalist movements transcend into terrorist organizations, theories of nationalism 
have identified several common characteristics regarding both the development of nationalist 
 
8 
movements and nationalist-based aggression. Those conditions influencing nationalist sentiment 
may also play decisive roles in the formation of ENS terrorist organizations or the decisions of 
nationalist movements to initiate terrorism. Therefore, nationalist theory may assist in identifying 
some of the stimuli encouraging the use of terrorism or assist in identifying which populations 
are most vulnerable to producing terrorist campaigns.  
Several theories attempt to explain nationalist movements, which in their most basic form 
involve a social political force, nostalgia for returning to a golden age, and three themes: 
“autonomy, unity, [and] identity” (Muro, 2005; Beiner, 1999; Smith & Hutchinson, 1994, p. 5). 
Also inherent in nationalist theories are cultural symbols with the potential to elicit strong 
emotional responses. Most of these theories concur that manipulating these symbols can affect 
nationalist sentiment and therefore play a key role in nationalist movements. Another common 
aspect is that most of these theories rely on a constructivist or biological explanation, or a 
combination of both evolutionary and structural forces influencing nationalist movements, while 
differing over assumptions of the age of nationalism, and its internal ‘psychological’ and external 
‘environmental’ triggers. Researchers often arrange these theories based on those paradigmatic 
variances, classifying them as either primordialist or modernist. Primordialism treats nationalism 
as enduring, with increasing trends to study its evolutionary and psychological components. 
Modernism instead limits the age of nationalism to the formation of nation-states, and relies on 
constructivist explanations that coincide with structural changes. A third method, 
ethnosymbolism, provides a theoretical bridge that combines aspects of both primordialist and 
modernist theories for explaining a long-existing phenomenon while rejecting notions of innate 
symbolic value. 
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Primordialism 
Primordialists share the view that nationalism is an archaic human trait, but diverge over 
assumptions about internal behavioral mechanisms. Researchers in this field study the long-held 
values that individuals and groups place on kinship, collective identity, and other symbols of 
identity, to suggest that behaviors inherent to nationalism are a continuation of an enduring 
human practice. They consider nationalism a normative part of the human experience in which 
its common traits, such as preferred kinship and quick aversion for unfamiliar persons, have 
remained universal communal characteristics for innumerable generations, which makes it a 
worldwide-antiquated heritable phenomenon. Essentially, arguing that nationalism has existed 
since or before the dawn of man, while the creation of nation-states merely extended its context 
and application. The extent to which these perspectives fluctuate draws from diverging cultural 
or evolutionary views. Although each is anthropological, culturalists focus on socially inherited 
dimensions of behavior, whereas evolutionists try to determine which aspects of behavior are 
socially learned and which are genealogical. While each approach views perception as key to 
explaining social interaction, evolutionists attempt to extend the understanding beyond structural 
components to include the internal mechanisms that make perception vital.  
Ozkirimli (2000) identifies Clifford Geertz and Pierre L. Van Den Berghe as influential 
scholars of primordialism. Geertz (1995), a culturalist, advocates studying behavior by focusing 
on intricate situational details, arguing how symbols of identity are not only multidimensional 
but vary among cultures and individuals within a culture. For that reason, analyses should 
involve thick descriptions that provide a holistic method for exposing deep roots of case specific 
stimuli, which facilitates retracing the perennial aspects of culture and behavior. Van Den 
Berghe (1987) in contrast, is a sociobiologist, who addresses the psychological mechanisms of 
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nationalism. Van Den Berghe (1987) relies on genetic, ecological, and cultural reasoning to 
argue that engineered behaviors for kin selection, reciprocity, and coercion contribute to all 
human interaction. From this view, organisms are vehicles for gene replication wherein 
evolutionary processes created survival instincts that influence interaction and reproduction with 
those perceived as genetic matches, with nationalism being coercion disguised as kinship. 
Modernism 
Modernism, in contrast, views nationalism as predominately induced by environment and 
a more recent human development. Ozkirimli (2000) writes that most scholars in this field follow 
one of three transformationist paradigms: economic, social-cultural, or political. Accordingly, the 
economic approach focuses on industrial changes, while social-culturalists view nationalism as a 
byproduct of maturing industrial societies, the latter viewing it as the result of evolving political 
structures. Each approach is highly constructivist with frameworks assuming that the creation of 
nation-states produced nationalism, with a consensus that its primary causes were the mass labor 
migrations during the Industrial Revolution and state consolidation. These factors contributed by 
establishing common identities within territories, from which recognizable symbols of national 
identity could elicit sentimental attachments to those regions. Statehood, in effect, produced 
preferred kinships through influencing a heightened sense of fear and antipathy for outsiders, 
wherein us-versus-them mentalities consolidate nationalist movements, making modernism a 
neoteric and outwardly produced response. 
John Breuilly and Eric J. Hobsbawm are both proponents of political modernism who 
find economic and political changes to be the underlying causes of nationalist movements during 
the mid-twentieth century. Breuilly (1982) argues that prior to this period the general populace of 
Europe was neither political nor nationalist. Their issues were unimportant politically and 
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therefore many felt unattached to national frameworks within their homelands. Then, tremendous 
changes during the Industrial Revolution altered political landscapes. Rivalries over economic 
power and world primacy led nations to consolidate, worsening xenophobia. Breuilly (1982) 
finds national identity becoming more widespread as states became better established, and finally 
becoming a normal characteristic of nations and an exploitable political tool. In Europe, 
nationalism incessantly fueled aggression, and during the World War interim period, Hobsbawm 
(1994) argues how previously impotent nationalist groups ascended to power, filling the vacuum 
left by collapsed regimes by inciting fear against those who did not belong to a narrowly defined 
nationality. Subsequently, attributing the rise of Naziism to uniting a collective identity based on 
an aggravated mistrust of non-ethnic Germans and ethnic Germans perceived as different.  
Ethnosymbolism 
Ethnosymbolism observes multidimensional and evolving symbols playing essential roles 
in defining identity throughout history. Distinct from the other two paradigms, ethnosymbolism 
is in-and-of-itself a theory, which Hale (2004) and Ozkirimli (2000) describe as a fusion of 
primordialism and modernism. Like primordialism, this approach illustrates the importance of 
enduring symbolic values and studies their historical relevancies not limited to abrupt changes 
within a specific chronological domain. At the same time, it emphasizes how people must ascribe 
values to those symbols if they are to influence perception. Consequently, it emphasizes the 
importance of perennial symbols while acknowledging how their interpretations change (Hale, 
2004). Therefore, Ozkirimli (2000) describes ethnosymbolism as a decidedly constructivist 
approach, which portrays culture as having ancient and enduring qualities, with symbols whose 
definitions constantly change and perpetually influence identity.  
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Hale (2004) and Ozkirimli (2004) credit Anthony D. Smith for developing the ethno-
symbolist model. According to Smith (2003), national identity derives from the perpetual 
reinterpretation “of values, symbols, memories, myths, and traditions,” with nationalism being a 
collective phenomenon of those sharing these traits (pp. 24-5). In addition, Smith (2003) argues 
how cultural symbols, some from antiquity, pass down through generations and continue 
influencing perception. Using religion to illustrate an ancient perennial symbol that established 
frameworks for national identity, Smith (2003) describes how Christianity united ancient 
civilizations and laid the foundations for modern Armenia, Ethiopia, and Russia. Like statehood, 
Smith (2003) argues, religion has unifying qualities that gave historically religious societies the 
equivalence of a national identity pre-nation-state. In earlier work, Smith (1994) also argues how 
ethnic identity existed prior to the Industrial Revolution by illustrating how each period of 
enlightenment gave credence to cultural symbols, which spread a sense of racial identity and 
created symbolic heirlooms that continued reinforcing ethnicity throughout generations.  
While observing a perpetual and reciprocal relationship between symbolism and cultural 
identity, ethnosymbolism also holds that the propensity of a symbol to influence identity depends 
on the interpretations of its value. As such, strong symbolic attachments might be less common 
in ethnically diverse populations having a vast assortment of insignificant symbols, while Smith 
(1991) considers ethnically exclusive groups, like the Basque, to be exceptionally sensitive to 
threats against their national identity. Smith (1991) argues how groups with notably close ethnic 
ties are more likely to share heritable traits, like gastronomy, language, and folklore. The close 
proximity of the population sharing culturally significant traits teaches and encourages members 
to place certain sentimental values in them, which shows how learning to recognize and 
appreciate values is necessary for symbols to have effective potential. 
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Theories of Terrorism 
Contemporary views on terrorism vie between strategic and psychological explanations 
of its origins. Although each of these models focuses on several components of terrorism, and 
views these organizations as being, to a certain extent, homogenous to one another, they disagree 
on many of the underlying factors that lead an organization to commit violent acts. Much of this 
dispute derives from strategic logic’s emphasis on rational choice by organizations that behave 
as single entities. While psychological theory likewise considers these organizations as being in-
and-of-themselves monolithic, it also focuses on individuals within each organization, especially 
the role they play during its development phase. The following offers a discussion about these 
methods for studying terrorism, and how they may contribute to understanding the forces behind 
nationalist/separatist-based campaigns. 
Psychology 
The psychological model views terrorism as the result of emotional responses. Terrorism, 
according to Sprinzak (1990), derives from a psycho-political process of delegitimation. One 
scholar commonly identified with this approach, Jerrold M. Post, argues that, “Individuals are 
drawn to . . . terrorism in order to commit acts of violence,” which is the effect of psychological 
factors (p. 25). This occurs when external forces affect the psychological frameworks of 
individuals that causes trauma and predisposes them to aggression. Terrorist organizations 
disproportionately attract these individuals, giving groups a high ratio of members with fractured 
identities who seek stimuli through action, are aggressive, and compelled to commit violence. By 
joining these organizations, such individuals gain a sense of belonging that helps to heal 
emotional damage, while their tendencies toward violence lead them to use groups for payback, 
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influencing groups to seek vengeance against those blamed for causing their psychosomatic 
trauma, and having an overpowering influence that increases the aggressive nature of the group. 
Several authors have written about the psychological traits of terrorists, and how these 
traits may provide explanations for terrorism. The psychological model identifies similar 
behavioral and emotional traits that contribute to a predisposition to joining a terrorist group. 
According to Post (1990), terrorist organizations attract a disproportionately high number of 
individuals with troubled pasts, emotional disorders, or psychological damage. Implicitly, the 
potential terrorist lacks a well-developed sense of self and feels fundamentally detached from 
society. Gibson (1994) depicts many terrorists as perceiving themselves as rogue warriors who 
view terrorism as a necessity, while Ross (1999) portrays the terrorist type as being anxious, 
thrill seeking, culpable, depressed, antisocial, narcissistic, and lost, and argues that continual 
demonstration of such behavioral traits contributes towards the likelihood of becoming a 
terrorist. Likewise, Post (1990) describes many terrorists as victims of severe adolescent trauma, 
belonging to dysfunctional families, being educational or vocational failures, and social outcasts. 
To illustrate, Post (1990) highlights reports by members of the Red Army Faction (RAF) and 2 
June Movement, showing how most of these members had divorced parents and unfavorable 
paternal relationships. Another example notes the high ratio of mixed Spanish/Basque ancestry 
among members of ETA, indicating individuals possibly having difficulty identifying with or 
being accepted by either culture, and thus lacking a strong sense of personal identity. 
Vital to this theory is the effect that environment has on individual growth. Many cases 
point to social detachment facilitating radicalization. Post (1990) and Cook (1982) both illustrate 
several instances of individuals living outside mainstream culture for substantial periods before 
becoming terrorists. In essence, they believe that enmeshment in counterculturalism can diminish 
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normative values or foster new ones, facilitate unrealistic unidimensional views, and decrease 
inhibitions for using violence. For some, the cultures in which they were raised are in-and-of-
themselves peripheral to society. For example, simply living under Francoism made Basque 
identity countercultural (Shabad & Llera Ramo, 1995). Subcultures might also emerge from 
shifting environmental conditions. Cook (1982) contends that living in a newly democratic post-
fascist Germany prejudiced views of injustice and led to a countercultural subculture in the 
1960s when German youth experienced a barrage of new concepts emphasizing rebellion that 
evolved from protest movements in the United States. These dynamics inspired a heightened 
sense of moral justice and aversion to Germany’s recent political past. Ultimately, however, 
financial security allowing excess in adolescent indulgence and political activism, along with 
inabilities to cope with new social pressures or identify with their own political system, brought 
about adverse views of society and skewed perceptions of reality, eventually leading to the 
formation of the Red Army Faction (RAF). 
Also important is that some who join terrorist organizations do so due to an emotional 
need. According to the psychological model, people seek out groups for healing psychological 
fragmentation caused by experiencing severe emotional trauma early in life and later emerging 
as a severe psychotic disorder. Post (1990) asserts that narcissism is a frequent terrorist trait, 
describing the commonly observed symptoms of splitting and externalization, which involve 
projecting inner weaknesses onto others, making them the targets of unsettled inadequacies. 
Cook (1982) adds that long held mistrust of society erodes standard reactions to stimuli, and that 
groups provide new normative guidance and identity. In Post’s (1990) view, groups are 
therapeutic; they offer a sense of belonging and a means for acting out aggression, while those 
who lack an adequate personal identity compensate by adopting a collective identity. The group 
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identity provides a platform for redressing grievances. Their enemies become the manifestation 
of the group’s inner emotional flaws. Groups also institute a sense of identity by establishing 
strict moral codes and enforcing homogeneity. They assume a sense of infallibility, and make it 
unacceptable to challenge beliefs. Pressure to conform compels submission to extreme views, 
while fears of isolation or retribution sustain cohesion. 
Within groups, Post (1990) asserts that the already high proportion of psychologically 
damaged members have considerable influence over group dynamics. Such mentalities become 
the group mindset, and gradually move the collective group from a nonviolent phase of 
antisocialism to a phase conducive to terrorism. Sprinzak (1990) details how this process led the 
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), which committed itself to nonviolence, to become the 
Weathermen within a decade. Sprinzak (1990) describes the stages as moving from a crisis of 
confidence, to a conflict of legitimacy, to a crisis of legitimacy. In the initial stages, low-level 
nonviolent ideological struggles exist, but once passive tactics for effecting change prove 
ineffective, the struggle begins employing greater levels of violence. Justification derives from 
believing that existing systems are corrupt and repressive, and that the group is able to provide a 
superior alternative. Also included in this process are the unhealed fractured identities, which 
progressively turn into stronger shows of narcissism and violence. Ross (1990) claims that 
groups reinforce these negative traits and teach ways to increase violence, until eventually, these 
traits define the group’s identity. At which point, Post (1990) argues members develop a sense of 
invulnerability and superior morality, while viewing their enemies as unidimensional. Moreover, 
Post (1990) finds these characteristics pressuring conformity and the use of violence, while 
Sprinzak (1990) finds the process of delegitimizing social norms to produce, what he terms, 
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“antinomian weltanschauung[s],” meaning they discard conventional morality while holding a 
black and white worldview, which ultimately creates the pathway to terrorism (p. 83). 
The psychological theory considers terrorism a group choice, typically following failed 
peaceful attempts to produce political or ideological reform, and where no conceivable substitute 
exists (Sprinzak, 1990). Consequently, the decision by groups to use terrorism derives from the 
perception that terrorism is their only option. Cooper (1997) calls this the doctrine of necessity in 
which groups share a belief that terrorism is the only effective means for pursuing their goals and 
therefore commit these acts believing they must. As Ross (1999) notes, many groups view it as 
the most effective and efficient means to pursue their interests. It justifies their existence while 
providing a sense of higher purpose, which Post (1990) discusses as the inevitable path to 
becoming irreversible monoliths. By illustrating ETA’s continued unwillingness to disarm after 
achieving substantial political gains, Post (1990) argues that the ultimate purpose of these groups 
is to commit terrorism. Violence gives the members of the organization self-worth and validates 
their continuation, while success threatens their survival. For this reason, Post (1990) believes 
that a terrorist organization will resist surrendering willingly or completely, essentially making 
terrorism a self-perpetuating necessity. 
Strategic Logic 
The strategic model describes terrorism as a calculated choice by organizations following 
a rational decision-making process. It focuses primarily on group logic instead of individual 
dynamics by viewing the organization as homogenously ideological and negating individualism. 
The scholars identified with this approach include Martha Crenshaw, Bruce Hoffman, and 
Walter Laqueur. Crenshaw (1990) argues that a terrorist organization collectively decides to 
commit terrorism and justifies its aggression by using an intra-group rationality. This is 
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demonstrated in deliberations that include a group’s ideology versus the proportion of the 
population sharing similar views, and the degree and potential effectiveness of attacks. However, 
while viewing these organizations as having a single identity, this model also considers them 
distinct, adept, logical, and deliberate. It applies a broad analysis that includes all forms of 
terrorism while providing a paradigm for identifying specific information about each case and 
integrating other theories into the analysis. In addition, because it offers a universal approach for 
studying terrorism, Crenshaw (1990) advocates this method as being the ideal framework for 
research in this field.  
The strategic method observes a logical process in the lengthy and divisive development 
of a terrorist organization. This process typically begins with passive opposition movements that 
over time become more aggressive. According to Crenshaw (1990), the initial decision by a 
group to use terrorism tends to follow the protracted buildup of experiences. It entails learning 
from current circumstances and past failures. As Hoffman (1998) notes, people grow weary of 
ineffective nonviolent methods and turn to terrorism because of its potential to manifest quicker 
results. Clark (1984) illustrates this progression in describing ETA’s development, which began 
as Ekin, “To do,” having roots with remnants of Euzko Ikasle Alkartuna (EIA), the “Society of 
Basque Students, and along with members of Euzko Gaztedi del Interior (EGI), the “Basque 
Revolutionary Youth,” whom both parted from the Partido Nacionalisto Vasco (PNV), the 
“Basque Nationalist Party,” primarily over the dispute whether to use active resistance. As 
Crenshaw (1990) observes, the decision to use terrorism is a divisive issue capable of 
destabilizing groups or factionalizing members. Accordingly, some members might view it as an 
only option while others might worry about it being counterproductive or too elitist, as some 
theories contend that mass participation is necessary to keep people actively engaged. When 
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movements do become more violent, the strategic model views this as adjusting tactics from the 
standpoint that organizations are being altered while members vie to employ more efficient and 
effective strategies.  
Therefore, strategic logic does not view terrorism as a precipitous act, but as a strategy 
for acquiring notoriety, gains, and resources that involves ideal moments and precise planning in 
order to limit the costs to the group while maximizing their results. These calculations for using 
terrorism are an important part of the strategic model. Terrorism, according to Crenshaw (1990), 
is often a “response to opportunity” where the decisions to commit terrorism involve not only 
previously failed strategies but also seizing opportune moments (p. 16). A key factor, Lustick 
(1993) claims, is whether a group feels an urgency to act under repressive conditions, especially 
if they sense regime vulnerability, which Crenshaw (1990) argues is important for several 
reasons. Chiefly, despotic conditions create time constraints to act. Groups need favorable 
moments where systems are vulnerable, making it possible to win quick support. Especially in 
authoritarian states, where accurate assessments of popular support are difficult to gauge, but 
latent underground support could exist; a group might act hoping to create revolutionary 
conditions and elicit a following. Furthermore, a group might act believing their actions will 
inspire future movements, an aspect that Crenshaw (1990) considers a long-term strategy of 
terrorism.  
Another aspect of strategic logic underlies the dynamics involved in the initial decisions 
to initiate terrorism. According to Crenshaw (1990), the conditions under which terrorism tends 
to occur indicate a sense of logic, which Reinares and Jaime-Jeménez (2000) find to involve 
circumstances that open doors to unease and unrest, including economic crisis, liberalization, or 
frustration felt as one segment of society threatens another segment’s idealist expectations for 
 
20 
society and government. In these situations, Crenshaw (1990) argues that some want to act but 
lack capability. Laws might ban organizing politically, or extreme views lack broad support. 
Whichever the case, groups are more likely to use terrorism when they cannot realize their goals 
peacefully, and are unable to rally forces sufficient for open confrontation. The case of the 
Weathermen illustrates this point. Sprinzak (1990) writes that the Weathermen had wanted to 
create a revolution in the United States, but their extreme ideology made them highly selective 
over membership, and as a result, the group never had more than four hundred members, and 
eventually sought to deliver their campaign through terrorism. This decision Crenshaw (1990) 
describes as the last in a succession of options, and often a weapon of the weak for small groups 
to compensate for their lack of force. Meanwhile, the media magnified violence endows them 
with greater authority, forcing others to take them more seriously than they might have done 
otherwise. 
The strategic model also holds that organizations consider the costs and benefits of using 
terrorism. Crenshaw (1990) argues that terrorist organizations use a logical process of gauging 
terrorism based on its potential effectiveness. One of the objectives is to provoke overreactions, 
which Laqueur (1999) calls a strategy of provocation where terrorists hope to further their cause 
and gain support by revealing governments as either ineffective or unjust. Several examples 
demonstrate terrorist organizations applying this logical analysis, which is especially common 
among ethno/nationalists and was ETA’s action-repression-spiral theory (Clark, 1984). Hoffman 
(1998) and Laqueur (1999) also describe the IRA as masters of using this logic to employ precise 
levels of aggression. According to Laqueur (1999), though the IRA was capable of massive 
violence, they routinely launched carefully directed and small-scale attacks to prevent estranging 
popular support. In addition, even acts foreseeable as destabilizing to terrorist organizations can 
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be a deliberate part of strategy. Sandler and Enders (2007) write how the September 11 attacks, 
which cost upwards of $100 billion, had the potential to cripple western market stability, which 
outweighed the potential damages to Al-Qaeda. 
The strategic model also highlights the ability of terrorists to estimate responsive impacts. 
When it comes to terrorism, governments and terrorists alike must consider the outcomes of their 
actions. If governments respond inadequately to a terrorist attack, the lack of security puts people 
at risk and demonstrates an inability to respond to social threats. However, overreactions that 
institute repressive conditions risk eroding popular support and validating the terrorist’s position, 
giving the terrorist organization considerable power and influence. Even still, responding too 
severely can diminish the terrorist organization’s support base. Much of this, Crenshaw (1990) 
argues, involves a population’s ability to endure “insecurity and repression” (p. 19). Laqueur 
(1999) provides the examples of leftists in Venezuela and the M-19 in Columbia, who 
overestimated their support and acted too aggressively, turning public sentiment against them. 
Furthermore, Rimanelli (1992) describes how the Red Brigade (BR) in Italy not only 
miscalculated its support base and the effects of improved industrial conditions, but also lacked 
foresight of historical and ideological trends, while being naïve as to the role of the US and 
Italy’s geopolitical importance during the Cold War. These cases illustrate the awareness needed 
for a terrorist organization to survive. For organizations to endure, it is essential to recognize 
beforehand not only how attacks will directly affect their targets, but also how governments will 
respond and how those responses will affect their organization.  
These calculations for ensuring longevity are a vital part of the strategic model. Although 
this model considers the adoption of terrorism initially based on its potential to foster immediate 
results, the majority of terrorist organizations do not achieve their primary goals right away. 
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Therefore, success rests not only on an ability to enact initial tactics, but also on the capacity to 
consolidate movements and develop long-term strategies for attaining incremental changes, 
which Rimanelli (1992) argues hinges on the ability to acquire communication outlets, new 
technologies, intra-group and transnational relationships, immunity abroad, and sponsorship. 
Crenshaw (1990) adds that organizations must also develop underground networks that can 
withstand nearly all repercussions. Fortifying movements, however, is a time consuming and 
difficult task. Crenshaw (1990) describes the Shining Path in Peru spending a decade developing 
itself clandestinely before its first attack. Meanwhile, Clark (1984) describes how the ferocity 
with which EIA was dismantled left an impression about the importance of covertness with the 
founders of ETA. As a result, ETA created a complex network, and took advantage of the 
Spanish/French border; where for years safe haven and immunity in France enabled ETA to 
survive against unrelenting Spanish persecution.  
Analyzing the Literature 
The following is an analysis of the theories for nationalism and terrorism that offers a critique for 
where they assist in explaining the causes of ENS terrorism or lack general applicability. While 
none of these theories exhaustively explains the causes of terrorism, each model provides a 
useful perspective for studying the origins of ENS terrorist movements. The nationalist approach 
indicates that populations with distinct histories are more culturally sensitive, and tend to react 
more strongly to threats against their cultural identity. Psychology, although failing to distinguish 
between terrorist organizations sufficiently based on their overall goals, recognizes an emotional 
component of terrorism, which provides a method for assessing areas unaddressed by strategic 
logic, such as emotional contributions to the decision to initiate terrorism, or factors influencing 
individuals to join terrorist organizations. Strategic logic, while predominately focusing on active 
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terrorist organizations, also offers the perspective that group behavior is calculated and evolving. 
Although each of these theories approaches this subject with a unique perspective, several of 
their principles are compatible with one another and collectively create a paradigm for analyzing 
ENS movements.  
Analyzing Theories of Nationalism 
The theories for nationalism contribute to the study of ENS terrorism by observing 
precise components of nationalist-based violence. Because nationalist movements are precursors 
to nationalist-separatist terrorism, forces leading to nationalist movements conceivably also play 
causational roles in the creation of ENS terrorist campaigns. While many terrorist organizations 
share similar characteristics, including a high ratio of males and roots in nonviolent oppositionist 
movements, motivations for opposition can vary. For nationalists, territorial claims often lie at 
the heart of conflicts. Inherently, this involves nostalgia for returning to a golden age that 
represents a utopian era of national unity and territorial sovereignty. Though the Roma never had 
a golden age in Spain, the Basque and Catalan did. These were the Kingdom of Navarre and the 
Catalan-Aragón Empire. These historic territories are central in defining Basque and Catalan 
national identity, with members from both populations referencing those eras to describe a once 
proud and independent people. Because ancestral land provides a platform for rhetoric that gives 
solidity to nationalist movements and influences aggression, it may also play a fundamental role 
in ENS terrorism. In addition to the potential significance that territory may have regarding these 
campaigns, the approaches to studying nationalism also provide intimations about several other 
possible forces behind ENS terrorism.  
Primordialism and psychology share the assumption that an emotional component links 
aggression to radicalism. Evolutionary psychology especially assumes that internal mechanisms 
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contribute to social attachments that manifest as collective identities deriving from evolutionary 
processes engineering survivalism in the human psyche (McKinnon, & Silverman, 2005; Van 
Den Berghe, 1987). Evolutionary psychologists attribute nationalist movements to an insecurity 
exhibited as aggression anchored in these survival instincts. Evolutionary and psychological 
theorists agree that nationalist movements form as increasing levels of fear influence the 
formation of protective layers of familiarity. Hale (2004) describes, “deeply rooted psychological 
mechanisms” dictating this development, which function as social navigators, constantly altered 
and conditioned by the environment, and therefore they are easily manipulable and instrumental 
in proliferating fears that incite nationalism (p. 481). These assumptions seem compatible with 
observations of both nationalism and terrorism, and correlate with Post’s (1990) argument that 
environments affect individuals psychologically, leading them to seek out groups for emotional 
comfort. They also share the view that aggression is a behavioral proclivity that contributes to a 
nationalist movement’s collective hostility. The difference is the extent to which individuals are 
considered inclined to aggression. Primordialists consider nearly all prone to violence without a 
prerequisite of prior psychological damage. Frans De Waal (1989), for example, finds aggression 
to be a heritable and situationally induced reaction, common to all primates thus existing before 
man, while Post (1990) sets a specific parameter wherefore terrorism results from psychological 
fragmentation.  
Modernism and ethnosymbolism emphasize the plasticity of perception, highlighting how 
changes in the industrial era influenced perception and drew together social collectives as nation-
states, defining the context of modern ENS movements. In fact, many trace the origins of Basque 
nationalism to the nineteenth century and the Carlist Wars, an era which Kurlansky (1999) 
describes as Basque on Basque warfare (Muro, 2005; Muro & Quiroga, 2005; Garmendia, 1985; 
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Clark, 1979). Garmendia (1985) describes how Basque nationalism emerged as Carlists 
emphasized a Basque golden age, while promising a return to it. Shabad and Llera Ramo (1995) 
write how economic changes as early as the 1890s led to strong nationalism within traditional 
Basque society, while drastic population shifts, along with high unemployment rates, mostly 
among the youth, during the twentieth century strengthened its fervency and attracted segments 
to extremist movements. Conclusively, this period affected Basque nationalism in a way that 
directly influences movements today. It commenced a chain of events that sit at the core beliefs 
of modern Basque terrorism, but not necessarily marking the birth of Basque national identity.  
The divergence of ethnosymbolism from modernism allows for observing nationalist 
roots beyond the corridors of the industrial age. This perspective helps to explain how historical 
progressions contributed to modern day movements. The conclusion that Christianity laid the 
foundation for Armenia, Ethiopia, and Russia, also applies to Spain, which united under 
Christianity during the Inquisition. Furthermore, Smith’s emphasis on symbolisms explains why 
Spaniards, united by Christianity, remained divided. Spain has an unusual terrain, and even 
within the Basque region, solitude gave rise to seven dialects of Euskera (Kurlansky, 1999). 
Basque ethnicity, defined by Euskera, the Basque language, is archaic, and ethnosymbolism 
implies that this symbol while not constantly uniting Basques, has consistently defined cultural 
exclusivity for innumerable generations. Catalan, however, is Latin-based, suggesting shared 
ancestral roots with other Spaniards, and in the case of the Roma, the Roma do not inscribe nor 
elicit the same symbolic values with Romani as the Basques are observed doing with Euskera. 
While notably distinct from Castilian, Romani is rare in Spain, with Caló, the Roma language in 
Spain, essentially being a form of improper Castilian. Euskera, to the contrary, delineates Basque 
identity. This distinction influences reluctance among Basques to recognize a shared ancestry 
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with other populations and explains why ETA views Euskera as key to uniting Euskadi as a 
decisively non-Spanish nation (Clark, 1984).  
Analyzing Theories of Terrorism 
Although psychology and strategic logic disagree about the general purposes for using 
terrorist violence, these theories share assumptions that can be applied to the development of 
terrorist movements. Post (1990) recognizes that terrorist organizations use a logical decision-
making process to balance accomplishing levels of success in order to legitimize their existence, 
whereas Crenshaw (1990) and Hoffman (1998) agree that terrorism offers emotional benefits. 
Hoffman (1998) writes how “the desire for action can lead to an obsession with violence,” which 
along with notoriety becomes a necessary fix, encouraging self-aggrandizement and perpetuating 
desires for publicity (p. 175). According to Post (1990), the difference between these theories is 
the assumption that terrorism is a choice among alternatives. Strategic logic views terrorism as a 
decision based on its potential effectiveness, which Post (1990) refutes, arguing that the decision 
to use terrorism does not derive from a rational deliberation that weighs it against alternatives, 
since black and white world conceptions negate the ability for rational discernment. Instead, Post 
(1990) believes that terrorists view terrorism as their only choice, and an end in-and-of-itself, but 
not as a method for achieving political goals. However, despite these incompatible assumptions, 
it is possible to merge these theories in a way that contributes to this subject by describing an 
aspect of terrorism involving emotional reactions that influence rational calculations.  
Analyzing Psychology 
One weakness of the psychological model is its uniform view of terrorism. The argument 
that terrorist organizations exist solely to commit terrorism excludes consideration for the types 
of organizations committing it. In his article, Post (1990) frequently cites the Red Army Faction 
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(RAF) to illustrate terrorism’s psychological mechanisms, although Laqueur (1999) and Konrad 
(1990) portray this group as dysfunctional and atypical, describing its leadership as mentally 
unstable and the entire group as deeply troubled. The founders of the Baader-Meinhof Gang, the 
predecessor of RAF, Ulrike Meinhof and Andreas Baader, both had notable emotional damage. 
Meinhof, suffered a brain injury as a child, and Baader was a drug addict. Moreover, both 
committed suicide. While Konrad (1990) does agree that most terrorists “suffer from deep 
psychological trauma and act out what trauma whispers into their conscious minds,” he argues 
that, “the German case is unique” (pp. 43, 46). The history of Nazism had an unusual effect on 
the perceptions of German youth; an aspect unshared in many regions where terrorism occurs. 
Another commonly referenced group, the Weathermen, may also be an aberration. Laqueur 
(1999) depicts this group emerging from social unrest that radicalized naïve youth, who suffered 
an identity crisis and wanted excitement, but lacked a deep understanding of minority repression 
and economic hardship, or economics in general, and came to manifest the licentiousness that 
they condemned. Such examples, however, do not accurately depict every terrorist organization, 
and repeatedly referencing them demonstrates a selective analysis. As a result, the assumptions 
derived by Post may lack general applicability for all cases of terrorism.   
Thus, Post’s (1990) assertion that ETA will not freely disarm because it failed to do so 
after achieving substantial political gains ignores that ETA has yet to realize its overall goal of 
Basque independence. Nor has Madrid ever completely given into ETA’s minimum requirements 
for a ceasefire and negotiations, which ETA-militar announced in 1978 with its five-point 
Koordinadora Abertzale Sozialista (KAS) Alternative. This involved amnesty for all political 
prisoners; legitimating all political parties, even those supporting Basque independence; 
withdrawal of Spanish police and military forces from the Basque region; improved working and 
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living standards; and autonomy for Euskadi, with Euskera as the national language, law 
enforcement under the control of Basque authorities, and unconditional self-rule (Shabad & 
Llera Ramo, 1995; Clark, 1984). Some of these goals were less plausible, as granting sovereignty 
would require amending Article 2 of Spain’s Constitution, describing Spain as indissoluble 
(Cowans, 2003; Kurlansky, 1999). Other aspects were possible however, and in 1978, Madrid 
recognized both Euskal Iraultzale Alderdia (EIA), the “Basque Revolutionary Party,” which 
grew out of ETA-político-militar, and Herri Batasuna (HB), “Popular Unity,” which grew out of 
ETA-militar. Then in 1979, the Spanish Parliament approved Basque autonomy but not 
independence, while making Navarre a separate region, leading to contentiousness among 
Basque nationalists wanting to restore the entirety of the Navarrean Kingdom, including its 
French Provinces (Totoricaguena, 2004; Kurlansky, 1999). 
Because Madrid has not entirely given in to these minimal requirements for a ceasefire, 
and because País Vasco remains under Spanish jurisdiction, claims that ETA will never willingly 
disarm are premature, especially when cases of similar successful movements indicate otherwise. 
Hoffman (1998) writes how many such movements fail to obtain their primary goal of national 
independence while small gains maintain campaigns of attrition. Konrad (1990) concludes that, 
“any such people, so long as they hold on to their convictions, cannot be appeased by anyone or 
anything; nor can they be satisfied by any change in conditions—they will fight until they are 
killed or caught” (p. 50). Thus, if the ultimate goal is national sovereignty, then assessing groups 
based on lesser gains is inadequate for concluding such definitive statements. Moreover, several 
examples exist of groups using terrorism in struggles of decolonization and secessionism, and 
disbanding after liberation. According to Hoffman (1998), when the Japanese attacked western 
colonies in World War II, western rule appeared vulnerable and liberation seemed possible, 
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leading to violent and successful uprisings throughout the colonized world. Cases from Algeria 
and Israel during this period illustrate effective separatist terrorist campaigns that ceased after 
gaining national independence. When Israel became a state in 1948, not only did Jewish 
terrorism diminish, but also did members of the Stern Gang legitimately enter the political 
process, with Menachem Begin, a Stern Gang leader, becoming Prime Minister of Israel in 1977 
(Hoffman, 1998; Lustick, 1993). These cases expose the inaccuracy in claiming that all terrorist 
organizations are incapable of voluntarily disbanding, especially ENS movements where history 
shows terrorism being used as a means to an end. 
The flaw in the psychological model, therefore, is that it fails to discriminate between 
organizations based on their overall purpose. ENS terrorists may not use terrorism for the same 
reasons as do other types of organizations, and while parts of psychology, such as ideological 
reinforcement appear significant in the case of ETA, other aspects appear irrelevant. Ferracuti 
(1990), for instance, agrees that “belonging to a group and remaining isolated from society 
reinforces” ideology and motivations (p. 61). This might explain why ETA-militar killed 
Eduardo Moreno Bergarche, Portell, ETA’s political strategist, in 1978 after Portell attempted to 
open dialogue with Madrid (Clark, 1990). However, it is not necessarily the case that Portell was 
killed to maintain a never-ending perpetuation of violence. The overall goals of terrorists vary 
drastically. Some of these goals, such as territorial sovereignty, are more rational than are others. 
They also likely represent an organization’s ideology and membership. Plausible goals with a 
history of being achieved illustrate ENS organizations having a greater comprehension of reality 
than organizations that pursue unrealistic objectives. Despite nationalist and leftist groups 
sharing a revolutionist ideology, leftists tend to establish short-term anarchist goals without 
comprehensive post-struggle views (Hoffman 1998; 1995). For example, RAF sought the 
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destruction of Germany’s democracy (Konrad, 1990). The Weathermen wanted a revolution in 
the US (Sprinzak, 1990). 17 November wanted to cripple capitalism and western alliances in 
Greece, and the Red Brigade espoused communism during a period when industrial conditions 
benefited the economy and living standards in Italy (Corsun, 1992; Rimanelli, 1992).  
This narrow viewpoint of psychological theory weakens its potential to explain terrorism. 
For ENS terrorism, the only distinction offered by Post (1990) is a positive and loyal attachment 
to family. Although family loyalty is difficult to assess accurately, it seems improbable that all 
members of any organization share this trait, or the lack thereof. Laqueur (1999) more accurately 
argues that any terrorist profile at best depicts the members of a specific group, at a distinct place 
and time. Essentially, psychology appears too overreaching by setting such precise parameters 
for terrorist violence. Post (1990) assumes that anarchist, anticapitalist, nationalist, and religious 
campaigns each stem from individuals with violent proclivities caused by emotional disturbances 
in adolescence that draws them to groups for emotional security, while Porta’s (1995) research 
finds, as with most types of political participation, nearly everyone joining terrorist organizations 
has personal ties with others in the group. Therefore, the high proportion of etarras with Spanish-
Basque heritage, which Post (1990) interprets as individuals radicalizing after facing adversity 
from a marginal social status, could also imply individuals well acquainted with one another due 
to familiar familial ties and a shared mixed-heritage. Even organizations commonly cited as 
having shared psychological components, might not. According to Ferracuti (1990), no study has 
been able to indentify common psychopathological traits among German or Italian terrorists. 
Furthermore, Konrad (1990) points to the flexibility within RAF, and its incoherent post-struggle 
view, to illustrate organizations as less rigid, single-minded, ideologues than generally believed, 
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altogether making the claims made by Post (1990) appear too generalized and unfitting for many 
cases of terrorism.  
Analyzing Strategic Logic 
The strategic model views terrorist organizations as a reactive, single entity, and although 
much of its focus is on active organizations, it contains concepts potentially applicable to the 
origins of movements. This approach views terrorism as reactive with traceable relationships 
between background conditions and episodes of terrorism. Strategic logic is also flexible for 
integrating a psychological component into this theory, which Crenshaw considers necessary for 
understanding several of the antecedent and individual intricacies relating to these movements. 
Therefore, the rational choice model offers a theoretical bridge for conceptualizing causes of 
terrorism, the motivations for launching movements, and how individual perceptions shape 
group-dynamics and influence the decision to initiate terrorism. 
Strategic logic views terrorism as a decision largely based on its potential effectiveness, 
group circumstances, and surrounding conditions. These factors bypass the possible internal and 
psychological mechanisms also affecting these decisions. These presumptions are of intentional 
design for maintaining broad applicability and stem from observations of active organizations, 
particularly political terrorism, which requires a level of preciseness to be effective and endure. 
This involves competency in securing arms, planning and watching targets, executing missions, 
and acquiring funds that often requires financial backing through either state sponsorship or 
independent sources, which delves into an additional aspect of strategizing (Laqueur, 1999). 
These barriers are so immense that Hoffman (1998) argues cause the majority of groups to die 
out quickly. Those who do endure demonstrate considerable capacity to effectuate strategy. This 
leads to an assumption that terrorists logically calculate and evolve strategy, though another 
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approach may view attributes contributing to clandestine survival as leading to an entrenchment 
of organizations highly adept at devising strategy. Organizations that act rationally potentially 
endure and gain a level of notoriety that influences the concept of the terrorist type: middleclass, 
educated, and intelligent (Laqueur, 1999). However, in consequence strategic logic may fall 
short in linking the factors motivating the continuation of terrorist campaigns to those motivating 
the formation of terrorist organizations. 
However, Crenshaw addresses these potential pitfalls by viewing terrorism as reactive 
and recognizing a need to increase comparative analyses of the background conditions where it 
occurs (1990). Extending studies to include these observations assists in conceptualizing its 
causes, but alone cannot adequately explain it. As was the case in Franco Spain, identifying with 
any non-Castilian heritage or leftist ideology could bring persecution, but only ETA and the 
Frente Revolucionario Antifascista y Patriota (FRAP), the “Patriotic Revolutionary Anti-Fascist 
Front” retaliated with terrorism (Clark, 1984). Because of examples like these, Crenshaw (1990) 
rejects the notion that environmental conditions alone produce terrorism but believes that tracing 
associations between background conditions and episodes of terrorism is vital for developing 
comprehensive theories, especially with ENS where history and heritage play a decisive role. A 
point shared by Laqueur (1999) who writes, the divergent Basque and Catalan response is only 
explicable by understanding the “perception[s] of historical, social, and cultural traditions, and of 
political calculus” (p. 36). To understand how these structural variations affect people 
differently, Crenshaw (1990) suggests utilizing psychology, pointing out that a thorough grasp of 
terrorism requires a psychological analysis of those involved, their objectives, and the emotional 
responses they receive. This highlights the benefits of using strategic logic. Its reactive approach 
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allows researchers to retrace the steps of terrorism for uncovering causational markers, while its 
broad design leaves room for interpreting case specific stimuli.  
Explaining the causes of individual cases of terrorism requires understanding how a range 
of conditions influence perceptions and lead to violence. Crenshaw (1990) and Konrad (1990) 
agree that theories of terrorism need to be more specific, which Konrad (1990) explains, requires 
taking into account not only the individuals involved but also the political and intellectual forces. 
Accordingly, an accurate depiction of ENS terrorism requires understanding all its mechanics. 
Some of these characteristics, such as patterns in violence, are common to all forms of terrorism. 
Organizations are observed radicalizing as like-minds coalesce, forming a bottleneck effect and 
becoming detached from society. According to Sprinzak (1990), terrorism occurs after gradual 
experiences with increasing levels of aggression dissipate the mystique of using violence. Cook 
finds that organizations gradually become more willing to use violence as isolation, losses of 
reality, and peer-pressure move them “from sensitivity to hypersensitivity to hyposensitivity” (p. 
177). According to Bandura (1990), the ability to use terrorism ultimately comes from a 
powerful and ongoing process of dehumanization, moral detachment, and justification, in which, 
Sprinzak (1990) adds, terrorism is the final stage. However, despite this similar process, it is 
important to recognize that not every opposition group radicalizes nor do all respond uniformly 
to the same experiences. Understanding the causes of terrorism therefore requires understanding 
why various groups respond to certain stimuli, for which Crenshaw (1990) believes “psychology 
is important in determining such behavior” (p. 7). Implicitly, therefore, merging strategic logic 
and psychological theory could assist in creating a comprehensive method for linking external 
and internal forces to examine and explain the transitions to ENS terrorism. 
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Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to study ENS terrorism by analyzing literature on 
nationalist and terrorist theory for developing a perspective on the transitions to terrorism that 
occur within nationalist movements. This focus on ENS terrorism highlights an important topic 
regarding conflict analyses that supersedes national boundaries and cultural identity. ENS 
terrorism transpires under various conditions throughout the world, and stems from organizations 
historically enduring far longer than other movements while also being the most successful. 
These organizations involve political revolutionists using unsanctioned, systematic, and intense 
violence for achieving national sovereignty while leaving an incessantly negative impact on life 
and infrastructure. However, despite the detriment caused by ENS terrorism, this subject is often 
glanced over as a minor facet as it relates to the general study of terrorism. The lack of coverage 
on this subject creates an opening to examine understudied elements associated with terrorist 
campaigns, and the regional, cultural, and circumstantial variations in which they occur.  
The theories discussed in the first chapter offer a beneficial perspective into the subject of 
ENS terrorism. Primordialism and psychological theory highlight the importance of emotion in 
hostile movements, primordialism and ethnosymbolism recognize how ethnic symbols influence 
national identity and have the potential to elicit powerful and aggressive emotional responses, 
and modernism and ethnosymbolism stress the high malleability and potential manipulability of 
perception. Furthermore, the theories for nationalism and psychology view aggression as 
environmentally induced, thus sharing the view with strategic logic that collective hostility is a 
reactive phenomenon. Therefore, each of these theories offers mutually inclusive principles that 
are useful for tracing nationalist terrorism to nationalist movements to its root causes. Implicitly, 
nationalist aggression derives from aspects of culture that individuals learn to value, which 
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include background conditions priming certain responses to various triggers. Because nationalist-
separatists in particular are observed using terrorism to achieve the same goals that they pursued 
as nonviolent oppositionists, and because these movements must exist before this form of 
terrorism can occur, one can draw the conclusion that symbols defining ENS movements also 
directly define dimensions of ENS terrorism. Together, these theories describe a paradigm for 
tracing the origins of ENS terrorism by looking for the antecedent conditions that lead to 
particular responses. This paradigm has the potential to assist in recognizing culturally sensitive 
populations, determining which conditions are likely to elicit an emotional response from those 
populations, and rationalizing why various individuals react differently. 
This chapter widens the perspective on nationalist, separatist, and terrorist movements. 
The following chapter describes the history of the Basque, Catalan, and Roma in Spain, which 
the literature on nationalist and terrorist theory provides a lens for analyzing and identifying 
contributing factors of nationalism and terrorism that may also pertain to other cases of minority 
populations and the creation of ENS terrorist organizations elsewhere. The findings from this 
analysis are operationalized and measured in the third chapter using a logit regression that tests 
their significance regarding the initiation of these movements worldwide. The intent is to add to 
the understanding of this subject and terrorism in general, potentially contributing towards an 
ability to foresee populations and environments facilitative to the emergence of ENS terrorism. 
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Chapter II 
Espainetan Abertzaletasuna eta Indarrikarako Edestia: the History of Nationalism and 
Terrorism in Spain 
In the study of nationalism and ENS terrorism, the Spanish case is significant, not only for the 
contributions of studying Basque terrorism, but also for observing the mystery that typifies these 
movements. Cases of ENS emerge under various conditions, and although research identifying 
common factors has contributed to an increased understanding about these movements, these 
indicators neither appear exclusive nor guarantee that they will occur. Even populations sharing 
similar traits and experiencing similar circumstances are observed responding differently. This is 
the case in Spain, where the Basque, Catalan, and Roma have coexisted precariously at times due 
to their unique and non-Castilian heritages. Each of these populations has suffered systematic 
discrimination at various periods in Spanish history, and simultaneously faced discrimination 
during the Franco era, 1937-1975 (Minorities at Risk, 2004). Despite the parallels between these 
populations under Francoism, only the Basque created a sustained terrorist campaign against the 
state. This case is similar to other cases of ENS terrorism, with Basque terrorism contrasting 
sharply against the nonviolent Roma response and poorly organized and restrained Catalonian 
violence. Basque terrorism indicates a reaction to more than cultural persecution or structural 
conditions. To understand the forces behind Basque terrorism, this chapter follows the advice of 
Laqueur (1999) by examining historical properties. The following discussion places the Basque, 
Catalan, and Roma in the context of Spanish history to observe how cultural development led to 
distinct intra-group dynamics that influence their various reactions. The discussion attempts to 
refine the understanding of terrorism including ENS terrorism in Spain and elsewhere throughout 
the world.  
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Modern Spain is a coalescence of civilizations descending largely from Iberian natives, 
Celts, Greeks, Romans, Visigoths, Franks, Semites, and Mozarabes. Throughout their history, its 
diverse inhabitants were frequently isolated by a mountainous geography that augmented various 
realms which for most their duration lacked unity to one another (Stanton, 2002; Trend, 1944). 
Rome first united Iberia as Hispania in 200 BCE, colonizing the southern and western regions 
where terrain was less formidable to conquest. These surmountable geographic features spurred 
greater diversity and the south often became the front of occupation. The northern landscape in 
contrast was more inaccessible. Its steep terrain posed great difficulty for outside forces 
attempting to impose their rule over it. This led to Roman expansion loosely breaching the 
Pyrenees, and while Latinization spread through the peninsular interior, the north remained on 
the periphery of Rome’s influential sphere (Stanton, 2002; Collins, 1983).  
Historically, the mountainous range of the north gave Pyreneans much autonomy where 
the Basque and Catalan developed in cultural isolation. The Basque are an ancient civilization of 
Iberian indigenes and their ancestral language, Euskera, predates Indo-Europeanism and is the 
oldest still functioning language in Europe (Kurlansky, 1999; Hooper, 1995). Euskera owes its 
survival to the modicum of Romanization in the north where even Lusitania maintained its 
indigenous language until the second century (Collins, 1983). For much of the duration of the 
Roman Empire, the Basques were independent from Roman subjugation and also Spanish law 
during Spain’s early development, instead ruling themselves through regional fueros 
(Totoricaguena, 2004; Kurlansky, 1999). Seclusion also led to physiological distinctions, giving 
the Basque a higher ratio of type O blood compared to other Spaniards or the French (Collins, 
1983). While this historical detachment distinguishes Basque cultural identity, Catalonian culture 
is less antiquated. Cataluña originated as a Frankish outpost during the ninth century to protect 
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Charlemagne’s Empire from Moslems in the south (Lalaguna, 2001). Their culture developed 
from a mixture of civilizations that inhabited the peninsula, and they speak a Romance language, 
which identifies them more closely with other Spaniards (Hooper, 1995). Cataluña’s notable 
differences, however, includes an indelibly Frankish rather than Moslem lineage deriving from a 
terrain facilitative to spreading French influence (Collins, 1983). 
During the Middle Ages, both Basque and Catalan kingdoms controlled the northern 
regions of Iberia. The Basque Kingdom of Pamplona arose in 818 under Íñigo Íñiguez, which 
developed out of sequential alliances defending against Visigoth and Moslem invaders, and later 
became the Kingdom of Navarre around 1087, and lasting until in 1512 at which time war 
divided the country (Totoricaguena, 2004; Kurlansky, 1999; Collins, 1983). The new Spanish-
French border bisected the Basque region with France annexing Basse Navarre, Labourd, and 
Soule (Kurlansky, 1999). Cataluña also ascended from the ninth century, becoming sovereign 
under Wilfred the Hairy, and uniting with Aragón in 1162 to form the Kingdom of Aragón 
(Stanton, 2002; Collins, 1983). During its reign, the Catalan-Aragón Empire spread its influence 
throughout the Mediterranean. Although once a formidable power, the Catalan-Aragón Empire 
began to decline into the fifteenth century following the death of King Martin I in 1410, the last 
heir to the Catalonian throne. This led to a succession of rulers of Castilian descent. Then in 
1453, Aragón lost its naval supremacy to the Turks, who retook Constantinople, and in 1469, the 
marriage between Ferdinand of Aragón to Isabella of Castile united these Kingdoms. Shortly 
after the kingdoms united, the revolt of the remensas1 in 1475 irreparably ruined crops and is 
attributed to the kingdom’s ultimate demise (Stanton, 2002; Trend, 1944). 
The Roma, akin to the Basque, are a remarkably distinct civilization, having neither a far-
reaching history in Spain nor an historic homeland elsewhere. Traditionally, they lived as 
 
39 
nomads who theoretically descended from the Rajputs, a people that fled northern India over a 
millennium ago to escape Moslem invaders (Lewy, 2000; Lyovin, 1997). This theory is partly 
based on their ancestral language, Romani, a form of Sanskrit, and similar to Sinhala, which is 
spoken in Sri Lanka (Lewy, 2000; Katzner, 1995). As the migration of the Roma spread 
throughout Eurasia, it rarely led to assimilation. In the fifteenth century, Germans believing them 
to be Egyptian travelers gave them the name Gypsy (Lewy, 2000). Furthermore, the Roma 
diaspora that spread across the continent gradually gained the reputation as thieves, savages, and 
witches. This reputation led to their excommunication and expulsion throughout Europe and 
influenced their mass migration into Spain during the fifteenth century (Kenrick, 1998; Quintana 
& Floyd, 1972).Traveling though Cataluña, the Roma arrived in Barcelona in 1447. While many 
continued traveling nomadically, others found refuge in colonies in Andalusia that were 
established years earlier by Roma migrating through northern Africa (Quintana & Floyd, 1972).  
Persecution followed the Roma as they settled into Spain. Almost as soon as they arrived, 
and for centuries to follow, laws were established that targeted their culture. Spanish officials in 
1499 banned nomadic lifestyles; in 1633 proclaimed that Roma was not an ethnicity; in 1695 
prohibited the Roma from any vocations except farming; in 1746 restricted the Roma to living 
within seventy-five cities; and in 1749, Spaniards enslaved the Roma. These persecutive 
circumstances for the Roma did begin to improve in 1783, under Charles III who, wanting to 
promote integration, made the Roma equal citizens (Kenrick, 1998). However, centuries of 
discrimination had taken their toll and the Roma neither assimilated nor kept their historic 
identity but instead were left with a limited and vanishing culture that overshadowed its early 
identity. Several aspects of Roma tradition were forgotten, including their language, with most 
                                                                                                                                                       
1 The remensas were a French style of serfdom, which attached peasants to the land (Lalaguna, 2001).   
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today speaking Caló, which is also a form of Castilian utilizing fragments of Romani (Lewy, 
2000; Kenrick, 1998).  
Hispania fractured in the fifth century following the collapse of the Roman Empire and 
remained apart until the eleventh century, when the Kingdom of Castile defeated Navarre and 
began advancing as a dominant force. By the thirteenth century, Castile was independent, and by 
the fifteenth century had reconstituted much of the region, which it developed from a defensive 
standpoint (Stanton, 2002; Trend, 1944). Prior to this period, Iberia had become vulnerable to 
unified powers, particularly along the French border, thus encouraging King Ferninand and 
Queen Isabella to fortify their strength by emulating the stability and power that was the model 
within France. This was done by creating a common identity by unifying Pyrenean and 
Cantabrian Christians in the Inquisition that sought to Christianize Spain (Stanton, 2002; Trend, 
1944). This effort led to the conquering of southern Moslem territories that were resettled by 
Christians, runaway slaves, and Jewish and Moslem converts, overall helping to solidify Spain as 
a Christian nation (Stanton, 2002; Trend, 1944). However, years of isolation contributed to a 
pluralistic ethnic demography that could not be easily undone.  
As Spain became a state, it embarked upon a tumultuous path. Despite forging statehood, 
its population never adopted a standard identity. Regions held onto their distinct characteristics 
that came to define their concept of nationalism. Particularly in the north, the enduring cultures 
laid the foundation for ethnic and national stateless identities. These divisions complicated 
efforts to homogenize Spanish identity and often led to violent conflicts over issues of identity, 
regional autonomy, irredentism, and secessionism. These pluralistic ethnic identities became 
especially prominent during the Industrial Revolution, which came to Spain through the Basque 
Country (Kurlansky, 1999). This period introduced avant-garde concepts and rapid development 
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that hastily altered conventional lifestyles. Traditional Basque industries, like wooden 
shipbuilding, became obsolete, and while some adapted, many Spaniards were inundated as the 
country fell into an engrossing partition amid bucolic Catholicism verses urbanization, 
secularism, liberalism, and centralism; between traditional economies and capitalism; between 
absolutism and democracy (Pérez-Agote, 2006). The Catalan and Basque reacted differently to 
the changes occurring during this era. As industry grew in Cataluña, the bourgeoisie class was 
more effective at tempering the population and maintaining control over it (Bowen, 1999). 
Meanwhile, the polarization was ruinous in País Vasco where these positions bitterly divided 
Basques and soon culminated as an aggressive movement advocating traditional values and 
regional autonomy (Kurlansky, 1999).  
The brewing tension ripened as revolution befell France, marking a turning point that 
ushered in a new period of liberalism. The violent overthrow of the French monarchy 
irreversibly transformed France into a republic, and within Spain worsened contentiousness and 
uncertainty about which looming transformations awaited it. The fusion of Basse Navarre, 
Labourd, and Soule in France further aggravated instability in the north where the seeds of 
Basque nationalism were already being planted. These territories were joined to form Béarn in an 
effort to homogenize French national identity. To make matters worse, Béarn was now forced to 
pay taxes to the new central government, something that Basques, along with mandatory military 
service, had been exempt from in Spain. This inflamed ideological tension among Spanish 
Basques who feared an analogous conversion of their own territory, and to which Napoleon’s 
invasion into Spain became the harbinger of inevitability (Kurlansky, 1999). 
The Spanish mounted no resistance as Napoleon marched his army into Pamplona in 
1808. Subsequently, King Charles IV abdicated to his son, Ferdinand VII who then relinquished 
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his throne to Joseph Bonaparte, the brother of Napoleon. This heralded a new era within Spain. 
Nearly without restraint, Bonaparte imposed policies meant to modernize Spanish society. The 
new ruler suppressed religion and attempted to abolish the Inquisition. This swift compulsion 
towards progressiveness ignited fuming traditionalists whose fears of change became reality. 
Consequently, it was not the crown, but Navarrean Basque traditionalists, who took it upon 
themselves to liberate Spain. With Navarre leading the charge, Spaniards rose in rebellion in 
what became the Spanish War of Independence, 1808 to 1813 (Kurlansky, 1999). By war’s end, 
the Spanish had expelled Napoleon’s forces and restored the monarchy. However, the 
reconstituted orthodoxy proved temporary as reformists continued undeterred to liberalize Spain. 
Ultimately, these divisions led to a series of civil wars. When King Ferdinand VII died in 
1833, he left his throne to his three-year-old daughter, Isabella. However, conservatives wanted 
to crown Ferdinand’s brother, Don Carlos, who stood for regionalism and monarchic absolutism. 
Theses proponents were known as Carlists, whose staunch support for Carlos led to what became 
the First Carlist War in 1833 (Bowen & Alvarez, 2007). This war pitched Catholic-rural-
traditionalism against urban-progressive-capitalism, and was fought primarily in the País Vasco 
and Cataluña regions, which endured the bulk of the ensuing conflict (Pérez-Agote, 2006; 
Kurlansky, 1999). The fighting stopped in 1839 when Carlists put down their arms in a surrender 
lasting until 1846 (Kurlansky, 1999). Then, fighting resumed during the Guerra de los 
Madrugadores, “War of the Early Risers,” which began in Cataluña and spread to Galicia where 
it ended in 1849 when Carlists conceded and received amnesty (Bowen, 2007). While conflict 
tore through Spain, liberal reformation swept the nation. During the second year of the First 
Carlist War, Queen Isabella II officially abolished the Inquisition; and in 1869, Spain legitimated 
secular marriage and religious freedom. Also in the interim, industrialization swept through the 
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mineral rich Basque region, alarming and angering Carlist anticapitalists. Subsequently, the 
Spanish Revolution in 1868, and violent elections in 1872, contributed to political instability and 
yet another Carlist uprising (Bowen & Alvarez, 2007; Nation Master Encyclopedia, 2005; 
Kurlansky, 1999). Thus began the second Carlist War that lasted until 1876, when once more 
Carlism was defeated and dealt another blow with the abolishment of foral law that same year, as 
fueros had been a requisite of Carlist doctrine (Bowen & Alvarez, 2007; Kurlansky, 1999).  
These wars divided Spaniards along class lines but in so doing, embedded new concepts 
of regionalist national identity. Carlists built their following by stressing regional distinctions 
that transformed traditionalism into ethnic nationalism. In País Vasco, Carlists idealized a 
Basque golden age and promised a return to it (Garmendia, 1985). While less effective in 
Cataluña where fueros were never fully established, this nationalist propaganda spawned a new 
Basque movement, grounded in ethic identity and led by Sabino Arana y Goiri (Bowen & 
Alvarez, 2007; Muro, 2005). Arana y Goiri came from a Carlist family made wealthy through 
shipbuilding, which had played a prominent role during the Carlist Wars (Kurlansky, 1999). 
However, the end of the Second Carlist War had rendered Carlism dead except for in the Basque 
region. This stalwartness was interpreted by Arana y Goiri as a distinguishing characteristic of a 
people inherently non-Spanish, which led to his advocation for Basque independence and 
founding of the Partido Nacionalisto del Vasco (PNV), the “Basque Nationalist Party,” in 1895 
(Lecours, 2007). Soon thereafter, Spain lost the Spanish-American War, leading to a heightened 
a sense of Basque and Catalan secessionism, which inspired a 1900 law, proclaiming separatism 
a crime against the state, and another in 1906, placing secessionism under military jurisdiction. 
Although regional nationalism continued its rise, the status quo ante bellum to follow allowed 
Spain to democratize for the first time in 1931 (Bowen & Alvarez, 2007; Kurlansky, 1999).  
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Civil war again erupted in 1936, led by Generals Mola, Sanjurjo, and Franco against the 
nascent Republic of Spain (Clark, 1984). However, one of the significant factors that set this war 
apart from the previous wars was the ideological reversal of Basque nationalists. Previously, the 
republic had granted regional autonomy to the Basque and Catalan territories, which the 
rebellion sought to abolish while advocating Castilian nationalism. By this point, however, the 
spirit of País Vasco had altered nationalistic perception. Many Basques now considered 
themselves a separate people, and consequently, when war once more pitted liberal-capitalists 
against traditionalists, Vizcayan and Guipuzcoan nationalists, favoring self-rule and believing 
that an independent Basque state could benefit from their bourgeoisie industrial class, sided with 
the republic (Pérez-Agote, 2006). 
The decision to side with the republic had a disastrous cost. In 1937, the conservatives 
overthrew the state and General Francisco Franco became dictator over Spain. The newly 
instilled regime executed two-thirds of its nearly 300,000 prisoners of war, along with 200,000 
civilians between 1939 and 1950 (MacDonald, 1987). Upwards of 30,000 children from leftist 
families were taken from their parents and permanently placed in state custody (Expatica, 2009). 
Thousands of Spaniards also fled into exile, and during Word War II, the Nazis rounded up 
nearly 30,000 of those refugees in France, with a majority dying interned in concentration camps 
during the war. The era to follow continued to nourish repression with the empowerment of 
fascism creating a movement to homogenize Castilian identity (MacDonald, 1987).  It began its 
reign by banning all non-Castilian culture, which it labeled unchristian. This prohibited regional 
languages and cultural symbols like the lauburu2 and Ikurriña.3 Moreover, registering babies 
                                               
2 * The Basque Cross 
3 * The Basque Flag, designed by Arana y Goiri   
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without French or Spanish names was forbidden while all existing non-Castilian names had to be 
translated into Castellano (Kurlansky, 1999; Clark, 1979).  
After the civil war, the regime continued to punish republican loyalty, with the Provinces 
of Cataluña, Guipuzcoa, and Vizcaya receiving extraordinary maltreatment for their resistance 
during the war. An estimated 21,780 Basque political prisoners received death sentences, while 
nearly 150,000 Basque men, women, and children went into exile (Totoricaguena, 2004; 
Kurlansky, 1999; Clark, 1984). These regions lost all autonomy and additionally became the 
financiers for their own repression, because most of Spain’s wealth had been concentrated in the 
north. Vizcaya since 1876, as an example, was 3.5 percent of Spain’s population but produced 15 
percent of its energy, one-third of its shipyards, and two-thirds of its steel (Kurlansky, 1999; 
Clark, 1984). The northern industrialization remained the backbone of infrastructure, and by 
1960, this region had the highest per capita incomes within Spain (Hooper, 1995; Payne, 1985). 
However, labor unions were illegal and the local population was forced to compete with 
migrants willing to work for lower wages. This caused a large number of foreign workers to 
migrate to the north and approximately 20,000 migrated to the Basque region yearly. From 1960 
to 1975, the Basque provincial population increased by 45 percent and during the 1970s only 60 
percent of the population remained indigenous (Reinares & Jaime-Jeménez, 2000; Kurlansky, 
1999; Clark, 1984). This growth was even more dramatic in Cataluña, which absorbed close to 
one million migrants during the 1960s alone (Hooper, 1995). 
The Cold War also contributed toward repression in Spain. For a short period during and 
shortly after the Second World War, the United States provided support for the PNV and other 
political exiles while opposing Franco, who was a noncombative ally with Hitler and Mussolini 
during the war. Although Spain never officially entered the conflict, both Germany and Italy had 
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given aid to the rebellion in Spain during its civil war. The Luftwaffe even carried out air raids 
against republican strongholds. However, the post World War II era reshaped policy, and by 
1951, US strategy against the Soviet Union altered their relationship with Spain. The US saw an 
advantage in establishing a military base on Spanish soil and as a result began financing the 
dictatorship of Franco while rescinding support for its exiles (Kurlansky, 1999; Clark, 1984). 
During that same year, the Spanish regime clamped down on labor unions in a harsh response 
against a labor strike in the Basque region that put an end to all underground unions (Clark, 
1984). These experiences contributed to a gradual shift of perception for many repressed 
Spaniards who came to view their country as heading down an irreversible course. As the change 
in US policy caused hope to fade regarding outside intervention, aggression by the state unsubtly 
vanquished optimism for unfettering its tyrannical chains. Those in opposition were now forced 
to look inward and rethink their strategy of resistance.  
As Francoism stigmatized non-Castilians, Basque movements began focusing on cultural 
preservation. In 1945, the PNV established the Euzko Gaztedi del Interior (EGI), the “Basque 
Revolutionary Youth,” for clandestinely distributing its propaganda in northern Spain (Zulaika, 
1985; Clark, 1984). Then in 1947, students formed the Euzko Ikasle Alkartuna (EIA), the 
“Society of Basque Students.” Although headquartered in the Netherlands, EIA promoted 
Euskera and Basque culture inside Spain, but in 1950 Spanish authorities arrested, imprisoned, 
or expelled its leadership (Clark, 1984). Other associations appeared such as Gaztedi, the “Farm 
Youth,” created in the 1950s by Don Jose Maria, a Basque priest from Itziar, Guipuzcoa, for 
promoting religious and social ambitions although less rebellious than EGI and EIA (Zulaika, 
1985). Each of these movements demonstrated little success at impeding the systematic attempt 
to homogenize Castilian identity. The goals of these movements began to shift in 1952 when four 
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university students in Bilbao, Jose Manuel Aguirre, Jose Maria Benito Del Valle, Julen 
Madariage, and Jose Luis Alvarez Enparanza, a former member of EIA, founded Ekin, “To Do.” 
Initially, Ekin worked with EGI and the PNV but were critical of the PNV’s soft-line approach 
and perceivably racial subordination to the Spanish and eventually ousted by the PNV for their 
radical views. Ekin and dissenting members of EGI went on to revive the teachings of Sabino 
Arana y Goiri. Rejecting autonomy and passive resistance, they advocated the creation of a 
Euskera speaking independent Basque state of Euskadi, and in 1959 formed Euskadi ta 
Askatazuna (ETA), “Basque Homeland and Freedom,” to achieve this goal (Clark, 1984).  
As ETA gained traction, so did secessionism within Cataluña. During the 1960s, Catalan 
separatists established the Front Nacional Català (FNC), “Catalan National Front.” Although the 
FNC began as a liberation movement, Marxism captured its focus by the end of the decade and 
in 1969, it factionalized (Birnir, 2007). That same year a breakaway element established the 
Partit Socialista d’Alliberament Nacional (PSAN), the “Socialist Party of National Liberation.” 
PSAN organized around the principles of separatist militancy that then radiated into two 
additional movements: Partit Socialista d’Alliberament Nacional-provisional (PSAN-p), the 
“Socialist Party of National Liberation Provisional,” and the Front d'Alliberament Català (FAC), 
the “Catalan Liberation Front.” These latter organizations also championed violent resistance for 
pursuing national independence and before long were followed by two additional ENS 
organizations. The third organization began to surface in 1978 and in 1980 became Terra Lliure 
(TL), “Free Land,” and the fourth began around 1987 known as Exèrcit Roja d'Alliberament 
Català (CRLA), the “Catalan Red Liberation Army” (Birnir, 2007).  
Each movement professed aspiration for violent resistance and national liberation, though 
their actions exemplified disparity, with only the Basque demonstrating an immovable resolve. 
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ETA began with an action-repression strategy based on the theory of provocation. The objective 
was to invoke retaliation against País Vasco in an effort to ignite revolution (Clark, 1984). Their 
first attack was in 1961, attempting to derail a train transporting the backers of Franco. While 
failing in its goal of derailing the train, this action brought significant notoriety to the group 
followed by increased violence. Since that incident, ETA has claimed over eight-hundred lives, 
including those of Prime Minister Carrero Blanco, Police Commissioner Meliton Manzanas, and 
Supreme Court magistrate Jose Querol (BBC, 2006; Kurlansky, 1999; Clark, 1984). The 
proliferation of Basque terrorism did not correlate with the burgeoning in Cataluña of less 
aggressive and unsustainable movements. PSAN-p went largely unnoticed while FAC committed 
over a hundred nonfatal acts between 1969 and 1971 and claimed responsibility for two deaths in 
1979 (Birnir, 2007; Schmid et al, 2005; Bowen & Petersen, 1999; Hooper, 1995). CRLA claimed 
responsibility for a bombing in 1987 that killed a Guardia Civil officer and injured others 
(Schmid et al, 2005). TL was the most violent, carrying out bombings and abductions during the 
1980s but never developed a durable campaign, and ended operations in the early 1990s (Birnir, 
2007; Bowen & Peterson, 1999). ETA, however, persisted despite the arrest, torture, and 
expulsion of nearly two-hundred members following its first attack and fractionalization 
throughout its first decade. Moreover, ETA survived a massive assault as retaliation for the 
assassination of Manzanas that led to more than six-hundred arrests in 1968, and almost two-
thousand in 1969. At this time, José María Ezkubi was the only leader left in Spain that avoided 
arrest and eventually escaped to France (Clark, 1984). During this time of massive retaliation, 
and during additional attempts, ETA continued to reorganize, and has successfully defied all 
attempts to destroy it.  
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In an era that gave birth to violent nationalism and separatism in Spain, the Roma share 
no similarity in their reaction. Their case contrasts sharply against the paths of Basque and 
Catalan nationalists. Despite their comparable cultural disparity, no effort arose among the 
Spanish Roma to establish national independence. Instead, they avoided organized oppositional 
aggression. Even towards the end of the twentieth century as they became the most discriminated 
against group in Spain, the Roma neither protested with violence nor created any known militant 
organization (Minorities at Risk, 2004; Cowans, 2003).   
Applying the Theories 
The theoretical literature on nationalism and terrorism assists in developing an analytical 
framework for interpreting the Spanish case. Concerning theories of nationalism, this case does 
not offer insight into whether nationalist-based aggression is genealogical but does suggest that 
the traits associated with nationalist movements existed before the Industrial Revolution. Basque 
identity, for example, has always been defined by culture. Even the Euskera word for Basque, 
Euskal, means speaker of Euskera, which defines Basque identity in the context of cultural 
symbolization. Moreover, as the kingdoms in Iberia developed around their own distinct cultural 
identities, the peninsula shared a common Latin heritage that contributed to consolidating Spain 
as a state and a Christian nation. This common Catholic identity influenced aggression against 
both the Moslems and the Roma for centuries, and guided Spain into its modernity, while events 
linked to the Industrial Revolution merely shifted perceptions of national identity. This case 
illustrates a far-reaching history of nationalism in Spain that strengthens primordialism. This 
case also supports the shared assumptions of primordialism, modernism, and ethnosymbolism 
that describe the roles of cultural identity, symbolic attachments, and the plasticity of perception 
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in nationalist movements. In addition, it provides answers for why Basque terrorism proved far 
more violent and durable than did the Catalonian movements. 
The Basque and Catalan share a similar history. These populations developed culturally 
isolated by a mountainous terrain where their kingdoms maintained control though much of the 
Middle Ages, hosted the bulk of development during the Industrial Revolution, and continued 
consolidating growth in the subsequent era. Following the late civil war, these regions became 
targets of abuse for remaining loyal to the republic during the war. This led to an increased desire 
among Basque and Catalonian populations to secede from Spain. This period launched a phase 
of radicalization that initially began with nonviolent political dissidence for preserving cultural 
identity, which Madrid harshly curated by responding to these movements with arrests frequently 
correlating with torture. For nearly a decade following the formation of EIA and FNC, both 
Basque and Catalonian nationalists experienced severe hostility from the state. During this 
period, motivations and strategies for coping with the repression began to shift the members of 
oppositionist movements into new directions. In País Vasco and Cataluña, Marxism and ethnic 
nationalism competed against conservatism and often against each other. Because fascism was 
their foremost ideological rival, movements initially developed with a combination of Marxist-
nationalist ideology. However, ideological competition was a destabilizing force and consistently 
led to factionalism and the reestablishment of organizations with greater intensity and narrower 
focus. Many new organizations developed and espoused increased militant ferocity, which also 
radiated into additional movements. This splitting predominately grew out of disputes within the 
organizations over strategic violence and their central philosophy. Meanwhile, the cultural 
differences between the Basque and Catalonian populations affected their ultimate methods of 
opposition.  
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Despite many linking the rise of Basque nationalism in Spain to the changes during the 
Industrial Revolution and Carlist Wars, symbols of Basque ethnicity have passed down through 
countless generations. Throughout Iberian history, symbols of Basque identity have influenced 
perceptions of cultural exclusion and the desire for regional autonomy. Meanwhile, the changes 
during the industrial age threatened those historic Basque symbols and led to a heightened sense 
of cultural sensitivity within traditional Basque society. Basque traditionalists became fearful of 
the potential changes to their traditional way of life, and they exhibited this insecurity as 
aggression expressed as nationalist sentiment. During this period, Pérez-Agote (2006) writes 
how a series of conflicts came to define the Basques. Shabad and Llera Ramo (1995) write that 
for generations, “numerous segments of Basque society perceived threats to their collective 
identity coming from both Madrid and from new groups within the Basque Country itself” (p. 
418). Early on, liberal and conservative ideologies were defining and dividing the Basques, such 
as during the War of Convention, 1793-1795, when Basque liberals led a secessionist movement 
in Guipuzcoa (Pérez-Agote, 2006). However, even amid this ideological divide, the desire for 
regional autonomy was a foundation of Basque nationalism. Both Carlist and fascist doctrine 
promoted traditionalism, although Basque nationalists consistently fought against centralism. 
During the Carlist Wars, Basque nationalists supported Don Carlos, who promoted the 
continuation of traditional society and regional autonomy, while they sided with the progressives 
during the latter civil war because of the progressive’s support for decentralization. Each time, 
regional autonomy was the decisive issue, illustrating how ethnicity dominated Basque identity 
and ultimately trumped any shared economic, political, or religious philosophy.  
In the period following Franco’s rise to power, avenues for addressing cultural grievances 
were lost although nationalism remained a strong part of Basque cultural identity. Subsequently, 
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Shabad and Llera Ramo (1995) describe an era where Basques emerged into an atmosphere of 
symbolic and physical hostility and oppression. During this period, identifying as Basque was 
considered traitorous and criminal, and therefore having Basque ancestral roots added additional 
hardships while Spain was already becoming developmentally stagnant and falling economically 
behind much of the rest of Europe. To add to this burden, País Vasco suffered disproportionate 
economic stress. The economic conditions were reducing the living standards for laborers within 
the region while the taxes on Basque industry financed the repression against them. Education in 
País Vasco was also being repressed. For example, provincial colleges could only offer scientific 
degrees to ensure its industrial base but prevent political enlightenment (Kurlansky, 1999). The 
regime made itself irreproachable to these hardships affecting País Vasco by preventing the use 
of conventional methods for redressing issues. The regime banned all labor unions and political 
parties, which reduced Basque nationalism to a disjoined and illegitimate struggle for preserving 
territory and culture (Shabad & Llera Ramo, 1995). This also left a political void that Ekin, and 
later ETA, would fill and gain popular support initially by providing an outlet for addressing 
cultural and political bereavement.   
The adoption of terrorism by ETA appears to have been based on its potential to affect 
the relationship between Spain’s central government and Basque society. There is little doubt 
whether the founders of ETA were aware of nonviolent alternatives for pursuing their goals, but 
instead they chose to use terrorism hoping to create a revolution in País Vasco. These individuals 
had each previously belonged to a nonviolent oppositionist movement, and at some point 
interacted with the PNV. Their experience working with the PNV meant that many had taken 
part in nonviolent political opposition. Ekin, however, wanted to act more forcefully to promote 
controversial goals that the PNV considered too extreme, and they eventually divested ties over 
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these issues. Furthermore, their decision to use terrorism was not based on a perceived necessity 
for individual survival, as many of the original members of ETA were college students coming 
from middle-class families. Had they not adopted terrorism and continued with their education, 
the founders of ETA would have had the potential to live with a standard of living relative to that 
of other middle-class Spaniards. Instead, ETA’s decision to adopt terrorism grew out of a 
heightened sense of Basque nationalism, which may have been based on a perceived urgency for 
protecting Basque cultural identity. The underground promotion of Basque cultural heritage and 
imposition of Castilian assimilation may have reinforced a cultural hypersensitivity that led to 
perceptions of cultural victimization and contributed to radicalizing the struggle for preserving it.  
In Spain, Basque terrorism thrived from an ability to spread nationalism while Catalonian 
movements failed largely over an inability to do so. Hooper (1995) writes how Cataluña in the 
1960s could not integrate immigrant populations, and therefore lacked national unity. ETA, on 
the contrary, was ethnically inclusive. They redefined Basque identity, and grew largely as a 
labor movement. Before ETA emerged as the defining symbol of Basque nationalism, Basque 
ethnicity was ancestrally based. In the late-nineteenth century, Sabino Arana y Goiri wrote that 
to be Basque, all four grandparents must have been born in the Basque Country, having Basque 
surnames. ETA broadened this definition to include anyone who spoke Euskera or lived within 
the region (Kurlansky, 1999; Collins, 1987; Clark, 1984). Moreover, ETA espoused Marxism, 
and drew broad support from the labor class (Clark, 1984). Adopting Marxism was a common 
practice of nationalist-separatist movements during this period, and according to Laqueur (1999), 
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the IRA, and ETA all used leftist 
rhetoric at a time when liberation movements correlated with concepts of communist revolution. 
However, Laqueur (1999) considers ETA exceptionally gifted at developing itself in between 
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extreme nationalism and classism. Reinares and Jaime-Jeménez (2000) attribute ETA’s success 
in joining class struggle and nationalism to the unsteady economic conditions in País Vasco that 
made leftist ideology popular for integrating new classes and gaining broad support, such that by 
the 1970s, nearly sixty percent of ETA was of non-Basque heritage (Clark, 1984).  
The different reactions of the Catalan and Roma to the repression under Francoism may 
also be because these populations lack several of the elements contributing to ENS terrorism. 
The historical context of Spain shows how Basque identity interacted with experiences during 
the Industrial Revolution, civil wars, and Franco era, influencing a totality of circumstances that 
gradually disintegrated the social fabric of Basque society (Shabad & Llera Ramo, 1995). 
Distinct Basque cultural symbols and identity continuously reinforced one another and led to 
strong symbolic attachments and an intense need for preserving them. Euskera and ancestral 
territory are two such archaic symbols that play a fundamental role in Basque nationalism, which 
advocates Euskera proliferation, secession from Spain and France, and irredenta of the historic 
Basque homeland. Conversely, Catalonian ethnicity is less discriminating and shares significant 
French and Spanish cultural roots, which Hooper (1995) and Stanton (2002) stress reduces 
secessionist sentiment, and, together with demographic shifts during the mid-twentieth century 
that racially diluted its population, kept Catalonian nationalism out of the mainstream. In the case 
of the Roma, conditions propagating nationalism are nonexistent. Alexander and Myer (1982) 
argue that territorial roots are an essential part of nationalist movements, and while remaining 
among the most discriminated against populations in Spain, the Roma diaspora are largely 
detached from one another and lack a territorial claim. These factors are considered vital 
antecedents for organizing separatist movements, because they center on the nostalgic drive to 
restore or preserve perceived cultural identity. As a result, Roma passivity derives from its lack 
 
55 
of what many consider essential for nationalist movements, a basis for demanding territorial 
autonomy, and because these movements are a prerequisite for ENS terrorism, it is unlikely that 
any area will ever manifest a Roma ENS terrorist campaign.  
This research indicates that ENS terrorism stems from group dynamics and a shared 
perception of events. These organizations, like all activist organizations, integrate like-minded 
individuals who often share similar heritabilities that place them within a greater historical 
struggle. ENS organizations share a perceived history of colonial subjugation in which the drive 
for resistance derives from sensitivity over a putative privation imposed upon them by the 
illegitimate occupiers of the disputed territory. This brand of rhetoric grows movements for 
generations, as the philosophy of us-versus-them imbues the society’s ideological framework. 
Subsequently, nationalist rhetoric shapes generations until changes in structural mechanisms 
trigger reactions among the affected populace. Abrupt sociological changes lead to increased 
oppositionist sentiment by offsetting previous equilibriums that kept bereaved sectors from 
demanding substantial change. When this ideology has mainstream support, it is more likely to 
be influential thus burgeoning opposition. Freedom to assemble also assists group formation, 
while circumstances determine the means of resistance. When changes are not possible through 
legitimate channels, oppositionist movements tend to intensify as members tire from seemingly 
ineffective tactics for stimulating change, while the leap to terrorism occurs when organizations 
assume it will manifest quicker results and be the ideal method for their struggle. 
This leads to the conclusion that conditions catalyzing the transitions to ENS terrorism 
involve a distinct national identity, territorial claims, distinct cultural markers, degrees of social 
agility, tumultuous social conditions, a desire to produce immediate change, an inability to 
influence changes peacefully, access to knowledge about revolution and clandestinity, and access 
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to resources. Nationalism is the core ideology of ENS terrorism. This involves a culture teaching 
its members to invest in and defend symbolic attachments of their national identity. An historic 
homeland is one such marker and a seemingly essential part of demanding territorial sovereignty. 
Other cultural markers are essential in delineating the minority and mainstream populations that 
show unambiguous differences to justify secession. The adoption of terrorism for achieving this 
goal seems to follow unsteady social, political, and economic conditions that contribute to social 
unrest and discontentment. At least in Spain, political conditions appeared to have allowed 
enough freedom for individuals to congregate but were insufficient for those individuals to affect 
change through legitimate political channels, which influenced their decision to circumnavigate 
direct channels by using violence. Cumulatively, this led to the development of several tactics 
that gradually became more violent, while the affluence in País Vasco helped to fund the 
continuation of mounting tactics against the state. In all, these variables appear to play a 
fundamental role in the conversion from nationalist movement to ENS terrorist campaign. The 
next step is to operationalize these findings and measure the relationship that they share with the 
formation of ENS terrorist organizations throughout the world. 
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Table I 
Summary of Expectations 
Variable ∆ Nationalist Theory Strategic Logic Psychological Theory 
Distinct 
Culture → 
Strengthens: Threats 
against cultural 
symbols & identity 
 
Strengthens: Violence 
integrated into cultural 
identity 
Distinct 
Culture ← 
Weakens: Cultural 
identity less relevant    
Hostile 
Conditions → 
Strengthens: 
Violence targeting 
ethny 
Strengthens: Strategy to 
gain notoriety amid 
hostile conditions 
Strengthens: 
Psychologically 
conditioned for violence 
Hostile 
Conditions ←   
Weakens: Less likely 
diminishing inhibitions 
against using violence 
Political 
Freedom →  
Freedom of assembly & 
strengthens if ethny is 
politically repressed  
Strengthens: Detached 
from reality & rejection 
of social norms 
Political 
Freedom ← 
Strengthens: Ethny 
politically repressed 
Strengthens: A lack of 
alternatives to violence  
Strengthens: Repressive 
conditions having a 
psychological effect 
Alternatives to 
Violence →   
Strengthens: Having 
alternative methods for 
pursing interests  
Alternatives to 
Violence ← 
Strengthens: Ethnic 
identity is 
vulnerable 
Strengthens: Lacking 
alternative methods for 
pursuing interests 
 
Social Unrest →  Strengthens: Terrorism used to maximize results   
Social Unrest ←   
Strengthens: Terrorism 
less likely used to 
maximize results 
Economic 
Resources →  
Strengthens: Able to 
fund the buildup of 
tactical resistance 
 
Economic 
Resources ← 
Strengthens: Ethny 
economically 
repressed 
Strengthens: Terrorism 
determined by available 
resources 
Strengthens: Repressive 
conditions having a 
psychological effect 
Access to 
Education →  
Strengthens: Greater 
access to information for 
clandestinity & rebellion 
Strengthens: Social 
expectations leading to 
psychological damage 
Access to 
Education ← 
Strengthens: Ethny 
educationally 
repressed 
Strengthens: Repressive 
conditions tactically 
influencing rebellion 
Strengthens: Repressive 
conditions having a 
psychological effect 
Increasing units →; decreasing units ← 
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Chapter III 
Statistical Model: Method and Variables  
This chapter uses a logit regression model to assess nationalist, strategic, and psychological 
theory in relation to the development of ENS terrorist campaigns by using the following formula: 
8877665544332211 ******** xxxxxxxxe  
The first chapter reviewed three paradigms for studying nationalism: primordialism, modernism, 
and ethnosymbolism, and two theories for terrorism: strategic logic and psychological theory. 
This study draws on the shared assumptions of the nationalist models that emphasize the role of 
collective identity, cultural symbolization, and plasticity of perception in nationalist movements, 
and highlights both shared and competing concepts between strategic and psychological theory. 
The second chapter discussed the case of terrorism in Spain from an historical context while 
applying the nationalist and terrorist theories as an analytical framework for identifying elements 
contributing to Basque and Catalan terrorism and cases of ENS terrorism elsewhere. From this 
case, the relevant factors appear to be an enduring and distinct ethno/national identity, threats 
against cultural symbols, volatile and hostile conditions, freedom to assemble, a desire to affect 
change without a legitimate method to pursue it, and access to information and financial sources.  
Chapter 3 operationalizes these findings to perform a measurement of the background 
conditions that may play a fundamental role in the origins of ENS terrorism. The cases observe 
two-hundred ninety-seven minority populations in one-hundred twenty-six states,4 and span 
primarily from 1945 to 2003, with the exception of Ireland, which was observed from 1946 to 
2003 and also in 1922.5 The independent variables assess cultural sensitivity, exposure to 
                                               
4 This paper treats the  Soviet Union as a country 
5 Some modifications occurred in MAR to adjust incorrect data due to interpolation and inaccurate data filing. 
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violence, political freedom, political transitions, economic conditions, representation/alternative 
options, educational stagnation, and developed educational systems. The data combines statistics 
from Minorities at Risk (MAR)6 World Bank (WB), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Polity 
IV, Global Terrorism Database (GTD), International Labor Organization (ILO), and United 
Nations (UN) along with several other sources to fill in missing data points.  
 This model evaluates nationalist theory by combining indicators for cultural differentials, 
group concentration, separatist beliefs, and ancestral territory. The nationalist approach argues 
that the presence of these indicators contributes to nationalist based aggression, which should 
also correlate with the formation of ENS terrorist organizations. The remaining variables are 
used to evaluate strategic logic and psychological theory. Strategic logic considers the initiation 
of terrorism to be a logistical decision influenced by financial and political restrictions, and 
transient conditions that open moments of opportunity. If the strategic model is accurate, ENS 
terrorist campaigns should develop in correlation with moderate levels of political freedom, 
underrepresentation, a lack of tactical alternatives, periods of instability, economic conditions 
limiting the scope of rebellion, and an educated population. Whereas these variables potentially 
influence a strategic response, the psychological model considers terrorism an irrational and 
emotional response driven by internal mechanisms shaped by traumatic experiences throughout 
life. From this view, structural conditions affect the decision to initiate terrorism when those 
conditions are psychologically damaging. If accurate, campaigns should develop in correlation 
with educational stagnation, an exposure to violence, and social instability relating to repressive 
and antagonistic conditions. These results should assist in determining whether it is possible to 
link nationalist theory to ENS terrorism and whether these campaigns develop in response to 
strategic or psychological forces.   
                                               
6 See Appendix C for populations and countries 
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The data on minority populations comes from MAR, which it classifies as ethno/national, 
indigenous, ethno/class, communal contender, religious sect, or national minority, and does not 
use multiple classifications for the same group within a state. This definition of ethno/national 
excludes such populations as the Catalan in Spain, indigenous populations in multiple countries, 
and Russians within post-Soviet states. However, examples of ENS terrorism emerging from 
among each of these populations illustrates that violent ENS movements are able to transcend 
these various classifications. Therefore, this study uses all but those labeled as a religious sect, 
due to the drastic differences thought to exist between ENS and religious based terrorism.  
This study excludes using populations labeled as a religious sect because some may lack 
the archaic ethnic traits that distinguish them from mainstream populations. As Hoffman (1998; 
1995) explains, religiously motivated terrorists are nonpolitical, monolithic, indiscriminately 
violent, and exist only to harm those not belonging to a narrow interpretation of their faith, while 
ENS terrorist campaigns tend to embrace both political and nationalist ideologies, gain broad 
support through cultural associations, are revolutionary with post-struggle aims, and use violence 
more discriminately. Though religion is one of several elements of cultural identity, the variance 
between these forms of terrorism implies disparate antecedent conditions. The societies united 
primarily by religion may lack other cultural denominators that provide a basis for ENS and 
therefore be peripheral to this subject, although this study does not discount the role of religion 
in ENS terrorism entirely. This study neither excludes all for whom religion provides a common 
identity nor does it ignore the impact that religion might have on them. ENS terrorist campaigns 
often develop in populations that share a common religion, and this dataset incorporates several 
religious groups not coded as a religious sect, including Jews in several countries, Catholics in 
Ireland, Maronite Christians in Lebanon, Chechens in Russia, and Muslims in France, who as 
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collectives share multiple communal traits leading to a non-religious ethno-political status. The 
excluded populations include Shiite and Sunni Muslims, who, coded as a religious sect, may lack 
several distinguishing components of national identity.   
The dependent variable is a dichotomous measurement for the formation of ENS terrorist 
organizations,7 primarily from GTD. Because this study focuses on the period that organizations 
establish themselves as terrorist networks, terrorist organizations that began as a nonviolent or 
non-terrorist movement are indicated in the year that they initiated their first attack, marking the 
transition from nationalist to terrorist organization. Meanwhile, organizations that developed in 
order to commit terrorism are indicated during the year that the group began. The organizations 
fitting this profile use terrorism to achieve national liberation, which does not include autonomy, 
a status where the parent state maintains its legal authority over the region. Secessionism, in 
contrast, involves gaining absolute sovereignty, an action that is potentially more consequential. 
In addition, while this study focuses on separatist movements, the lack of information on several 
organizations often impedes discerning between goals of liberation and separation. Although 
strictly speaking, separatism defines the emancipation of geographically connected territories, 
literature on this subject frequently references separation, liberation, and anti-colonialism as the 
same. Such movements view themselves in a struggle against territorial privation and illegal 
occupation, fighting to separate from dominant powers and gain national sovereignty regardless 
of the geographic proximity to the central base of opposition. Therefore, by defining separatism 
broadly it becomes analogous to national liberation and the parameter for this study.  
The first variable assesses the general concepts of nationalist theory that consider national 
identity influenced by heritage, communal behavior, symbolisms, and the manipulation of those 
symbols while viewing condensed minority populations as particularly reactive against perceived 
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cultural threats. Smith (1991) describes these populations as sharing distinct ethnic ties and 
placing stronger value in cultural symbols and therefore more sensitive to perceived threats 
against those symbols. Cultural sensitivity is measured using a categorical variable that averages 
MAR’s indices for separatist ideology sepx, cultural differences culdfxx, group concentration 
groupcon, and historic homeland gc8. The separatist index (0-3) assesses whether secessionism 
had an historic role in group dynamics or exists latently, played an active role in movements 
between the 1940s and 1980s, or has a recent or active role in group-consciousness. The cultural 
index (0-4) measures the disparity between minority and mainstream populations based on 
ethnicity and nationality, language, historical origin, religion, social customs, and residence. The 
categories range from no differences, to minor, significant, major, and acute differentials. For 
example, in 1999, Basques in Spain had substantial cultural differentials because their 
nationality, language, and historical origin are substantially different from the mainstream 
population of Spain. The index for group concentration (0-3) categorizes the geographic 
dispersion of populations ranging from wide dispersion, such as the Roma, to mostly urbanized 
or marginally concentrated; a majority living within close proximity; and all concentrated to a 
single region. Lastly, the variable for historic homeland (0-4) indicates the existence of ancestral 
lands and the extent of which a group still inhabits that territory. The coding for ancestral lands is 
reordered to indicate respectively: the absence of ancestral lands; ancestral lands within another 
state; ancestral lands not exceeding the group’s provincial base; ancestral lands exceeding the 
group’s provincial base but not state; or ancestral lands exceeding both the group’s provincial 
base and the state.  
The cultural variable attempts to encapsulate internal and external influences on cultural 
identity to assess whether nationalism is a response to threats against enduring cultural symbols. 
                                                                                                                                                       
7 See Appendix B for descriptions of terrorist organizations included in the dependent variable. 
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Smith (1991) argues that concentrated and unique populations tend to be more sensitive to and 
react more strongly against such threats. A common symbol, territory, is a central theme of 
liberation movements and when historically attached to a people, territory becomes a potent 
component of identity. Because Smith (1991) argues that nationalist based aggression derives 
from threats against cultural symbols, the existence and degree of control that a population is 
able to exercise over its historic homeland represents a cultural symbol and measures the threat 
against it. The expectation is that waning control over a fatherland jeopardizes the preservation 
of national identity, in which case a minority group living only within a fraction of its historic 
homeland should prove most volatile. Separatist ideology, cultural disparity, and geographic 
clustering are each considered contributory to cultural sensitivity and therefore their presence is 
expected to further the potential for volatility. For these reasons, high scores should indicate 
elevated cultural sensitivity and correlate strongly with the formation of ENS terrorist 
organizations. One of the drawbacks in using this variable however is that is does not provide a 
determinant between primordialism and modernism. It incorporates presumed factors that 
contribute to nationalist based aggression without assessing heritability for cases only occurring 
in the postindustrial era. 
The second variable assesses psychological theory by measuring the relationship between 
violence and the formation of ENS terrorist organizations. Psychological theory argues that 
personality traits, anti-socialization, and violent experiences lead to terrorism. The expectation is 
that frequent aggression will lower inhibitions against using violence, leading to a radicalization 
process wherefore individuals in hostile regions are more willing to commit violence, thus 
increasing the probability that terrorist organizations will emerge. To assess this argument, this 
study measures the influence that an exposure to violence has on the development of terrorist 
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campaigns by combining each of the aggression indices in MAR. The rebellion indices, 
"Quinquennial Rebellion Scores, 1945-1999,” rebel (0-8), and “Annual Rebellion Scores, 1985-
2000,” reb (0-8), record the most severe levels of violence occurring between minority groups 
and the central regime. And, the intercommunal indices, “Decennial Indicators of Intra-
Communal Conflict, 1940s to 1990s,” comcon (0-6), and “Annual Indices of Intercommunal 
Conflict, 1990-2000,” comco (0-6), record the most severe levels of violence between minority 
groups and other antagonistic groups. This model utilizes the highest score from among each of 
these variables, lagged to avoid endogeneity, and indicating respectively: no conflict; individual 
nonfatal intergroup attacks or political banditry against the state; intergroup political agitation or 
terrorist campaigns directed against the state; periodic factional violence or local rebellions; 
large-scale anti-group protests or small-scale insurgency against the state; rioting and intergroup 
attacks or intermediate insurgency; prolonged communal warfare or extensive insurgency; and 
civil war. Consequently, high scores indicate severe levels of violence, and a positive statistically 
significant relationship between this variable and the formation of ENS terrorist organizations 
would support Post’s (1990) argument that an exposure to violence contributes to a radicalization 
process that then leads to terrorism.  
The third variable assesses strategic logic by measuring the association between levels of 
democracy and the formation of ENS terrorist organizations. Democratic freedom is measured 
using Polity2 (-10-10); the data is constructed with Eugene (3.203), and assesses a state’s 
democratic freedom on a range from absolute autocracy to absolute democracy. Although 
strategic logic describes terrorism being used when no viable substitute exists, the literature on 
this subject frequently correlates terrorism with democracy attributed to social agility and less 
severe prosecution (Laqueur, 1999; Abadie, 2006; Feldmann & Perälä, 2004; Reinares & Jaime-
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Jeménez, 2000; Fox, 2003; Fleming, 1982). However, endurance is one of the defining 
characteristics of ENS terrorism, and the forces influencing the continuation of violence 
potentially diverge from those motivating the initial reasons for developing an organization. 
ETA, for example, began under a fascist system with moderate freedom but survived over 50 
years, becoming most violent during and after Spain’s democratization. The implication is that 
repression encouraged dissident Basques to organize covertly while liberalism emboldened them 
to act. If this case is similar to other cases of ENS, then organizations should develop most often 
in areas with restricted freedom. Therefore, interpreting the results of the democratic variable 
requires a different approach than with the other variables. A positive statistically significant 
relationship would strengthen the aspect of strategic logic that considers the freedom to assemble 
essential for formulating campaigns. However, these same results correlating with a negative 
relationship between the variable for nonmilitant organizations and the dependent variable would 
indicate the presence of legitimate political channels and weaken the argument that terrorism is a 
strategy used in areas void of legal alternatives.  
The fourth variable uses the number of nonmilitant organizations for comparing the 
competing concepts between strategic logic, which considers terrorism a tactic when no viable 
substitute exists, and psychological theory, which attributes terrorism to irrational and emotional 
forces. Although the psychological model also describes the decision to use terrorism based on 
the perception that it is the only available option, its purpose is to achieve radical goals that 
develop during a period of social detachment. These goals are developed by antisocial and 
antinomian groups, and by their origin lack mainstream support, but are pursued regardless of 
public opinion or political conditions. The motivation behind this violence is to avenge those 
perceived as responsible for causing their psychological fragmentation, a view less supported by 
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strategic logic. The difference between these concepts is that strategic logic describes terrorist 
organizations as more politically versed, with goals, in this case national liberation, that are more 
rational. The expectation in strategic logic is that terrorists have a better grasp on reality than 
described by psychological theory, and, therefore, the formation of ENS terrorist organizations 
should correspond with measureable limits on political freedom, which this study determines by 
the number of nonmilitant organizations within the state that represent the interests of the 
minority population. 
The variable for nonmilitant organizations measures both political representation and 
alternatives to terrorism and is built using the number of nonmilitant organizations recorded by 
MAR. This study quantifies these groups, reverses the results from positive to negative,8 and lags 
to the year following their formation in consideration of the time needed to consolidate and to 
become known. Nonmilitant organizations represent an aspect of political freedom different from 
what the variable for democratic freedom measures. The nonmilitant variable offers an analysis 
of the political circumstances directly affecting the minority population. It represents both 
associations directed at addressing several specific needs and advantageous freedoms decreasing 
the likelihood of repressive conditions. Despite the occasion of central regimes using proxy 
agencies claiming to represent the interests of the minority population to further their own 
interests, a greater number of organizations would decrease the probability of state puppeteering. 
Moreover, it would open channels for addressing cultural grievances and pursuing political 
aspirations. This offers insight into whether a minority population and terrorist organization 
shares similar goals while assessing the roles of logic and emotion. Although the strategic and 
psychological models agree that terrorism is conceived as a last resort, they diverge over the 
                                               
8 Reversing the variable for groups is for visual preference that has no effect on the results of the logit regression 
model.  
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underlining causes that motivate groups and influence their goals. Post (1990) argues that 
terrorist organizations result from grouping people with violent proclivities in which terrorism 
derives from an emotional necessity whereas for Crenshaw (1990) it is a strategic necessity due 
to the lack of tactical alternatives. Therefore, a statistically significant negative relationship with 
the dependent variable would indicate an emotional choice despite having alternatives, with a 
positive relationship implying tactical disadvantages that strengthens the strategic model. 
The variable for political transitions compares strategic logic and psychological theory by 
noting changes that occur in a state’s political freedom to measure the relationship between 
social instability and the formation of ENS terrorist organizations. The transition variable is a 
dichotomous indicator that represents changes in political freedom determined by changes in 
Polity2 and includes instances of political transformation varying from democratization and 
autocratization to slight gains or losses of liberty. Though both strategic logic and psychological 
theory consider terrorism a response to accumulating events, they diverge on which factors 
ultimately lead to its initiation. Psychological theory argues that terrorism follows a failure of 
alternative peaceful attempts at reform, consequently making it prone to stagnant environments 
that continuously block change. Strategic logic, in contrast, considers shifting political and 
structural conditions more likely to encourage violence, as clandestine organizations have a 
tactical advantage during periods of unease and unrest. Consequently, while both paradigms 
view terrorism as a replacement for an absence of legitimate channels, the latter describes the 
leap to violence as a reaction to moments where terrorist organizations can maximize their 
results. These moments of opportunity involves rapid change that leads to social uncertainty and 
regime vulnerability, including not only periods of democratization but also illiberalization and 
other notable transitions. Therefore, a positive statistically significant relationship between 
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political transitions and the dependent variable would strengthen strategic theory, while the 
opposite results would support psychological theory. 
The economic variable assesses strategic logic by measuring the relationship between 
economic conditions and the formation of ENS terrorist organizations. This categorical variable 
combines MAR’s economic differential index, ecdifxx, and state unemployment rates. Strategic 
logic considers terrorism a weapon of the weak compensating for a lack of resources and 
describes two factors that significantly influence the scope of rebellion. The first factor relates to 
organizations like the IRA, which are capable of committing attacks on a larger scale but 
deliberately limit their magnitude to prevent igniting adverse public sentiment. However, groups 
like the IRA are an exceptional case as Crenshaw (1990), Laqueur (1999), and Hoffman (1998) 
illustrate by describing the primary factor being a group’s financial capacity, while emphasizing 
the difficulty in funding clandestinity. Laqueur (1999) and Crenshaw (1990) describe this 
capacity involving a position between an ability to acquire funds sufficient for underground 
rebellions without enough for large-scale assaults. This generally requires access to affluent 
regions or state sponsorship. However, ENS movements typically develop around a regional 
identity unaffiliated with a global ideological network and are therefore limited in acquiring 
financial support internationally. Consequently, these movements are more likely dependent on 
domestic economies, implying that the dependent variable ought to occur infrequently in affluent 
regions among economically advantaged people who can choose between terrorism and open 
rebellion. Meanwhile, the least likely scenario involves indigent populations in impoverished 
states, while terrorist organizations are most likely to develop between these two extremes.  
To measure the validity of this hypothesis, the economic index ecdifxx is combined with 
unemployment rates in order to analyze the economic status of the minority population. The 
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economic index, ecdifxx (-2-4), categorizes economic standing based on income, land and 
property, higher education, presence in commerce, presence in professions, and presence in 
official positions, scaling from economically advantaged to extreme disparity. It is recoded from 
one to seven to remove zero to permit the construction of interactive variables. This new value is 
multiplied with unemployment rates resulting in low scores that indicate the most economically 
affluent populations and regions, and high scores indicating the most impoverished. From this 
variable, there are two possible approaches for assessing whether economic conditions influence 
the decision to use terrorism. The first method is to perform a two-tailed test around the mean 
with spacing corresponding to the standard deviation. However, the mean is 54 percent and 
standard deviation is 63 percent, therefore using this method to test for economic affluence 
requires selecting values that could be interpreted as being selected for their results.9 Instead, this 
study divides the economic variable into five categories corresponding with the standard 
deviation. The first category consists of all values above the fourth standard deviation from zero, 
based on the assumption that extreme economic hardships substantially reduce the probability of 
the dependent variable. The second category comprises the first standard deviation from zero, 
based on the assumption that well-financed organizations are able to decide between large and 
small-scale confrontation, leaving terrorism as a choice among other tactics. The third, fourth, 
and fifth categories comprise the second, third, and fourth standard deviations from zero 
respectively, indicating gradations where wealth and economic opportunity become more limited 
wherein the final category is considered illustrative of hardships incapable of sustaining 
movements larger than clandestinity, leaving terrorism the only conceivable choice for those 
determined to rebel by using violence.  
                                               
9 See Appendix A for economic results using a 2-tailed test 
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The final indicators assess the relationship between education and terrorism. Strategic 
logic and psychological theory equally consider education to be a contributing factor of 
terrorism. From one aspect, Post (1990) describes the potential terrorist as being a social outcast, 
typically involving educational failure, although Laqueur (1999) refutes this notion by describing 
several campaign organizers as being middleclass and having an educated background. Though 
contradictory, both concepts are potentially valid. Evidence suggests that numerous elements of 
education contribute both directly and indirectly to terrorism. Traits differentiating terrorists 
from other criminal networks include the organizational use of violence guided by political 
ambition that requires moderate knowledge of underground structuralization and violent 
resistance. In the case of ETA, literature commonly depicts its founding members as more 
intellectual than later generations, but while intelligence and sophistication are attributably 
fundamental in developing durable networks and successful missions, equally characteristic of 
ETA, movements are also complex. Terrorist organizations potentially rely on variously skilled 
individuals for different aspects of logistics and violence, and whose educational experiences are 
potentially uniquely influential within the organization. Even educational restrictions under 
Franco are considered relevant where both education and its repression are seen as contributing 
to ETA’s formation.  
The intimation is that both access to education and the lack thereof contribute in several 
important ways regarding terrorism. This leads to a bifurcated approach for analyzing the role of 
education in which the first variable comprises underdeveloped educational systems determined 
by literacy rates under ninety-eight percent and measures educational stagnation. The second 
variable measures the significance of highly developed systems by assessing states with literacy 
rates at and above ninety-eight percent. Despite the twentieth century being witness to growing 
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populations with decreasing illiteracy rates worldwide, few states have achieved full literacy. 
Literacy rates have a direct relationship with educational systems and are a strong indicant for 
human development used by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to track 
progress in developing states. These rates measure literacy among those aged fifteen years and 
older and therefore educational stagnation is measured by comparing the growth rate of the 
literate portion of the population to changes in its actual size. When the number of persons aged 
fifteen and over increases at a rate higher than the literate population, educational systems are 
considered more stagnant, but when literacy rates increase at a higher rate it indicates that 
educational systems are expanding and therefore less stagnant. A benefit of this approach is that 
it observes a direct correlation between education and demographics most prone to terrorism 
which tend to be young males slightly past the age of formal education and less affected by 
current educational structures. In addition, it compares systems with drastically disparate literacy 
rates, although it is ineffective for highly literate populations.  
The measurement for educational stagnation is relevant for areas with suboptimal literacy 
rates but not for countries like Australia, Canada, Great Britain, France, Switzerland and the 
United States that report literacy rates in the 98th percentile or higher. These states provide full 
access to education with estimates representing a generally educated populace where illiteracy is 
no longer a common social barrier. Meanwhile, illiteracy remains an epidemic in several 
locations throughout the world. Nearly ninety percent of the cases in this analysis have literacy 
rates under ninety-eight percent and some lower than three percent. In order to incorporate each 
case, this study develops a dichotomous variable to test the significance of literacy rates at and 
above ninety-eight percent, which controls against inaccurately reporting stagnant educational 
 
72 
systems while measuring the significance that highly developed educational systems have on the 
development of terrorist organizations. 
Literacy rates correlate with several components of societal development, and therefore 
the educational variables may produce several inferences. Although statistical significance would 
strengthen several theoretical concepts, insignificant correlations would weaken neither strategic 
logic nor psychological theory. While none of the variables in this study necessarily reflects the 
specific reality of the individuals forming a terrorist organization, this fact is especially important 
to consider when interpreting these latter variables. Accordingly, a positive statistically 
significant relationship with educational stagnation could indicate psychologically damaging 
conditions but would not retract from strategic logic, as it provides no indication about the 
educational attainment of those creating the terrorist organization. Moreover, stagnation could 
correlate with a multiplicity of factors that influence a strategy of resistance utilizing terrorist 
violence. Alternatively, a positive statistically significant relationship with literacy rates above 
98 percent increases the probability that those individuals are educated and have access to 
information for learning about clandestine resistance. Furthermore, it could indicate education 
contributing to social expectations in which educational failure reduces social status and 
contributes to forces influencing antisocialism and aggression.  
By integrating these eight variables into the logic model, the formula appears as follows: 
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Results of Logit Regression 
TABLE II 
Logit Analysis of Environmental Conditions during the Formation of Ethno/national Separatist 
Terrorist Organizations 
Ind. Variables                      Creation of ENS Terrorist 
Organization 
Culture 1.245*** 
 .143 
Exposure to Violence .296*** 
 .035 
Political Freedom .134*** 
 .014  
Nonmilitant Groups .237*** 
 .071 
Political Transitions .485** 
 .216      
Economic Conditions  .216** 
 .099 
Educational Stagnation -5.009** 
 2.004 
.98+ Literacy Rates .345 
 .233 
   
Constants -3.422 
 2.062 
  
Log Likelihood -695.70947 
Pseudo-r squared  0.196 
Number of 
Observations 9321 
*p<.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.00 
 
 
 
TABLE III 
Change in probability of ENS terrorist organization developing as a function of unit change in 
the independent variables  
             Prob. of ENS  Culture Violence Democracy Groups Transition Economy Education 
(dy/dx)  .78% .18% .08% .15% .38% .13% -3.13% 
1 unit increase   .63% 1.41% .81% .71% .78% 1.01% .76% -2.5% 
Total  units         .63% 3.36% 2.07% 2.31% 1.83% 1.01% 1.15% -5.44% 
Dy/dx = proportional change in ENS formation per unit change in independent variable
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Analysis of Logit Results 
These findings offer important insights into the study of ENS terrorism. Table 1 describes 
the results of the logit model, which measures the relationship between possible contributors of 
nationalism and terrorism and the formation of ENS terrorist organizations. It includes 9321 
observations of minority populations throughout the world with 174 cases of the dependent 
variable, indicating that ENS terrorist organizations have a 1.9 percent probability of forming 
within these populations. The independent variables represent cultural sensitivity, exposure to 
violence, political freedom, political representation/alternatives to violence, political transitions, 
economic conditions, educational stagnation, and developed educational systems, with all except 
developed educational systems showing a significant relationship with the dependent variable. 
Educational stagnation is the only variable showing a negative correlation, and Table 2 and the 
graphs illustrate the probability in relation between the dependent and independent variables. 
GRAPH I 
Correlation of cultural identity and creation of ethno/national separatist terrorist organization 
Cultural Sensitivity
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The association with cultural sensitivity in Table 1 supports concepts of nationalist theory 
and connects ENS terrorism to cultural symbolization and distinct ethnic identity. Table 2 shows 
this propensity increased by 0.78 percent per unit increase in the cultural indicant where the most 
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sensitive populations increase the probability of the dependent variable by approximately 3 
percent. In addition, Graph 1 shows a nonlinear relationship with a sharp curvature in the 
dependent variable at 2.5 units. This signifies importance within each of the four cultural indices, 
which individually correlate considerably with the dependent variable. These four indices are 
illustrated in Table 3 (see below), which shows cases occurring most frequently among 
geographically clustered populations with 69 percent among the most concentrated and 21 
percent where the majority lived within close proximity, and only 2.7 percent occurring among 
widely dispersed populations. Separatist ideology was present in 82 percent of the cases, and 
although only 44 percent occurred among the most culturally distinct, zero cases occurred when 
no notable differences existed between mainstream and minority populations. The results for 
historical homeland vary somewhat from the expectation that volatility would increase when 
minority populations have less control over ancestral lands. Although 41 percent of cases did 
occur where ancestral lands surpassed provincial and state boundaries, 40 percent also occurred 
where territory did not exceed the provincial base, though only 1.5 percent occurred when 
ancestral lands were inexistent. However, the symbols of cultural identity are innumerable and 
the cases where ancestral territory remained completely within a population’s domain do not 
imply that no other cultural symbols were under threat.  
TABLE IV 
Correlations between indices of cultural sensitivity and the formation of terrorist organizations 
Culture  Sepx Groupcon Culdifxx gc8 (recoded) 
 no. occur % no. occur % no. occur % no. occur % 
0 0 0 5 .03 0 0 3 .02 
1 18 .1 18 .1 21 .12 18 .1 
2 16 .1 38 .21 29 .16 66 ..37 
3 143 .81 116 .66 45 .25 18 .10 
4 X X X X 82 .46 72 .41 
Total 177 100 177 100 177 100 177 100 
X = no observations; sepx=separatist ideology; groupcon=group concentration; 
culdifxx=cultural differentials; gc8=historic homeland with reordered categories  
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GRAPH II 
Correlation between violence and creation of ethno/national separatist terrorist organization 
Exposure to Violence
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 Levels of violence between minority populations and the state or other antagonists are 
shown in Table 1 to have a positive relationship with the formation of ENS terrorist campaigns. 
Table 2 describes this relationship involving a unit probability of 0.2 percent indicating a 3.4 
percent probability of the dependent variable in extreme conflict, such as civil war, although no 
cases in the data appear at this point. In addition, 15 percent of the cases occurred when no 
violence was reported whatsoever. The lack of violence in some cases indicates that hostility 
potentially contributes towards the decision to use terrorism but is not definitive that terrorism 
will occur and consequently provides inconclusive results regarding psychological theory. The 
role of increased frequencies of violence could be as much psychological as tactical. To validate 
the psychological argument that a radicalization process precedes the initiation of terrorism, the 
cases that show an absence of violence would require the presence of either undocumented 
violence or borderline and antisocial personalities, although equally possible, violence could 
factor in strategically if populations are conditioned to extreme violence and therefore less 
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responsive to moderate tactics. Just as violence could contribute to a psychological breakdown 
that encourages aggression, people living amid hostility might also be encouraged to employ 
aberrant violence in order to gain notoriety, in which case these findings support both strategic 
logic and psychological theory. 
GRAPH III 
Correlation between democracy and creation of ethno/national separatist terrorist organization 
Political Freedom
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 Political environments appear to have a multidimensional relationship with the creation 
of ENS terrorist organizations. In accordance with the assumption that terrorism occurs most 
often in democracies, democratic freedom is shown in Table 1 to have a significant positive 
relationship with the dependent variable, with nearly every case occurring where some degree of 
political freedom, however sparse, was present. Graph 3 describes this relationship becoming its 
most pronounced in the positive range of Polity2, with a sharp increase in the dependent variable 
towards the highest levels of political freedom. Nearly 72 percent of the cases correlated with 
democratic scores of 8, 9, and 10, while only one case occurred where autocracy was valued at -
10. Moreover, Table 2 shows political freedom having a unit probability of 0.08 percent thereby 
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leading to a 2.1 percent probability of the dependent variable in the democratically freest states. 
These findings support assumptions about the relationship between democracy and terrorism, 
primarily the need for the right to organize in order to integrate movements. However, despite 
this positive correlation, ENS movements do not appear to be a byproduct of endowed liberty.  
GRAPH IV 
Correlation between representation and creation of ethno/national separatist terrorist organization 
Nonmilitant Organizations
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Movements often transpire in correlation with political freedom allowing social mobility 
but lacking sufficient milieus for addressing many social, political, or economic concerns. The 
analysis suggests that while these movements tend to emerge within liberal environments, the 
minority populations comprising them lack equal status or access to political society. Not a 
single case occurred among minority populations categorized by MAR as politically advantaged 
while nearly 85 percent occurred where at least moderate levels of political deprivation were 
present. Moreover, Table 1 shows nonmilitant organizations correlating significantly with the 
dependent variable. Nearly half the cases took place where no peaceful organizations were 
shown to represent the interests of the minority population, with nearly 93 percent of cases 
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occurring where fewer than three nonmilitant organizations were present. This suggests that the 
freer environments providing agility for organizing movements are not allocating freedoms 
equally, are potentially relegating members of the minority population to a lower sociopolitical 
status, and as a result supports the theory that terrorism is a tactic used when viable alternatives 
are unavailable for legitimately pursuing political goals. 
Furthermore, Table 1 shows the variable for political transitions having a positive and 
significant relationship with the formation of ENS terrorist organizations. Although fewer than 
14 percent of the observations contain these transitions, almost 18 percent of cases occurred 
during these periods, with nearly 80 percent occurring in areas where terrorist organizations had 
previously been established, 75 percent of which the minority population responsible had already 
produced a terrorist organization. Although this variable includes various changes in political 
freedom, its general presence increases the probability of the dependent variable by 3.7 percent, 
nearly doubling its probability. Therefore, political instability and social insecurity appear to play 
important roles in the development of terrorist organizations. Even among cases not occurring 
during these periods, less than a quarter took place in areas where the level of political freedom 
had remained constant for a decade or longer. These correlations support the assumption that 
social unrest contributes to terrorism although transitions primarily appear factoring in locations 
where terrorism is already a common practice. In this case, impoverished, unsafe, and unstable 
environments potentially function as an opportunistic backdrop for discontent persons who view 
terrorism as a normative tactic to mobilize and act by using terrorism to maximize their results. 
These findings point to both a logistical methodology and psychological forces facilitating the 
use of extreme violence, which supports psychological theory while reinforcing ideas of strategic 
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logic that consider terrorism a reaction to opportunity influencing not only acts of terrorism but 
also the initiation of campaigns. 
However, the political environment may be less decisive in the development of ENS 
terrorist campaigns in comparison to the dynamics of the population itself. Several populations 
repeatedly create new terrorist organizations despite changes in political freedom. Albanians in 
Yugoslavia, Basques in Spain, Hill Tribes in Bangladesh, Malay-Muslims in Thailand, and 
Moros in the Philippines each share a protracted pattern of producing new terrorist campaigns 
long after gaining substantial levels of political freedom. These populations reflect the behavior 
of the Ijaw in Nigeria and Karens in Burma, who first created campaigns during liberal periods 
and then during autocracy, and Corsicans in France, Palestinians in Israel, Irish in Great Britain, 
and Kurds in Turkey, who continue producing new movements amid greater political stagnancy. 
This legacy of renewing terror campaigns possibly shows views on using terrorism developing as 
an integral part of a cultural identity. This association between culture and terrorism indicates a 
cultural inclination for using terrorism that surpasses several structural conditions, in which case 
nationalism, strategy, and psychological forces may each function in the initiation of terrorist 
organizations.  
The model shows economic factors also play a significant role in the formation of ENS 
terrorist organizations. Table 1 shows the economic variable having a positive relationship that 
Table 2 reports as having unit probability of 0.13 percent, leading to a 1.2 percent probability of 
the dependent variable within the highest category. These findings support the assumption that 
financial resources influence levels of rebellion, which also appear important in considering 
which type of organization to develop. The analysis further provides insight into correlations 
between a country’s economic circumstances and a population’s position within that economy, 
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also indicating that factors of privation may contribute to a psychological component leading to 
terrorist violence. These results highlight an aspect of terrorism that unemployment rates alone 
cannot explain. The majority of cases in this study correlated with lower unemployment rates 
with nearly 70 percent of cases occurring when unemployment rates were at or below 10 percent, 
over half occurred below 5 percent, while only 13 percent occurred above 20 percent, the highest 
at 36.7 percent. However, only one percent of cases occurred amongst populations considered by 
MAR as economically advantaged whereas nearly 85 percent correlated with disadvantages, with 
nearly half occurring amid severe economic disparity. These results strengthen strategic logic by 
indicating that economic conditions do influence the scope of rebellion, and further show that an 
economic system can contribute to the initiation of terrorism based on a combination of national 
prosperity and economic repression within that system.    
GRAPH V 
Correlation between economy and creation of ethno/national separatist terrorist organization 
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Table 1 shows stagnant educational systems having a significant negative relationship 
with the formation of ENS terrorist organizations, implying a strong relationship between factors 
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relating to civil development and terrorism. Educational stagnation is shown in Table 2 to have a 
-3.13 percent unit probability, which shares a nonlinear correlation with the dependent variable. 
Illustrated in Graph 6 (see below), the probability of the dependent variable decreases 
substantially as the proportional variation in annual literacy growth rates nears those of the 
population aged fifteen and over. When literacy rates increase at 30 percent the rate of the 
population, the probability of the dependent variable is 7.4 percent, and as this variation 
approximates 90 percent, the probability of the dependent variable decreases to less than one 
percent and becomes virtually nonexistent as growth in literacy rates begins to surpass the 
demographic. Illustrated in Table 4 (see below), nearly 100 percent of the cases, not including 
those where literacy rates were above 98 percent, occurred before the variance between literacy 
and population growth rates reached 102 percent with no observations shown above 108 percent, 
and by the maximum variation, 224 percent, the probability of the dependent variable decreased 
by 5.4 percent.  
GRAPH VI 
Correlation between educational and creation of ethno/national separatist terrorist organization  
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TABLE V 
The annual proportional changes in literate population divided by annual proportional change in 
population aged 15 and over. 
Proportion variation Including 98%+ Literacy rate <98% Literacy 
 No. Occur % No. Occur % 
75.4% 1 .5 1 .6 
94.5% 1 .5 0 0 
97.6% 1 .5 1 .6 
99%-- 100% 42 21.9 19 11.7 
-- 101% 58 30.2 53 32.5 
-- 102% 51 26.6 51 31.3 
-- 103% 30 15.6 29 17.8 
-- 104% 5 2.6 5 3.1 
-- 105% 2 1 2 1.2 
-- 106% 1 .5 1 .6 
-- 107% 0 0 0 0 
-- 108% 1 .5 1 .6 
Total 192 100 163 100 
 
Table 1 does not show developed educational systems having a significant relationship 
with the formation of ENS terrorist organizations. These results, along with those for nonmilitant 
organizations and educational stagnation point to a complex relationship between democracy and 
the dependent variable. Illustrated in Table 6 (see below), the majority of observations with 
literacy rates at and above 98 percent correlate with higher levels of democratic freedom. 
Implicitly, if liberalization alone led to an increase in the development of terrorist organizations, 
the expectation would be that high literacy rates also correlate with their development. However, 
the higher literacy rates are not shown to be a significant factor. Instead, the data shows ENS 
terrorist organizations developing most often in less-developed educational systems. Nearly 90 
percent of the cases occurred in states with literacy rates below 98 percent, with more than half 
occurring where literacy rates were below 60 percent, the lowest being 11.6 percent. Because 
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numerous aspects of human development correlate with literacy rates, including infant mortality, 
the contributions to terrorism could develop from multiple stimuli associated with these findings, 
and in which case expanding educational systems likely indicate progressive polices aggressively 
addressing a variety of social needs and therefore reducing motivations to rebel. These findings 
show the roles of education and civil development as multidimensional, and while liberalization 
correlates with the dependent variable, the motivations behind ENS terrorism appear to originate 
from repressive conditions. 
TABLE VI 
Distribution of democratic freedom and observations of literacy rates at and above 98 percent  
Dem. -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total 
Obs. 67 2 349 11 3 16 17 2 5 8 2 94 39 58 104 124 114 715 1730 
% 4 .1 20 .6 .2 .9 1 .1 .3 .5 .1 5 2 3 6 7 7 41 100 
 
In conclusion, the purpose of this study is to learn more about the background conditions 
that influence the development of ENS terrorist organizations. Analyzing this aspect of terrorism 
requires understanding several elements of both nationalist and terrorist movements. Although 
theories of nationalism disagree about the age of nationalism and structural versus biological 
mechanisms, they share concepts about cultural identity, symbolisms, and the plasticity of 
perception. Other than viewing the case of terrorism in Spain from a historical context, this 
analysis did not attempt to compare the competing views of nationalist theory. Rather, it set out 
to determine whether the concepts of nationalist-based aggression also apply to terrorism, and 
can be used to explain cases of ENS terrorism, by measuring the relationship between cultural 
sensitivity and the formation of ENS terrorist campaigns. However, this study does compare two 
theories of terrorism: strategic logic and psychological theory. These two theories are evaluated 
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using variables that assess experiences with violence, levels of democracy, changes in political 
freedom, economic conditions, representation, and stagnant and developed educational systems.  
The results of the logit model connect ideas of nationalist, strategic, and psychological 
theory to the origins of ENS terrorism. Except for developed educational systems, each variable 
is shown to have a significant relationship with the creation of ENS terrorist campaigns. The 
variable for cultural sensitivity strengthens theoretical assumptions about factors that lead to an 
aggressive response from some populations to threats against their cultural identity. These results 
bridge the theories of nationalism to ENS terrorism by showing an association between elements 
of cultural identity deriving from a manner in which a minority population perceives its status 
relative to the status of the mainstream population. The variables for an exposure to violence, 
nonmilitant organizations, and educational stagnation suggest that repressive and volatile 
conditions may contribute to a psychological breakdown facilitating an acceptance of violence as 
a means of resistance, although by organizations that have a logical grasp on reality somewhat in 
harmony with the consciousness of the majority of the minority population. The variables for 
political freedom, nonmilitant organizations, and economic conditions suggest that ENS terrorist 
campaigns tend to emerge in politically freer states from among minority populations who are 
more repressed than the mainstream population. The variables for political transitions and 
educational stagnation also support strategic logic and psychological theory. These variables 
show terrorism being initiated during periods of social unrest that are potentially psychologically 
damaging, but more important, provide an opportunity for terrorist organizations to maximize 
their results. Moreover, this suggests that violent conditions may strategically encourage the use 
of terrorism in order to gain notice. 
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DIAGRAM I 
Forces influencing the creation of ethno/national separatist terrorist organizations  
 
The results of this project show that the theories of nationalism and terrorism each assists 
in explaining aspects of ENS terrorism. Anthony D. Smith thoroughly integrated concepts of 
primordialism and modernism to create an accurate depiction of several elements of nationalist-
based aggression. Crenshaw (1990) accurately explained several forces motivating organizations 
to use terrorism as a strategic response, and appears correct in suggesting that psychology plays 
an important role in developing terrorist organizations, while the contributions of psychological 
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theory appear more subjective. This study suggests that psychological forces influencing the 
creation of terrorist organizations predominately contribute to an acceptance of violence as a 
method of resistance. However, while this study cannot assess whether ENS terrorist campaigns 
develop in response to long-term emotional damage, Post (1990) appears too overreaching in so 
precisely defining the role of psychology in terrorism. Although psychological forces may factor 
in as they relate to cultural identity, social instability, and repression, the conditions under which 
ENS terrorist organizations tend to develop demonstrates a strategic response driven by several 
factors. These findings put the formation of ENS terrorist organizations inside a strategic realm 
that shows a strong association between cultural identity and conditions influencing the scope of 
rebellion. Therefore, the ideas offered by nationalist and strategic theory seem to fit compatibly 
within the focus of this analysis, while the role of psychology appears more subtle. As a result, 
nationalist theory and strategic logic appear to offer the most valid explanations for the origins of 
ENS terrorist organizations.  
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Conclusion 
This paper examines several social, political, and economic conditions that potentially influence 
the development of ethno/national separatist (ENS) terrorist organizations. Terrorism is a critical 
subject around the world, and concerns over this issue continue to grow as the cases of terrorism 
become more frequent while having a continuously devastating impact on society. The subject of 
terrorism covers a broad spectrum of aggression and ideology that limits the potential to develop 
a theory that can precisely explain every case of terrorism. While terrorist organizations typically 
share several common characteristics, such as using violence or the threat of violence to achieve 
recognition, many distinguishing traits exist between these organizations that primarily derive 
from the forces motivating their adoption of violence. The threats posed by terrorism increase the 
need to understand more about these specific forms of terrorism and the conditions that increase 
their potential to occur. To address this need, this study examines the ENS form of terrorism by 
focusing on the origins of ENS terrorist campaigns.  
The approach taken for studying the ENS form of terrorism begins by analyzing literature 
on nationalist and terrorist theory. These theories describe a paradigm for studying the origins of 
ENS terrorism, which involves organizations that begin as ethno-political movements established 
around a goal of achieving national sovereignty. These movements tend to develop within certain 
populations that the theories for nationalism explain to result from an increased sense of cultural 
sensitivity based on perceived threats against their cultural identity. This heightened sensitivity 
tends to correlate with condensed populations who share a unique ethnic identity and cultural 
symbols that reinforce their distinctiveness. As it relates to ENS terrorism, an historic homeland 
is often seen as a powerful symbol of a cultural identity, and ENS campaigns tend to correlate 
with populations who share a strong attachment to their ancestral territory. Furthermore, the 
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approaches for studying terrorism portray this subject as a reactive phenomenon committed by 
organizations that behave as a single entity. The theories for terrorism describe several possible 
forces motivating oppositionist movements to transition from a phase of nonviolence to an active 
terrorist campaign, while sharing a view that assists in retracing episodes of terrorism to their 
root causes for identifying case specific stimuli. 
The areas where the theories for nationalism and terrorism come into disagreement relate 
to the manner in which individuals are considered inclined towards aggression. Primordialism 
and psychological theory point to an emotional element linking individual aggression to hostile 
movements, and while some primordialists argue that the associations between aggression and 
nationalism are evolutionary inheritable traits, modernists and ethnosymbolists view nationalist-
based aggression as stemming from populations being taught to interpret structural conditions. In 
addition, the theories for terrorism disagree on the underlying forces influencing an organization 
to adopt terrorism, deviating on whether this decision is conceived rationally. Strategic logic 
views the adoption of terrorism as a tactic for maximizing gains. However, psychological theory 
considers this an irrational decision by antisocial groups that have a unidimensional worldview.  
Moreover, while strategic logic considers psychology playing a central role in the development 
of a terrorist organization, psychological theory views these organizations as the manifestation of 
the personality disorders of emotionally damaged individuals within the groups. 
After analyzing the theoretical literature, this study examines the examples of Basque and 
Catalonian terrorism and Roma passivity in Spain. This case illustrates how certain background 
conditions may have influenced the development of ENS terrorism in Spain. These conditions 
appear to involve an enduring and distinct ethno/national cultural identity, threats against cultural 
symbols, volatile and hostile conditions, levels of social agility, desires to affect change without 
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lawful methods to pursue it, and access to information about underground rebellion and financial 
resources. These conditions may also play a central role in the development of ENS terrorist 
organizations elsewhere, and this study operationalizes these findings and uses a logit model to 
evaluate their relationship with the development of ENS terrorist organizations throughout the 
world. The results of this study show that it is possible to identify populations and environments 
that have an increased potential for producing ENS terrorist organizations. 
TABLE VII 
Expected Results 
  Nationalist Theory Strategic Logic Psychological Theory 
Cultural 
Sensitivity 
 Strengthens: threats 
to cultural symbols 
leading to violence 
 
Strengthens: violence 
integrated into cultural 
identity 
Violent 
Environment 
 Strengthens: 
violence targeting 
ethny 
Strengthens: a strategy 
to gain notoriety amid 
hostile conditions 
Strengthens: 
psychologically 
conditioned for violence 
Political 
Freedom 
 Freedom of assembly & 
strengthens if ethny is 
politically repressed  
Strengthens: detached 
from reality & rejection 
of social norms 
Alternatives to 
Violence 
 Weakens: violence is 
used despite having 
alternatives 
Strengthens: violence is 
used despite having 
alternatives 
Social Unrest 
 Strengthens: terrorism 
used to maximize results  
Weakens: terrorism 
used for tactical 
advantage 
Limited 
Financial 
Resources 
 Strengthens: ethny 
is economically 
repressed 
Strengthens: terrorism 
determined by available 
resources 
Strengthens: repressive 
conditions having a 
psychological effect 
Educational 
Stagnation 
 Strengthens: repressive 
conditions influencing 
rebellion 
Strengthens: repressive 
conditions having a 
psychological effect 
Access to 
education 
 Strengthens: greater 
access to information for 
clandestinity & rebellion 
Strengthens: social 
expectations leading to 
psychological damage 
 
The example of terrorism in Spain also shows the dispute in nationalist theory concerning 
the age of nationalism being a semantical debate. The behaviors that correlate with nationalist-
based aggression are observed existing in Iberia long before Spain became a modern nation state. 
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Foremost, the Roman Empire introduced a common identity to the Peninsula that formulated a 
common Latin identity around which the Kingdom of Castile later reunited the region, and 
contributed to distinguishing Basque and Catalonian identity. Furthermore, Castilian identity led 
to xenophobia against both Roma and Moslem populations for centuries before the industrial 
age. The changing perceptions of Basque national identity following the Industrial Revolution 
and civil wars merely illustrated the plasticity of perception, which strengthens the concepts of 
ethnosymbolism that highlight the enduring qualities of national identity and their continued 
alteration by perceptions of reality. Furthermore, strategic logic and psychological theory explain 
how a progression of increased propensities for violence ultimately resulted in the emergence of 
Euskadi ta Askatazuna and Terra Lliure. These terrorist organizations followed a process that 
moved Basque and Catalonian oppositionist movements between Marxism and nationalism, and 
eventually led to jingoist struggles for achieving Basque and Catalonian national independence. 
The logit regression model offers an assessment of the nationalist and terrorist theories by 
measuring the relationship between the findings from the Spanish case and the origins of ENS 
terrorism throughout the world. The cases in this model observe two-hundred ninety-seven 
minority populations from one-hundred twenty-six states, including the Soviet Union, with 
observations spanning primarily between 1945 and 2003. The independent variables assess the 
role of cultural sensitivity, encounters with violence, political freedom, representation/alternative 
options, transitioning levels of political freedom, economic conditions, educational stagnation, 
and developed educational systems. The dependent variable is a dichotomous indicator for the 
development of ENS terrorist organizations among these populations. The analysis shows ENS 
terrorist organizations having a 1.9 percent probability of developing, with cultural identity, 
encounters with violence, political freedom, social unrest, underrepresentation, disproportionate 
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economic privation, and stagnant educational systems and other factors of civil development 
increasing this probability. This implies an ability to detect the conditions contributing to the 
development of ENS terrorism, including the populations and areas where organizations are 
likely to develop, the personality and background of those involved, their individual and 
collective goals, and other motivating forces, therefore implying the potential to improve policies 
for effectively confronting this issue. 
The results of this study also show several concepts of national theory being compatible 
with strategic logic and psychological theory, suggesting that each of these theories may assist in 
explaining the origins of ENS terrorism. The cultural variable strengthens the general concepts of 
nationalist theory by measuring nationalist sentiment, distinct cultural markers, and the degree of 
threat against national identity. The remaining variables contribute to both strengthening and 
weakening the concepts of strategic logic and psychological theory. The variables for political 
freedom and nonmilitant organizations that measure the social agility and legitimate channels for 
pursuing political change show terrorism used to compensate for a lack of alternatives. The 
variables for violence, transitions, and education assess the effects of unstable social conditions, 
showing both strategic and psychological forces potentially influencing the use of terrorism. The 
variable for economic conditions shows economic privation influencing the scope of rebellion, 
indicating a strategic response while also implying conditions that are potential psychologically 
damaging. Finally, the variables for education assessing civil development and access to 
information indicate conditions that are potentially psychologically damaging but also contribute 
to a rational basis for employing clandestine rebellion. These findings show unstable conditions 
potentially contributing to a psychological breakdown of inhibitions against using violence. 
However, it appears that terrorist organizations, at least initially, maintain a logical grasp on 
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reality, and develop in populations that are more repressed than mainstream populations. These 
organizations tend to emerge in moderately liberal climates while the most fertile environments 
involve a history of terrorism and political instability; consequently, indicating a psychological 
conditioning for using terrorism when it is strategically beneficial for maximizing results. 
There are weaknesses to this study however. The variables analyzed in this model lack 
specific indications about the individuals forming terrorist organizations. The absence of a direct 
observation of these individuals impedes the ability to assess accurately several psychological 
forces considered to contribute to the decisions to initiate terrorism. Psychology potentially plays 
a multidimensional and intrinsic role in the development of ENS terrorist organizations, but this 
study is limited in its ability to assess the full scope of those emotional components. The best 
conclusion that this study can offer regarding the role of psychology in the development of ENS 
terrorism is how similar background conditions correlate with the creation of campaigns, and the 
pattern among specific populations who continue developing additional terrorist movements, 
seems to imply a socially learned or situationally induced psychological state that facilitates an 
acceptance of violence. However, future research aimed at addressing the psychological aspects 
of terrorism may strengthen the understanding about the role of psychology with ENS terrorism.   
This paper provides a starting point for new research. Currently, there may be more than 
two-hundred active ENS terrorist organizations around the world, although research in this field 
tends to focus disproportionately on notorious organizations such as the IRA, PKK, and ETA. 
Advancing knowledge in this field requires expanding beyond these already well-documented 
cases. There is a significant amount of untapped knowledge regarding this subject, and future 
studies should expand the range of observations to include several other populations and terrorist 
organizations. Furthermore, research should continue studying the biological components of 
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aggression while continuing to combine concepts of nationalist and terrorist theory. Additional 
analyses should observe concepts that this paper was unable to assess, such as organizational 
splitting or the intrinsic parts of nationalism. Studying specific organizations or innate individual 
characteristics, however, may require utilizing case studies or measuring a smaller number of 
observations, since precise details about many movements or the individuals involved are hard to 
obtain. Another important step would involve analyzing ENS organizations, such as Movimiento 
Estudiantil de Chicanos de Aztlán (MECHA), which have not initiated terrorism for furthering 
their goals. These suggestions illustrate the ample space for advancing the study of terrorism, 
especially ENS terrorism, which has the potential to become an increasingly common tactic for 
marginalized populations worldwide.    
The threats from terrorism are likely to remain a growing concern around the world and a 
major security challenge for most states. As globalization brings the world closer together and 
transforms once rural areas into hubs of modernity, threats from terrorism are likely to increase. 
Concerns over this issue will continue expanding the need to develop policies that prevent or 
reduce its destructive results. These policies should focus on the underlying causes of terrorism, 
and to have the greatest impact, they should address those forces initially motivating individuals 
to become terrorists. This study has demonstrated that several social, political, and economic 
forces have a direct and significant correlation with the creation of ENS terrorist organizations. 
These results show that it is possible to detect, even predict, populations and environments with 
increased potential for producing terrorism. While psychology may assist in identifying those 
individuals within a population who are more prone to becoming terrorists, policy change offers 
the most effective approach for confronting this issue. Terrorism is a form of rebellion, and 
rebellion is a common human response; consequently the potential for terrorism may always 
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exist in the midst of desires to affect change. Nevertheless, steps can be taken that reduce the 
motivations for violent rebellion. Developing civil infrastructure and promoting social equality 
and human rights can significantly reduce its potential. Furthermore, such steps offer a variety of 
benefits, not only lessening the threats that terrorism poses on a population but also providing 
opportunity for improving lives. Most important, preventative measures can thwart the beginning 
of a movement that once active is nearly impossible to stop.  
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APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL TABLES 
 
TABLE VIII 
Logit results using the two-tailed test economic variable  
Ind. Variables                      Creation of ENS Terrorist 
Organization 
Culture 1.245*** 
 .143 
Exposure to Violence .295*** 
 .035 
Political Freedom .133*** 
 .014  
Nonmilitant Groups .237*** 
 .071 
Political Transitions .491** 
 .216      
Economic Conditions  .297** 
 .181 
Educational Stagnation -4.961** 
 2.004 
.98+ Literacy Rates .33 
 .233 
   
Constants -3.261 
 2.065 
  
Log Likelihood -696.6197 
Pseudo-r squared  0.195 
Number of 
Observations 9321 
*p<.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.00 
 
This table shows the results when using a dichotomous economic variable. These results are 
similar to the results from using a categorical economic variable, which uses the same logic. The 
first standard deviation from zero is coded zero. The next three standard deviations are coded 
one, and the remaining values are coded zero. This slightly decreased the coefficients of the 
variables for violence, democracy, and educational stagnation, and decreased the pseudo r-
squared. This also slightly raised the coefficients for transitions and economic conditions. The p-
value for the economic variable rose from 0.029 to 0.1. Because the economic variable is two-
tailed, however, its p-value is considered .005; therefore, remaining significant. 
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TABLE IX 
Relationship between cultural sensitivity and the development of ethno/national separatist 
terrorist campaigns 
 
TABLE X 
Relationship between political representation and the development of ethno/national separatist 
terrorist campaigns 
Nonmilitant Groups Total Cases 
No. 
Occur % Total 
0 7,121 89 46 7,123 
1 3,101 66 34 3,113 
2 1,463 24 12.4 1,459 
3 849 9 4.6 844 
4 305 2 1 305 
5 197 1 .5 197 
6 68 1 .5 68 
7 22 2 1 24 
8 21 0 0 21 
Total 12,960 194 100 13,154 
 
 
 
 
Culture Sensitivity Total Cases 
No. 
Occur % Total 
0 3 0 0 3 
.5 149 0 0 149 
.75 808 3 1.5 811 
1 754 10 5.2 764 
1.25 579 0 0 579 
1.5 1,423 0 0 1,423 
1.75 871 5 2.6 876 
2 1,323 2 1 1,325 
2.25 1,186 8 4.1 1,194 
2.5 1,975 33 17 2,008 
2.75 1,485 29 15 1,514 
3 1,003 34 17.5 1,037 
3.25 696 47 24.2 743 
3.5 642 23 12 665 
Total 12,909 194 100 13,091 
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TABLE XI 
Distribution of violent encounters and development of ethno/national separatist terrorist 
campaigns 
Exposure to Violence Total Cases 
No. 
Occur % Total 
0 7,592 29 15 7,621 
1 858 19 10 877 
2 623 18 9.3 641 
3 983 20 10.3 1,003 
4 557 29 15 586 
5 697 36 19 733 
6 601 27 14 628 
7 414 16 8 430 
8 5 0 0 5 
Total 12,960 194 100 13,154 
 
 
 
 
TABLE XII 
Distribution of economic and political differentials and development of ethno/national separatist 
terrorism campaigns 
 Economic % Total Political % Total 
Terrorist Campaign 0 1 0 1  0 1 0 1  
Advantaged 774 1 6.1 .5 775 557 0 4.3 0 557 
Some advantages 605 1 4.8 .5 606 341 2 2.7 1 343 
No major disparity 2,500 26 19.8 13.4 2,526 2,282 28 17.8 14.4 2,310 
Slight disparity 1,552 28 12.3 14.4 1,580 2,755 48 21.4 24.7 2,803 
Substantial disparity 1,363 30 10.8 15.5 1,393 2,692 44 20.9 22.7 2,736 
Major disparity 1,513 37 12 19.1 1,550 2,403 36 18.7 18.6 2,439 
Extreme disparity 4,336 70 34.3 36.1 4,406 1,824 36 14.2 18.6 1,859 
Total 12,643 193 100 100 12,836 12,853 194 100 100 13,047 
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TABLE XIII 
Distribution of literacy and unemployment rates and development of ethno/national separatist 
terrorist campaigns 
 Literacy Rates Unemployment Rates 
 No. Occur % No. Occur % 
0 – 5% 0 0 66 37.3 
-- 10% 0 0 50 28.2 
-- 15% 3 1.5 28 15.8 
-- 20% 2  1 10 5.6 
-- 25% 2 1 7 4 
-- 30% 3 1.5 7 4 
-- 35% 6 3.1 5 2.8 
-- 40% 9 4.6 4 2.3 
-- 45% 7 3.6 0 0 
-- 50% 13 6.7 0 0 
-- 55% 16 8.2 0 0 
-- 60% 13 6.7 0 0 
-- 65% 13 6.7 0 0 
-- 70% 4 2.1 0 0 
-- 75% 6 3.1 0 0 
-- 80% 2 1 0 0 
-- 85% 19 10 0 0 
-- 90% 11 5.7 0 0 
-- 95% 20 10.3 0 0 
--100% 45 23.2 0 0 
 98-98.9% (7) (3.6) 0 (0) 
99-100% (21) (10.8) 0 (0) 
Total 194 100 177 100 
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TABLE XIV 
Distribution of political freedom, total observations, and development of ethno/national 
separatist terrorist organizations 
Political Freedom Frequency Percent Terrorist Group Percent 
-10 212 1.63 1 .5 
-9 1,044 8.02 8 4.1 
-8 529 4.06 2 1 
-7 3,017 23.17 20 10.4 
-6 661 5.08 5 3 
-5 369 2.83 3 2 
-4 268 2.06 2 1 
-3 312 2.40 3 2 
-2 197 1.51 2 1 
-1 308 2.37 2 1 
0 415 3.19 6 3.1 
1 219 1.68 0 0 
2 226 1.74 3 2 
3 168 1.29 1 .5 
4 603 4.63 6 3.1 
5 403 3.10 3 2 
6 395 3.03 7 4 
7 473 3.63 9 5 
8 805 6.18 43 22.3 
9 866 6.65 42 21.8 
10 1,531 11.76 25 13 
Total 13,021 100 193 100 
 
 
TABLE XV 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Culture 13091 2.155 .778 0 3.5 
Exposure to Violence 12524 1.437 2.158 0 8 
Non-militant Groups 13190 -.873 1.27 -8 0 
Political Freedom 13021 -.35 7.128 -10 10 
Political Transitions 13189 .137 .343 0 1 
Economic Conditions 9969 1.354 .748 0 4 
Educational Stagnation 12748 1.015 .035 .302 2.24 
Literacy Rate > .98 13181 .135 .341 0 1 
Dichotomous economics 9969 .26131 .44 0 1 
Terrorism in logit model  9321 .019  0 1 
Total cases of terrorism 13154 .015 .121 0 1 
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APPENDIX B: ENS terrorist organizations forming in the period of 1945 to 2003 
 
Abu al-Rish Brigades: also known as Fatah 
Hawks, Abu al-Reesh Brigades, Ahmed 
Abu al-Rish Brigades, al-Reish 
Brigades; founded in 1993 as a militant 
faction of al-Fatah, active in Gaza, its 
goal is the liberation of Palestine. 
Abu Nidal Organization (ANO): see Fatah 
al-Qiyadah al-Thawriyyah  
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG): also known as 
Abu Sayyaj Moro, and al-Harakat al-
Islamiyah, “Bearer of the Sword;” an 
Islamic Moro separatist organization 
founded in 1991 by dissenting members 
of MNLF, active in the Philippines and 
Malaysia, its goal is to establish an 
independent Islamic state in Mindanao 
in the southern Philippines.  
Abu Sayyaj Moro: see Abu Sayyaf Group   
Accolta Nazinuale Corsa: also known as 
Resistenza Corsa: a Corsican separatist 
organization founded in France in 2002, 
in response to a ceasefire by FLNC, and 
merged with FLNC in 2003. 
Aceh Merdeka: see National Liberation 
Front of Acheh Sumatra  
Adivasi Cobra Force (ACF): also known 
Adivasi Militant Force; formed in India 
in 1996 by Santhal nationalists and other 
tribal natives of Assam following violent 
incursions with Bodos. Its goals include 
seeking reparations for damages caused 
to Santhals during the conflict. The ACF 
is currently working towards becoming a 
legitimate political party. 
Adivasi Militant Force: see Adivasi Cobra 
Force 
Afwaj al Muqawama al Lubnaniya 
(AMAL): also known as Lebanese 
Resistance Detachments and Movement 
of Hope; founded by Imam Musa Sadr in 
Lebanon in 1975 as a Shiite protectionist 
organization, pursuing Shiite interests 
and supporting Palestinians during 
Israel’s 1978 invasion, it eventually 
fused with Hezbollah. 
Ahmed Abu al-Rish Brigades: see Abu al-
Rish Brigades   
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades: founded by 
members of al-Fatah in the West Bank 
and Gaza in 2000, its goal is the 
liberation of Palestinians. 
Al-Asifa: see Al-Fatah   
Al-Badar: see Al-Badr   
Al-Badhr Mujahidin: see Al-Badr   
Al-Badr: also known as al-Badhr Mujahidin, 
and al-Badar; original established in 
1971 by Pakistani Inter Services 
Intelligence, it was reestablished in 1998 
under Kashmiri leadership, its goal is the 
establishment of an independent Islamic 
Kashmir.  
Albanian National Army (ANA): founded in 
2002 in Macedonia following incursions 
with Macedonian troops in 2001, its goal 
is to establish an ethnic Albanian state 
comprised of Albanian populations 
throughout the Balkans. 
Al-Faran: formed in India in 1995, possibly 
by Kashmiri separatists from JeM and 
HuA, its goal is to establish an 
independent state of Kashmir but has 
been inactive since 1995.  
Al-Fatah Intifada, “Fatah Uprising:” also 
known as Fatah Abu Musa; formed in 
1983 by factionalized members of Fatah 
and PLO. It has links with Hezbollah 
and is committed to liberating Palestine. 
Al-Fatah: also known as al-Asifa, Harek at-
Tahrir al-Wataniyyeh al-Filastiniyyeh, 
and Fateh; founded by Faruk Qaddumi, 
Khalid al-Hasan, Salah Khalaf, Khalil 
El-Wazir, and Yassar Araft in the West 
Bank and Gaza in 1959. Originally, 
Fatah was a secularist organization 
seeking the violent removal of Israelis 
from Palestinian territory. Following the 
Oslo Accords in 1993, Fatah became a 
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legitimate political group, renouncing 
terrorism and recognizing Israel’s right 
to exist. 
Al-Hadid: founded in 1994 in India as a 
Kashmiri separatist organization, 
although its purpose is questionable with 
suspicions of it being an Indian military 
scheme, it has been inactive sine 1994.  
Al-Harakat al-Islamiyah: see Abu Sayyaf 
Group   
Al-Jabha al-Dimuqratiyya li-Tahrir Filastin: 
see Democratic Front for the Liberation 
of Palestine  
Al-Jabha ash-Sha'abiya li-Tahrir Falastin, 
“Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP):” founded by George 
Habash in 1967 following the Arab-
Israeli War, its goal is the destruction of 
Israel and creation of a Marxist 
Palestinian state. 
Al-Jabhah al-Islamiyah litahrir Filastin, 
“Islamic Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (IFLP):” formed by 
factionalized PLO members in Lebanon 
in 1986, its goal was to establish a 
sovereign Palestinian state. IFLP has 
been inactive since 1990. 
All Tripura Bharat Suraksha Force 
(ATBSF): a Tripura separatist 
organization and splinter of NLFT, 
possibly founded during the 1990s, its 
goal was the liberation of the tribal areas 
in northeastern India and creation of an 
independent state of Tripura, although 
rumored as having more to do with 
organized crime. ATBSF is no longer 
active.   
All Tripura People’s Liberation 
Organization (ATPLO): founded in India 
in 1980 by Blinada Jamatia and other 
former members of the TNV, flowing 
Hrangkhawal’s orders for the TNV to 
disband, its goal was the liberation of the 
tribal areas in northeastern India and 
creation of an independent state of 
Tripura but was neutralized by 1983.  
All Tripura Security Armed Force 
(ATSAF): a Tripura separatist 
organization and splinter of NLFT, 
possibly founded during the 1990s, its 
goal was the liberation of the tribal areas 
in northeastern India and creation of an 
independent state of Tripura, although 
rumored as having more to do with 
organized crime. ATSAF is no longer 
active.   
All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF): a Tripura 
separatist organization founded in India 
1990 by Ranjit Debbarma and other 
dissenting members of TNV as the All 
Tripura Tribal Force, its goal is to 
liberate the tribal areas in northeastern 
India and establish a sovereign state of 
Tripura. ATTF is also anti-Bengali.  
All Tripura Volunteer Association (ATVA): 
a Tripura separatist organization and 
splinter of NLFT, possibly founded 
during the 1990s, its goal was the 
liberation of the tribal areas in 
northeastern India and creation of an 
independent state of Tripura, although 
rumored as having more to do with 
organized crime. ATVA is no longer 
active.   
All Tripura Volunteer Force (ATVF): a 
Tripura separatist organization and 
splinter of NLFT, likely founded during 
the 1990s, its goal was the liberation of 
the tribal areas in northeastern India and 
creation of an independent state of 
Tripura, although rumored as having 
more to do with organized crime. ATVF 
is no longer active.   
Al-Madina Regiment: also known as al-
Madinah; founded in 2002 as an Islamic 
Kashmiri separatist organization, its goal 
is to establish an Islamic state in 
Malaysia.  
Al-Madinah: see Al-Madina Regiment   
Al-Mansoorain: founded in 2003 as a branch 
of LeT, its goal is to liberate Kashmiris 
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from India and establish an independent 
state of Kashmir.   
Al-Qassam: see Saraya al-Quds  
Al-Quds Battalions: see Saraya al-Quds  
Al-Quds Brigades: see Saraya al-Quds  
Al-Reish Brigades: see Abu al-Rish 
Brigades   
Al-Saiqa: founded by Syrian Ba'athists in 
1966 as a Syrian branch of al-Fatah and 
PLO, its goal is the liberation of 
Palestine, mostly providing support 
beneficial to Syrian policies. 
Apocu Genclik Intikam Mufrezeleri, “Apo's 
Youth Revenge Brigades:” founded in 
Turkey around 1999 by Kurd separatists 
in retaliation to the apprehension of 
Abdullah Ocalan, the founder of the 
PKK, and has been inactive since 1999.  
Apo'nun Intikam Sahinler, “Revenge Hawks 
of Apo:” a Kurdish separatist 
organization founded in Turkey around 
1999 in retaliation to the apprehension of 
Abdullah Ocalan, the founder of the 
PKK, and has been inactive since 1999.  
Apo's Youth Revenge Brigades: see Apocu 
Genclik Intikam Mufrezeleri  
Arab Liberation Front (ALF): also known as 
Jabhat al-Tahrir al-'Arabiyya; founded 
by Iraqi Ba'athists in 1969 as an Iraqi 
branch of al-Fatah and PLO, its goal is 
the destruction of Israel and liberation of 
Palestine. 
Arab Organization: see May 15 
Organization for the Liberation of 
Palestine   
Arab Revolutionary Brigades: see Fatah al-
Qiyadah al-Thawriyyah  
Arab Revolutionary Council: see Fatah al-
Qiyadah al-Thawriyyah  
Arab Revolutionary Expansion Movement: 
see Harakat al-Madd al-Thawri al-Arabi  
Arab Revolutionary Resurgence Movement 
(ARRM): see Harakat al-Madd al-
Thawri al Arabi  
Arab Revolutionary Surge: see Harakat al-
Madd al-Thawri al-Arabi  
Armata Corsa, “Corsican Army:” founded 
by factionalized members of FLNC, 
Jean-Michel Rossi and Francois Santoni, 
in 1999, deterred by FLNC’s links to 
organized crime, but still shares the goal 
of establishing an independent Corsican 
state. 
Armata di Liberazione Naziunale (ALN): 
formed by Corsican separatists in France 
around 2002 but has been inactive since 
although its existence is questionable.    
Armed Commandos of Liberation: see 
Comandos Armados de Liberacion  
Armed Forces of National Liberation: see 
Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion 
Nacional  
Armee Revolutionnaire Bretonne (ARB), 
“Breton Revolutionary Army:” also 
known as Emgann; formed in France in 
1971as the militant branch of the Front 
de Liberation Breton (FLB), which has 
links with ETA, and seeks to establish an 
independent state of Brittany. 
Army of Mohammed: see Jaish-e-
Mohammed  
Army of the Prophet: see Jaish-e-
Mohammed  
Army of the Pure: see Lashkar-e-Toiba  
Army of the Righteous: see Lashkar-e-Toiba  
 Arteshen Rizgariya Gelli Kurdistan 
(ARGK), “People's Liberation Army of 
Kurdistan:” also known as Kurdistan 
National Liberty Army, and People's 
Defense Force; founded in 1984 as a 
militant branch of the PKK, its goal the 
liberation of Kurdistan from Turkey.  
August 23 Movement: possibly arose in 
Lebanon in 1982 from Palestinian and 
Lebanese leftists, although its existence 
is questionable. 
Babbar Khalsa International (BKI): a Sikh 
separatist organization founded in India 
around 1978, its goal is to establish an 
independent state of Khalistan in the 
Punjab Province of northern India. 
Badr Force: see Quwat Badr  
 
105 
Baganda Youth Movement: founded in 1994 
by Bagandans in Uganda, its goal is to 
achieve an independent Buganda state. 
Baloch Liberation Army: see Baluchistan 
Liberation Army  
Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA): also 
known as Baloch Liberation Army; 
founded between 2000 and 2003 by 
Baloch separatists in Pakistan. Its goal is 
to gain sovereignty for Baluchistan. 
Barisan Bersatu Merdeka Pattani, “United 
Front for the Independence of Pattani:” 
also known as Bersatu, “Solidified,” Ber 
Satu, and Payong Organization; founded 
Thailand in 1989 by members of 
Mujahadeen Pattani, BRN, and PULO, 
active in northern Malaysia and southern 
Thailand,  its goal is an independent 
Malay state of Pattani. 
Barisan Nasional Pembe-Basan Pattani 
(BNPP), “National Liberation Front of 
Pattani:” founded first in 1947 and 
reorganized in 1960, its goal was the 
establishment of an independent Pattani 
state in southern Thailand. BNPP has 
been inactive since the 1980s.  
Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Pattani 
(BRN), “National Revolutionary Front:” 
founded by Ustaz Karim Haji Hassan in 
1963 as a breakaway sect of BNPP, 
active in Malaysia and Thailand,  its goal 
was to create an independent Malay 
state, Pattani. Losing strength during the 
1970s, BRN may have merged into 
Bersatu.  
Basque Homeland Freedom: see Euskadi ta 
Askatazuna  
Bayelsa Youths Federation of Nigeria 
(BAYOF): a militant Ijaw organization 
founded in Nigeria in 1960, the Ijaw are 
pursuing an independent state in the 
Niger-Delta of Ijawland.  
BdSF: see National Democratic Front of 
Bodoland  
Bearer of the Sword: see Abu Sayyaf Group   
Belier Party: a Jura or Jurassian separatist 
organization operating in Switzerland, 
possibly formed prior to 1985, its status 
is currently unclear.  
Bhindranwale Tiger Force of Khalistan 
(BTFK): a Sikh separatist organization 
founded by Gurbachan Singh Manochal 
in India in 1984, its goal was the 
establishment of an independent Sikh 
state of Khalistan in the Punjab Province 
of northern India. Its status is currently 
unclear. 
Birsa Commando Force (BCF): founded by 
Santhal separatists in India in 1996, its 
goal was the establishment of an 
independent Bodo state. The BCF has 
recognized a ceasefire since 2004. 
Black Liberation Army (BLA): founded by 
former members of the Black Panther 
Party in the United States in 1971 for 
violently pursuing the self-determination 
of African-Americans. The BLA is no 
longer active. 
Black Panthers (West Bank/Gaza): founded 
in Israel in 1988, funded by al-Fatah for 
violent resistance and Israel, it appears 
to have been inactive since 2005. 
Black September Organization (BSO): 
founded in 1971 as a splinter of al-Fatah 
in retaliation of Jordan removing the 
PLO. BSO is no longer active. 
Black Widows: see Chyornyye Vdovy  
Bodo Liberation Tiger Force (BLTF): see 
Bodo Liberation Tigers  
Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT): also known 
as Bodo Liberation Tiger Force (BLTF) 
and Terrorist Group of Assam: founded 
by Prem Singh Brahma in 1996 in 
Assam, India, its goal was to establish a 
sovereign Bodo state. In 2003, BLT 
negotiated a ceasefire and disbanded. 
Bodo Security Force (BSF): see National 
Democratic Front of Bodoland  
Borok National Council of Tripura (BNCT): 
a Tripura separatist organization founded 
India in 2000 as a breakaway of the 
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NLFT due to tribal factionalism; its goal 
is the liberation of the tribal areas in 
northeastern India and creation of an 
independent state of Tripura. 
Bosnian Serb Armed Militia (BSA): 
established in 1991 as a splinter of the 
Yugoslav Peoples Army (JNA), 
comprising Bosnian Serbs, the BSA 
fought along side the JNA during the 
Bosnian-Kosovo conflict. As a loose 
collaboration of Chetnik militias, it 
launched a terror campaign pursuing an 
ethnic Serbian state of Srpska.  
Boys of the Ijaw god of War: see Egbesu 
Boys  
Breton Revolutionary Army: see Armee 
Revolutionnaire Bretonne 
Catalan Liberation Front: see Front 
d'Alliberament Català  
Catalan Red Liberation Army (CRLA), also 
known as Exèrcit Roja d'Alliberament 
Català: a Catalan separatist organization 
possibly founded during the late 1980s. 
Its status is unknown. 
Catholic Reaction Force (CRF): founded in 
1983 in Northern Ireland as a branch of 
the INLA. CRF shares INLA’s goal for 
establishing an independent Irish state. 
Chikoko Movement: a pan-Niger Delta 
militant organization founded in 1997 as 
a coalition of IYC and Egbesu, 
comprising Andonis, Ijaws, Ikwerres, 
Ilajes, Iteskiris, Ogonis, and Urhobos, 
led by Oronto Douglas, it seeks 
protection and self-determination for the 
ethnic groups of southern Nigeria.  
Chin National Front: a Zomi (Chin) 
separatist organization founded in 
Burma in 1967, its purpose is to 
establish an independent Chin state.  
Chittagong Hill Tracts United People’s 
Party: see Parbatya Chattagram Jana 
Sanghati Samity  
Chyornyye Vdovy, “Black Widows:” began 
in 2000 in Russia with Chechen widows 
becoming suicide bombers after being 
taught that their husbands died in clashes 
against Russian forces as punishment for 
their sins, and subsequently becoming a 
burden on Chechen separatists. 
Clandestini: see Clandestinu   
Clandestinu: also known as Clandestini: 
founded in France by Corsican 
separatists around 1999, although 
inactive, elements Clandestinu may have 
merged with Clandestini Corsi. 
Comandos Armados de Liberacion (CAL), 
“Armed Commandos of Liberation:” 
founded in 1968 by Puerto Rican 
separatists, its goal was to establish a 
sovereign state of Puerto Rico. CAL 
disbanded by 1972, with some members 
creating FALN in 1974. 
Continuity Army Council: see Continuity 
Irish Republican Army 
Continuity IRA: see Continuity Irish 
Republican Army 
Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA): 
also known as Irish Continuity Army 
Council (ICAC), Continuity IRA, and 
Continuity Army Council: founded in 
Northern Ireland in 1968, its goal is to 
reunite north and south Ireland as a 
sovereign state. 
Corsican Army: see Armata Corsa  
Corsican Patriotic Front (FPC): formed in 
1999 by Corsican nationalists and 
members the FLNC and other Corsican 
terrorist organizations, in 2002 it 
negotiated a ceasefire, remaining 
inactive since.  
Corsican Revolutionary Armed Forces 
(FARC): see Front Armi 
Revolutionnaire Corse  
Dagestan Liberation Army: founded in 1999 
by Dagestan separatists, its goal is to 
establish a sovereign Islamic Republic of 
Dagestan, but has not been a violent 
threat since 2004. 
Dagestani Shari'ah Jamaat: also known as 
Islamic Jamaat of Dagestan and 
Dzhennet, “Paradise;” founded in 2002 
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in northeastern Russia by Chechen 
separatists. Its goal is to establish an 
independent Islamic state of Chechnya. 
Darfur Liberation Front (DLF): founded in 
2002 by members of the Fur tribe in 
Sudan, its goals was to liberate Darfur 
from Sudan and create an independent 
state. In 2003, DLF became the SLM. 
Daughters of Faith: see Dhtaran-e-Millat  
Daughters of the Nation: see Dhtaran-e-
Millat  
Democratic Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (DFLP): also known as 
Popular Democratic Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP), and al-
Jabha al-Dimuqratiyya li-Tahrir Filastin: 
founded by Nayaf Hawatmeh in 1969 
based on Marxist philosophy, its goals 
are the destruction of Israel and creation 
of a socialist Palestinian state. 
Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA): 
also known as Progressive Buddhist 
Karen National Organization, and 
Democratic Karen Buddhist Association; 
a Karen separatist organization, DKBA 
is the militant branch of the Democratic 
Karen Buddhist Association, a 
breakaway element of the KNU. 
Founded in 1995, it violently opposes 
the KNU and seeks to establish a 
sovereign Karen state known as Kayin in 
the northern regions of Burma.  
Democratic Karen Buddhist Association: see 
Democratic Karen Buddhist Army  
Dhtaran-e-Millat (DeM), “Daughters of the 
Nation:” also known as Daughters of 
Faith; founded by Asiya Andrabi in 1987 
as a Kashmiri Islamic women’s 
organization, its goal is to liberate 
Kashmir from India although supporting 
annexation by Pakistan.  
Dima Halam Daoga (DHD): founded by 
Jewel Garlossa in 1996 as a breakaway 
sect of the Dimasa National Security 
Force (DNSF). DHD aspires to carryon 
DNSF’s goal of gaining Assamese 
independence from India. Currently, 
DHD is recognizing a ceasefire. 
Dogu Turkistan Kurtulush Orgutu: see 
Sharq azat Turkistan  
Dzhennet: see Dagestani Shari'ah Jamaat   
East Turkistan Liberation Organization 
(ETLO): see Sharq azat Turkistan  
Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation 
Front (EPRLF): founded by Sri Lankan 
separatists in 1980, EPRLF worked as a 
terrorist organization throughout the 
1980s seeking to establish independence 
for Tamil Eelam, after which it began 
reestablishing itself and is now a 
political party.   
Eelam Revolutionary Organization of 
Students (EROS): also known 
Revolutionary Eelam Organization; 
founded in 1975 by Tamil separatists in 
Sri Lanka and was the first Tamil 
separatist terrorist organization, its goal 
was to establish an independent Tamil 
state known as Tamil Eelam, comprised 
of pre-colonial Tamil territory on the 
island of Ceylon (Sri Lanka).  
Egbesu Boys, “Boys of the Ijaw god of 
War:” also known as Egbesu Cult, and 
Warring Ijaw Youths; possibly founded 
in 1999 in Nigeria as a militant branch 
for either the Ijaw National Congress or 
the Ijaw Youth Movement, used as a 
militant force, it supports the Ijaw 
movement pursuing self-determination 
and sovereignty over Ijawland the Niger-
Delta.  
Egbesu Cult: see Egbesu Boys  
Ein Tyrol: a South Tyrolean separatist 
organization founded in Italy in 1960, its 
status is currently unclear.  
Ejercito Popular de Boricua (EPB): also 
known as Macheteros: founded in 1978 
by Puerto Rican separatists, its goal is to 
establish a sovereign state of Puerto 
Rico. 
Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF): founded in 
Egypt in 1960 by Eritrean students, its 
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goal was to achieve Eritrean 
independence from Ethiopia. In 1970, 
ELF split and EPLF emerged as the 
dominant force. In 1991, Eritrea gained 
its independence.  
Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF): 
founded in Ethiopia in 1970 by Isaias 
Afewerki following a split in ELF, its 
goal was to liberate Eritrea from 
Ethiopia, in 1991 defeated Ethiopian 
forces, and secured Eritrean sovereignty.  
ETA militar: resulted from ETA 
factionalizing in 1974, and reclaimed 
ETA’s title following ETA p-m’s 
dissolution in 1982. 
ETA politico-militar: resulted from ETA 
factionalizing in 1974, strongly 
influenced by communist ideology, it 
sought a sovereign socialist Basque 
state, Euskadi. In 1982, ETA p-m 
negotiated a ceasefire and disbanded. 
ETA-V: formed in 1971, when ETA 
fractured over the dispute between 
Marxism versus ethnic struggle. Focused 
more on ethnicity, ETA-V united with 
Euzko Gaztedi del interior (EGI)-
Batasuna, “United Basque Youth,” in 
1972 to reemerge as ETA. 
ETA-VI: formed in 1971, following a split 
in ETA over a Marxist versus ethnic 
dispute, more interested in Marxist 
struggle, ETA-VI merged with the 
Revolutionary Communist League 
(LCR) in 1973. 
Euskadi ta Askatazuna (ETA), “Basque 
Homeland and Freedom:” founded in 
Spain in 1959 by Jose Manuel Aguirre, 
Jose Maria Benito del Valle, Julen 
Madariage, and Jose Luis Alvarez 
Enparanza, and is a breakaway group of 
the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV). 
Active in Spain and France, ETA is 
among the longest lasting and most 
destructive terrorist groups. Its goal is to 
establish an independent Basque, 
Euskadi, comprising the historic Basque 
lands in northern Spain and southern 
France. 
Exèrcit Roja d'Alliberament Català: see 
Catalan Red Liberation Army  
Falcon: see Shahin   
Fatah Abu Musa: see Al-Fatah Intifada  
Fatah al-Qiyadah al-Thawriyyah, “Abu 
Nidal Organization (ANO):” also known 
as Revolutionary Organization of 
Socialist Muslims, Arab Revolutionary 
Council, Fatah Revolutionary Council, 
and Arab Revolutionary Brigades; 
founded in 1974 as breakaway group 
from the PLO, its goal is the liberation 
of Palestine but has been in decline since 
the 1980s. 
Fatah Hawks: see Abu al-Rish Brigades   
Fatah Revolutionary Council: see Fatah al-
Qiyadah al-Thawriyyah  
Fatah Uprising: see Al-Fatah Intifada  
Fateh: see Al-Fatah   
FLNC du Mai 1996: founded in 1996 by 
members of Corsica Viva, formerly 
belonging to FLNC-canal habituel, its 
goal was the establishment of an 
independent Corsican state. In 1999, it 
fused with canal historique, Fronte 
Ribellu, Resistenza, and Clandestinu to 
reestablish FLNC.  
FLNC-canal habituel, “usual channel:” 
founded in France in 1990 after 
factionalism led to a split in FLNC, its 
goal was to establish a sovereign Corsica 
state. In 1996, canal habituel was 
disbanded by its public front, 
Movimentu pá l’Autodeterminazione 
(MPA). Many members joined the 
Rinnovu Naziunale Party (RN), others 
created Corsica Viva, which later 
became FLNC du 5 Mai 1996. 
FLNC-canal historique, “historic channel:” 
founded in France in 1990 after 
factionalism led to a split in FLNC, its 
goal was to establish a sovereign Corsica 
state. Between 1998 and 1999, canal 
historique fused with FLNC du Mai 
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1996, Fronte Ribellu, Resistenza, and 
Clandestinu to reestablish itself as the 
FLNC Union des combatants. 
Free Aceh Movement: see National 
Liberation Front of Acheh Sumatra  
Free Land: see Terra Lliure  
Free Papua Movement: see Organisasi 
Papua Merdeka  
Free People of Galilee: also known as the 
Galilee Liberators; founded by Israeli 
Arabs in 2003. It has no known terrorist 
links and no longer considered a violent 
threat. 
Front Armi Revolutionnaire Corse (FR): 
also known as Corsican Revolutionary 
Armed Forces (FARC): founded by 
Corsican separatists in France in 1992, 
its goal is to establish a sovereign 
Corsican state.  
Front d'Alliberament Català (FAC), 
“Catalan Liberation Front:” a Catalonian 
separatist organization founded in 1969 
in Spain as a breakaway sect of the 
Catalan National Front (FNC). Its goal 
was to liberate Cataluña but dissolved in 
the mid 1970s. 
Front de Liberation Nationale de la Corse: 
see Fronte di Liberazione Naziunale di a 
Corsica  
Front for Mauritanian Armed Resistance: 
see Front Uni pour la Resistance Arm^e 
en Mauritanie  
Front for the Liberation of the French 
Somali Coast (FLCS): also known as 
Somali Coast Liberation Front; founded 
around 1962 in French colonized 
Djibouti, comprised of Issaq Somalis, it 
fought to liberate the French colonies. 
Successful in its struggle, Djibouti 
became independence in 1977. 
Front Uni pour la Resistance Arm^e en 
Mauritanie (FURAM), “Front for 
Mauritanian Armed Resistance:” a 
Kewri resistance organization founded in 
Mauritania in 1990, although waging 
open rebellion, FURAM also used 
terrorism as a tertiary tactic; its status is 
currently unclear. 
Front Unifié pour la Libération des Races 
Opprimées (FULRO): a Montagnard 
resistance movement founded in 
Vietnam around 1960 to resist the 
Vietcong and establish an independent 
state in the highlands of Vietnam.  
Fronte di Liberazione Naziunale di a Corsica 
(FLNC), “National Liberation Front of 
Corsica:” also known as Front de 
Liberation Nationale de la Corse; 
established in 1976 as fusion of GP and 
FPCL, its goal is to gain Corsican 
independence from France.  
Fronte Paesanu Corsu di Liberazione 
(FPCL): founded in 1973 by Corsican 
separatists in France, its goal was to 
establish a sovereign state of Corsica. In 
1976, FPCL fused with GP to form 
FLNC. 
Fronte Ribellu: founded in 1996 by Corsican 
separatists in France and in 1999 fused 
with FLNC du Mai 1996, FLNC-canal 
historique, Resistenza, and Clandestinu 
to establish the FLNC Union des 
combatants 
Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional 
(FALN), “Armed Forces of National 
Liberation:” also known as Fuerzas 
Armadas de Liberacion Nacional 
Puertoriquena; founded by remnants of 
CAL in 1974, operating in the United 
States and Puerto Rico, its goal was to 
establish a sovereign state of Puerto Rico 
but has been inactive since the mid 
1980s.  
Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional 
Puertoriquena: see Fuerzas Armadas de 
Liberacion Nacional  
Fuerzas de Liberación Africanas de 
Mauritania (FLAM): a Kewri separatist 
organization founded in Mauritania in 
1983, it fought for Kewri independence 
throughout the 1980s but suffered 
significant losses. Since the 1980s, 
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FLAM has worked through legitimate 
political channels.   
Galilee Liberators: see Free People of 
Galilee   
Gazteriak, “Youth:” founded in 1994 in 
France. Its goal is to reunite the historic 
Basque land in northern Spain and 
southern France as a sovereign Basque 
state. 
Gerakan Aceh Merdika (GAM): see 
National Liberation Front of Acheh 
Sumatra  
Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Pattani (GMIP), 
“Islamic Mujahidin Movement of 
Pattani:” founded by Nasoree Saesaeng 
in Thailand in 1995 as Malay-Muslim 
separatist organization, its goal is to 
establish an independent Pattani state. 
Ghjustizia Paolina (GP): founded in 1974 in 
France by Corsican separatists, its goal 
was to establish a sovereign state of 
Corsica. In 1976, GP fused with FPCL 
to form FLNC. 
God's Army of the Holy Mountain: a Karen 
separatist organization founded by 
Luther and Johnny Htoo in 1997 as a 
KNU splinter group, its goal was to 
establish a sovereign Karen state known 
as Kayin in the northern regions of 
Burma. God’s Army suffered significant 
losses during the early 2000s and now 
appears inactive.  
Gora Euskadi Askatuta, “Long Live a Free 
Basque Homeland:” founded in 2002 by 
Basque nationalists in France. Its goal is 
to gain an independent Basque state of 
Euskadi, comprising the historic Basque 
lands in northern Spain and southern 
France. Currently, its members may be 
working with other Basque terrorist 
organizations. 
Hamas: also known as Islamic Resistance 
Movement, and Harakat al-
Muqawammah al-Islammiyya; formed in 
Israel in 1987 as a splinter of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Its goal is to destroy Israel 
and establish a Palestinian Sunni state. 
Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami Fi Filastin, 
“Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ):” formed 
around 1979 as a splinter organization of 
the Muslim Brotherhood, a fusion of 
Palestinian nationalism and Sunni Islam, 
small but active throughout the Middle 
East, PIJ seeks the destruction of Israel 
and liberation of Palestine. 
Harakat al-Madd al-Thawri al-Arabi, “Arab 
Revolutionary Resurgence Movement 
(ARRM):” also known as Arab 
Revolutionary Surge, Revolutionary 
Outburst Movement, and Arab 
Revolutionary Expansion Movement; 
founded around 1993 in Lebanon as a 
pro-Palestinian organization. ARRM has 
been inactive since 1993. 
Harakat al-Muqawammah al-Islammiyya: 
see Hamas   
Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HUM): founded in 
Pakistan in 1985, HUM is an Islamic 
terrorist organization linked to Al-Qaeda 
and al-Faran, of its goals include 
supporting Kashmiri separatism in India. 
Harek at-Tahrir al-Wataniyyeh al-
Filastiniyyeh: see Al-Fatah   
Harkat ul-Ansar (HuA): founded in India in 
1993 as a Kashmiri separatist 
organization, supported by Pakistani 
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and 
thought to be a militant branch of 
Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islami (JUI), a 
Pakistani Islamic political party, HuA 
has been inactive since 1996.  
Hezbollah, “Party of God:” also known as 
Revolutionary Justice Organization, 
Organization of the Oppressed on Earth, 
The Islamic Resistance, Islamic Jihad, 
and Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of 
Palestine, founded by Shia clergyman in 
Lebanon in 1982, following the Israeli 
invasion. Its goals include the 
destruction of Israel, liberation of 
Palestine, eradication of Western 
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influence from the Middle East, and 
establishment of a Lebanese theocracy. 
Hizb ul-Mujahidin: see Hizbul Mujahideen  
Hizbul Mujahideen (HM): also known as 
HM of the Jamaat-e-Islami, and Hizb ul-
Mujahidin; founded in 1995 as a militant 
branch of Jamaat-i-Islami, a Pakistani 
Islamic political party, HM is the biggest 
Kashmiri militant organization, 
supporting Kashmir liberation from 
India although favoring irredentism to 
Pakistan.  
HM of the Jamaat-e-Islami: see Hizbul 
Mujahideen  
Holy War Warriors: see Laskar Jihad   
Iduwini Youths: see Ijaw Youth Movement   
Ijaw National Congress (INC): founded in 
1992 as an amalgamation of multiple 
Ijaw groups in the Niger-Delta, its goals 
include the creation of a sovereign Ijaw 
state in southern Nigeria known as 
Ijawland 
Ijaw Youth Movement: also known as 
Iduwini Youths: possibly organized in 
1999 in Nigeria as the militant branch of 
the Iduwini National Movement for 
Peace and Development (INMPD), its 
goal is to liberate Ijaw territory in Niger-
Delta.  
Ijaw Youths Council (IYC): founded in 
Nigeria in 1998, its goal is to unite the 
Ijaw and pursue self-determination in the 
Niger Delta.  
Independent Armed Revolutionary 
Movement (MIRA): a Puerto Rican 
separatist organization founded Filiberto 
Ojeda Rios in 1967, its goal was to 
secede from the United States and 
establish an independent state of Puerto 
Rico. MIRA has been inactive since the 
1970s. 
International Islamic Battalion: see Islamic 
International Peacekeeping Brigade  
International Islamic Brigade: see Islamic 
International Peacekeeping Brigade  
Internet Black Tigers (IBT): founded around 
1997 as a cyber militant branch of 
LTTE, its goal is to establish an 
independent Tamil state known as Tamil 
Eelam, comprised of pre-colonial Tamil 
territory on the island of Ceylon (Sri 
Lanka). Offensives by Sri Lankan forces 
in 2009 seriously crippled LTTE, and its 
ability to continue is in question.  
Iparretarrek (IK), “Northerners:” founded in 
1973 by Basque nationalists in France 
following an industrial dispute in Behe-
Nafarroa. IK is a splinter organization of 
ETA, seeking to reunite the historic 
Basque lands in northern Spain and 
southern France as the sovereign Basque 
state of Euskadi. 
Iraqi Liberation Army: see Jaish al-Tahrir 
al-Iraqi  
Irish Continuity Army Council (ICAC): see 
Continuity Irish Republican Army 
Irish National Liberation Army (INLA): also 
known as the People’s Republican Army 
(PRA) and People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA), formed by Seamus Costello in 
Northern Ireland in 1974 as a militant 
arm of the Irish Republican Socialist 
Party (IRSP), its goal was to establish an 
independent Irish state. Although no 
longer a terrorist organization, INLA 
remains involved with organized crime. 
Irish Republican Army (IRA), also known 
as Provos and Provisional Irish 
Republican Army (PIRA); founded in 
1922 following the Anglo-Irish Treaty. 
Its goal was to establish a sovereign Irish 
state. In 2005, the IRA officially 
declared a ceasefire. 
Islamic Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(IFLP): see Al-Jabhah al-Islamiyah 
litahrir Filastin  
Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade 
(IIPB): also known as International 
Islamic Brigade and International 
Islamic Battalion: founded by Shamil 
Basayev Ibn al-Khattab in Chechnya in 
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1998, its goal is to create a Chechen 
theocracy, strictly prescribing to Sharia 
law. 
Islamic Jamaat of Dagestan: see Dagestani 
Shari'ah Jamaat   
Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine: 
see Hezbollah  
Islamic Jihad: see Hezbollah  
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU): 
also known as Islamic Party of 
Turkistan: an Islamic separatist 
organization founded in 1998 and 
connected to Osama bin Laden, it works 
with Uyghur separatists to establish an 
Islamic state across Central Asia. 
Islamic Mujahidin Movement of Pattani: see 
Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Pattani  
Islamic Party of Turkistan: see Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan  
Islamic Resistance Movement: see Hamas   
Jabhat al-Kifah al-Sha'bi, “Popular Struggle 
Front (PSF):” also known as Palestinian 
Popular Struggle Front; formed in 1967 
as a splinter of al-Fatah. Its goal was the 
liberation of Palestine and since the 
1990s evolved into a nonviolent political 
organization. 
Jabhat al-Tahrir al-'Arabiyya: see Arab 
Liberation Front  
Jaish al-Tahrir al-Iraqi (ILA), “Iraqi 
Liberation Army:” founded by Kurdish 
separatists in 1980, its goal was to 
liberate Kurds from Turkey and Iraq and 
establish a sovereign state of Kurdistan. 
ILA has been inactive since 1981. 
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM): also known as 
Mohammed, Army of Mohammed, 
Tehrik Ul-Furqaan, Army of the 
Prophet, Mohammed's Army, National 
Movement for the Restoration of 
Pakistani Sovereignty and Army of the 
Prophet, and Jaish-e-Muhammad 
Mujahideen E-Tanzeem: founded by 
Maulana Masood Azhar, a member of 
HuA, in 2000. Thought to have links 
with Al-Qaeda and Pakistani Inter-
Services Intelligence (ISI), it seeks the 
liberation of Kashmir from India and 
favors irredentism with Pakistan.  
Jaish-e-Muhammad Mujahideen E-
Tanzeem: see Jaish-e-Mohammed  
Jamiat ul-Mujahedin (JuM): founded in 
1990 in order to liberate Kashmir and 
Jammu from India, its goal is to annex 
these territories with Pakistan  
Jammu and Kashmir Islamic Front (JKIF): 
founded by Pakistani Inter Services 
Intelligence (ISI) in 1994 as a splinter of 
the JKLF, its goal was to liberate Jammu 
and Kashmir from India but is now 
inactive. 
Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front 
(JKLF): founded in India in 1976 by 
Kashmiri separatists, its goal was to 
liberate Jammu and Kashmir from India; 
originally, JKLF had a large following 
although decreasing as Pakistani Inter 
Services Intelligence (ISI) recruited its 
member to form JKIF in 1994.  
Javhadda Waddaniga Xoreynta Ogaddeenya, 
“Ogaden National Liberation Front 
(ONLF):” founded by Ogaden and 
Darood separatists in 1984, linked to 
OLF, it seeks to create an independent 
Somali state in the Horn of Africa.  
Jenin Martyr's Brigade (JMB): founded by 
Mahmoud Nashbat in Israel in 2003, 
comprised of breakaway elements of 
several Palestinian terrorist groups, its 
purpose is to protect and liberate 
Palestinians. 
Jerusalem Battalions: see Saraya al-Quds  
Jerusalem Brigades: see Saraya al-Quds  
Jordanian National Liberation Movement: 
founded in 1972, it has been inactive 
since failing to hijack a Jordanian flight 
that same year. Although little 
information about them is available, it 
likely consisted of Palestinians, 
motivated by Palestinian liberation and 
defiance against Israel and Jordan. 
 
113 
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM): 
founded on or after 2000 as Darfur 
separatist organization, led by Khalil 
Ibrahim and linked to SLM/SLA. In 
2006, JEM fused with SLM to create the 
Alliance of Revolutionary Forces of 
West Sudan.  
KADEK: see Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan  
Kamtapur Liberation Organization (KLO): 
formed in 1995 by Rajbongshi students 
in northeastern India, its goal is to 
establish a sovereign Kamtapur, and 
receives support from ULFA. 
Karen National Union (KNU): also known 
as Kayin National Union: a Karen 
separatist organization founded in 1959, 
it is Burma’s biggest and oldest 
insurgent group. Its goal is to establish a 
sovereign Karen state known as Kayin in 
the northern regions of Burma.  
Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP): 
a Karen separatist organization founded 
by Saw Mah Rew in 1955, although 
often acting as a political channel, KNPP 
at times commits terrorist acts. The 
KNPP recognized a ceasefire in 1995 but 
remains a threat against the Burmanese 
government.  
Khalistan Commando Force (KCF): a Sikh 
separatist organization founded by 
Sukhdev Singh in India around 1984, its 
goal was the establishment of an 
independent Sikh state of Khalistan in 
the Punjab Province of northern India. 
Active throughout the 1980s and early 
1990s, it remains active but 
factionalized.  
Khalistan Liberation Force (KLF): a Sikh 
separatist organization founded by 
Shaheed Aroor Singh in India in 1986; 
its goal was to establish an independent 
state of Khalistan in the Punjab Province 
of northern India. Its main activity 
occurred during the 1980s and early 
1990s. 
KHK: see Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan  
Kongra Gele Kurdistan (PKK/KONGRA-
GEL), “People’s Congress of 
Kurdistan:” established in 2003 as the 
title to replace the PKK in an effort to 
shed its communist origins but 
maintained its goals of Kurdish 
independence. PKK/KONGRA-GEL 
reassumed the name PKK in 2005.  
Kongra-Gel (KGK): see Partiya Karkeran 
Kurdistan  
Kongreya Azadi u Demokrasiya Kurdistan: 
see Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan  
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA): also 
known as Ushtria Clirimtare E Koseves 
(UCK); formed in 1992 in Macedonia 
for uniting segments of Albania, 
Kosovo, and Macedonia as an ethnic 
Albanian nation. Since 1999, KLA has 
remained nonviolent. 
Kurdish Democratic Party: see Partiya 
Demokrat a Kurdistanê  
 Kurdish Islamic Unity Party: founded in 
Turkey in 1995 as a Kurdish separatist 
organization, it has been inactive sine 
1995 although its existence is 
questionable.  
 Kurdish Patriotic Union (PUK): founded in 
1994 as a splinter group of the PKK, its 
goals included Kurdish separation from 
Turkey. In 1997, PUK merged with the 
Kurdistan Allied National Forces.  
Kurdistan Freedom Democracy Congress: 
see Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan  
Kurdistan People's Conference: see Partiya 
Karkeran Kurdistan  
Kurdistan Workers' Party: see Partiya 
Karkeran Kurdistan  
Lashkar-e-Taiba: see Lashkar-e-Toiba  
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT): see Lashkar-e-
Toiba  
Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), “Army of the 
Righteous:” also known as Lashkar-e-
Taiba, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT), and 
Army of the Pure; founded in 1984 as a 
militant branch of MDI, linked to 
Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence 
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(ISI), MDI is a Kashmiri separatist 
organization in favor of irredentism with 
Pakistan.  
Laskar Jihad: also known as Holy War 
Warriors; founded in 2000 based on 
Salafist Islam on Indonesia’s Maluku 
Islands. Its nationalist sentiment extends 
influence over Acehnese, Sulawesi, and 
West Papuans who share the goal of 
establishing an Asian Pacific pan-
Islamic state. 
Lebanese Resistance Detachments: see 
Afwaj al Muqawama al Lubnaniya  
Liberation Front of Quebec (FLQ): also 
known as Quebec Liberation Front: 
founded by Québécois national socialists 
in Canada in 1963, its goal was to 
establish a sovereign Quebecer state. 
FLQ has been inactive since the 1970s.  
Liberation of Tripura Tribal Force (LTTF): a 
Tripura separatist organization and 
splinter of NLFT, possibly founded 
during the 1990s, its goal was the 
liberation of the tribal areas in 
northeastern India and creation of an 
independent state of Tripura, although 
rumored as having more to do with 
organized crime. LTTF is no longer 
active.  
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE): 
founded in 1976 by members of the 
Tamil New Tigers, it is Sri’ Lank most 
notorious terrorist group, fighting to 
establish an independent Tamil state, 
Tamil Eelam. Offensives by Sri Lankan 
forces in 2009 seriously crippled LTTE, 
and its ability to continue is in question. 
Long Live a Free Basque Homeland: see 
Gora Euskadi Askatuta  
Macheteros: see Ejercito Popular de Boricua  
Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad (MDI): 
founded in 1989 as an Islamic Kashmir 
separatist organization, linked to 
Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence 
(ISI), it favors liberating Kashmiris from 
India and favors of irredentism with 
Pakistan.  
Martyr Abu-Ali Mustafa Brigades: also 
known as Red Eagles; began in 2001 as 
a militant branch of the PFLP, its goal is 
the liberation of Palestine and creation of 
a Marxist Palestinian state. 
May 15 Organization for the Liberation of 
Palestine: also known as Arab 
Organization of May 15: formed in 1979 
as a breakaway element of the PFLP-
Special Operations Group (SOG), 
operating from Iraq, its goal was the 
destruction of Israel but disbanded 
during the 1980s; several members 
joined Fatah. 
Milliyetci Kurt Intikam Timleri, “Nationalist 
Kurdish Revenge Teams:” founded in 
Turkey around 1999 by Kurd separatists 
in retaliation to the apprehension of 
Abdullah Ocalan, the founder of the 
PKK, and has been inactive since 1999.  
MNLF Lost Command: founded in 1988, 
this group is likely a breakaway group of 
MNLF, which seeks to establish an 
independent Moro Islamic state in the 
southern Philippines. 
Mohammed: see Jaish-e-Mohammed  
Mohammed's Army: see Jaish-e-Mohammed  
Mong Tai Army (MTA): establish in 1963 
as a Shan militant organization in 
Burma, although its primary purpose 
was drug trafficking, segments of MTA 
also pursued Shan independence. MTA 
is no longer active; some members 
refuse to surrender while others went 
onto form the Shan State Army (SSA) in 
1983.  
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF): a 
Moro separatist organization founded in 
1978 as a breakaway of MNLF, its goal 
was to establish an independent Islamic 
state in the Philippines. Since 2005, 
MILF renounced terrorism, although it 
may still be active.  
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Moro Liberation Front (MLF): see Moro 
National Liberation Front  
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF): 
also known as Moro Liberation Front 
(MLF); founded by Nur Misuari in the 
Philippines in 1968, its purpose was to 
establish an autonomous Islamic state in 
the Philippines. Throughout the 1970s, 
the MNLF had several breakaway 
organizations, and in the 1990s entered 
peace talks, although Nur Misuari 
remains a committed terrorist.  
Movement of Hope: see Afwaj al 
Muqawama al Lubnaniya  
Movsar Baryayev Gang: founded around 
2002, is an amalgamation of SPIR and 
IIPB. Its goal is to establish an 
independent Chechen Islamic state 
Mujahideen al-Mansooran: founded in 2002 
in India as a Kashmiri separatist 
organization, it has been inactive since 
2002.  
Mujahideen Pattani Movement (BNP): 
founded in 1985 by Pattani separatists, 
based in Malaysia, BNP sought the 
liberation of Pattani territory and 
creation of an independent Pattani state. 
The BNP is no longer active in Thailand 
and works in Malaysia as a political 
party.  
Naga National Council (NCC): founded in 
1946 in India to represent Naga interests, 
since its formation, NCC has worked as 
both a political and terrorist 
organization.  
National Democratic Alliance (NDA): 
founded in 1994 by Bagandans in 
Uganda, although little information on 
them is available, a prominent separatist 
ideology among Bagandans likely 
influences NDA ideology, which has 
been mostly inactive since 1995. 
National Democratic Front of Bodoland 
(NDFB): also known as Bodo Security 
Force (BSF) and (BdSF); founded by 
Ranjan Daimary in India in 1988, for 
achieving a sovereign Bodo state. 
National Liberation Front of Acheh Sumatra 
(NLFAS): also known as Aceh Merdeka 
and Gerakan Aceh Merdika (GAM), 
“Free Aceh Movement;” formed in 1976 
by Hasan di Tyro based on Suku Aceh 
ethnicity and Islam, active in Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Sweden, its goal is to 
establish a sovereign theocracy in 
Indonesia’s Aceh Province of Sumatra. 
National Liberation Front of Corsica: see 
Fronte di Liberazione Naziunale di a 
Corsica  
National Liberation Front of Pattani: see 
Barisan Nasional Pembe-Basan Pattani 
National Liberation Front of Tripura 
(NLFT): a Tripura separatist 
organization founded in India in 1989 by 
Dhananjoy Reang, a former leader of 
TNV; its goal is the liberation of the 
tribal areas in northeastern India and 
creation of an independent state of 
Tripura. 
National Movement for the Restoration of 
Pakistani Sovereignty Army of the 
Prophet: see Jaish-e-Mohammed  
National Revolutionary Front: see Barisan 
Revolusi Nasional Melayu Pattani  
National Socialist Council of Nagaland 
(NSCN): founded by Thuingaleng 
Muivah, Isak Chisi Swu, and S.S. 
Khaplang in India in 1980, its goal was 
to establish an independent Nagaland in 
northeastern India. In 1988, NSCN 
fractured into NSCN-IM and NSCN-K.  
National Socialist Council of Nagaland-
Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM): founded by 
Thuingaleng Muivah and Isak Chisi Swu 
following a split in NSCN in 1988, its 
goal is to establish an independent 
Nagaland in northeastern India 
National Socialist Council of Nagaland-
Khaplang (NSCN-K): established 
following a split in NSCN in 1988 by 
S.S. Khaplang, a cofounder of NSCN; its 
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goal is to establish an independent 
Nagaland in northeastern India. 
Nationalist Kurdish Revenge Teams: see 
Milliyetci Kurt Intikam Timleri  
New Pattani United Liberation Organization 
(New PULO): founded in Thailand in 
1995 by factionalized members of 
PULO, active in northern Malaysia and 
southern Thailand, its goal is the 
creation of an independent Malay state, 
Pattani. 
Northerners: see Iparretarrek  
Odua People's Congress (OPC): also known 
as Yoruba O'odua Peoples' Congress; 
founded originally by Frederick Fasehun 
founded in Nigeria in 1995 to advocate 
for Yoruba rights; however in 1999, 
Gani Adams led a breakaway militant 
faction to establish Yoruba 
independence.    
Official IRA (OIRA): founded in 1969 in 
Northern Ireland, its goal was to 
establish a Marxist based independent 
Irish state. In 1972, OIRA declared a 
ceasefire, remaining inactive since. 
Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF): 
see Javhadda Waddaniga Xoreynta 
Oglaigh Na hEireann, “Real Irish 
Republican Army (RIRA):” also known 
as True IRA and Real IRA; founded in 
1998 as a splinter group opposing a 
ceasefire and negotiations between IRA 
and British forces. RIRA remains active. 
Omega-7: established in 1974 in the United 
States as a Cuban liberation movement, 
although unsuccessful in its endeavor 
Omega-7 turned to drug trafficking, and 
subsequently neutralized by the FBI in 
the early 1980s. 
Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM), “Free 
Papua Movement:” founded in 1963 as a 
liberation movement, it became an 
insurgent group in 1969. OPM operates 
in Papua New Guinea and Indonesia, its 
goal is to create a independent state in 
western New Guinea known as West 
Papua.  
Organization of the Oppressed on Earth: see 
Hezbollah  
Oromo Liberation Front (OLF): an Oromo 
separatist organization founded in 1973, 
linked ONLF, its goal is to secede the 
historic Oromo homeland from Ethiopia, 
comprising more than half Ethiopia’s 
territory. OLF has been inactive since 
2002.  
Our Kashmir: see Panun Kashmir  
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO): 
founded by Yassir Arafat during the 
Palestinian Congress in 1964, connected 
to al-Fatah, its goal was the liberation of 
Palestine. Following the Oslo Accords in 
1993, many Arafat loyalists renounced 
terrorism and now pursue Palestinian 
sovereignty through legitimate political 
channels. 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ): see Harakat 
al-Jihad al-Islami Fi Filastin  
Palestinian Popular Struggle Front: see 
Jabhat al-Kifah al-Sha'bi  
Palestinian Revolution Forces General 
Command: founded in 1985, possibly as 
a branch of the PLO, its goal was the 
liberation of Palestine but has been 
inactive since 1987. 
Panun Kashmir, “Our Kashmir:” a Kashmiri 
separatist organization founded in India 
in 1990, its goal is to increase rights for 
Kashmiri Hindus and establish an 
independent Kashmir state. 
Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity 
(PCJSS), “Chittagong Hill Tracts United 
People’s Party:” founded in Bangladesh 
in 1975 by Chittagong separatists, its 
goal is to gain independence in the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts and expel the 
Bengali Muslims from the region.  
Partit Socialista d’Alliberament Nacional-
provisional (PSAN-p), the “Socialist 
Party of National Liberation-
Provisional:” a Catalonian separatist 
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organization founded in 1969 as a 
breakaway group from the Catalan 
National Front (FNC). PSAN-p is no 
longer active. 
Partiya Demokrat a Kurdistanê (KDP), 
“Kurdish Democratic Party:” founded in 
Kurdistan in 1946 to pursue Kurdish 
autonomy from in Iraq. After the fall of 
the Saddam regime, KDP assumed a 
legitimate role in Iraqi politics.   
 Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan (PKK), 
“Kurdistan Workers' Party:” also known 
as Kurdistan People's Conference, the 
People’s Congress of Kurdistan, 
Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy 
Congress, KADEK, Kongreya Azadi u 
Demokrasiya Kurdistan, KHK, Kongra-
Gel (KGK): founded by Turkish Kurds 
in 1974 based on Marxist ideology. Led 
by Abdullah Ocalan, it sought an 
independent Kurdish socialist state. The 
PKK has since denounced communism 
but continues pursing Kurdish liberation.  
Party of God: see Hezbollah  
Patriotic Union of Kurd: see Yaketi 
Nishtimani Kurdistan  
Pattani United Liberation Organization 
(PULO): founded in 1968 by Pattani 
separatists, active in Thailand and 
Malaysia and more moderate or 
secularist than other Malay-Muslim 
separatist groups, active in northern 
Malaysia and southern Thailand, its goal 
is to separate from Thailand and create 
an independent Malay state of Pattani. 
People’s Congress of Kurdistan: see Kongra 
Gele Kurdistan  
People’s Congress of Kurdistan: see Partiya 
Karkeran Kurdistan  
People’s Liberation Army (PLA): founded 
by Bisheswar Singh and other Meitei 
separatists in Manipur, India in 1978, to 
India’s northeastern tribes and liberate 
Manipur. 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA): see Irish 
National Liberation Army  
People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil 
Eelam (PLOTE): founded in 1979 by 
Uma Maheswaran, a former leader in the 
LTTE, and remnants of the People’s 
Liberation Front (JVP), a Sri Lankan 
communist resistance group founded in 
1967, PLOTE sought independence for 
Tamil Eelam. PLOTE began declining 
during the 1980s from incursions with 
LTTE.   
People’s Republican Army (PRA): see Irish 
National Liberation Army  
People's Defense Forces (HPG): founded by 
Turkish Kurds in the 1990’s as the 
militant branch of the Kongra-Gel, its 
goal is the establishment of a sovereign 
Kurdish state.  
People's Liberation Army of Kurdistan: see 
Arteshen Rizgariya Gelli Kurdistan  
People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak 
(PREPAK): founded in 1977 by R.K. 
Tulachandra in India as a Manipur 
separatist organization, originally 
representing the Naga, Kuki, and Meitei, 
although evolving into a predominately 
Meitei organization, its goal is to create 
an independent state in northeastern 
India.  
PFLP-General Command (GC): founded by 
Ahmed Jabril in 1968 as a splinter of the 
PFLP, its goal was the destruction of 
Israel and liberation of Palestine. During 
the 1970s, PFLP-GC became staunchly 
opposed to Arafat, Fatah, and the PLO. 
Based in Lebanon, PFLP-GC has links 
with Hamas and continues its attacks 
against Israel. 
Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation 
of Palestine (PDFLP): see Democratic 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine  
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP): see Al-Jabha ash-Sha'abiya li-
Tahrir Falastin  
Popular Resistance Committees (PRC): 
founded by Jamal Abu Samhadana in 
Gaza in 2000, comprising secularists and 
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religious Palestinians, PRC is committed 
to Israeli destruction and Palestinian 
liberation. 
Popular Struggle Front (PSF): see Jabhat al-
Kifah al-Sha'bi  
Progressive Buddhist Karen National 
Organization: see Democratic Karen 
Buddhist Army  
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA): 
see Irish Republican Army  
Provos: see Irish Republican Army  
Puerto Rican Resistance Movement: 
founded in 1981 and considered to be a 
Puerto Rican separatist movement. Little 
is known about this movement, which 
has been inactive since 1981.  
Quebec Liberation Front: see Liberation 
Front of Quebec  
Quebec National Liberation Movement: 
founded in 1995 by Raymond 
Villeneuve, a former member of FLQ, its 
purpose is the continuation of FLQ’s 
goal of Québécois separatism.  
Quwat Badr, “Badr Force:” founded around 
2001 in the West Bank and Gaza, its 
goal is the liberation of Palestine but is 
no longer active and likely merged with 
a larger terrorist organization. 
Real IRA: see Oglaigh Na hEireann  
Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA): see 
Oglaigh Na hEireann  
Red Eagles: see Martyr Abu-Ali Mustafa 
Brigades   
Republic of New Africa (RNA): began 
following the Detroit Conference of 
Militant African-American Nationalists 
in 1968. Based on communist ideology, 
its goal was to gain Black sovereignty 
over Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, and South Carolina. 
Currently, the RNA works as a non-
violent political organization. 
Resistenza Corsa: see Accolta Nazinuale 
Corsa   
Revenge Hawks of Apo: see Apo'nun 
Intikam Sahinler  
Revolutionary Eelam Organization: see 
Eelam Revolutionary Organization of 
Students  
Revolutionary Justice Organization: see 
Hezbollah  
Revolutionary Organization of Socialist 
Muslims: see Fatah al-Qiyadah al-
Thawriyyah  
Revolutionary Outburst Movement: see 
Harakat al-Madd al-Thawri al-Arabi  
Riyad us-Saliheyn Martyrs' Brigade: also 
known as Riyadus-Salikhin 
Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion 
of Chechen Martyrs and Riyadh-as-
Saliheen; founded around 2002, its goal 
is to establish an independent Chechen 
Islamic state. 
Riyadh-as-Saliheen: see Riyad us-Saliheyn 
Martyrs' Brigade 
Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance: see 
Riyad us-Saliheyn Martyrs' Brigade 
Russian Nat Bolshevist Party (NBP): a 
Russian nationalist organization founded 
by Eduard Limonov in 1993, NBP is 
anti-capitalist, anti-Semitist, anti-
Western, and opposes Vladimir Putin. It 
is active throughout the former Soviet 
Union, aligning itself with multiple 
Russian causes.  
Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs: see 
Riyad us-Saliheyn Martyrs' Brigade 
Salah al-Din Battalions: also known as Salah 
al-Din Brigades; began in 2000 as the 
militant branch of the PRC, which is 
committed to the destruction of Israel 
and liberation of Palestine. 
Salah al-Din Brigades: see Salah al-Din 
Battalions   
Saraya al-Quds, “al-Quds Brigades:” also 
known as Jerusalem Battalions, al-Quds 
Battalions, Sayf al-Islam Brigades, Al-
Qassam, and Jerusalem Brigades; 
founded around 1979 as a militant 
branch of PIJ, its goal is the liberation of 
Palestine. 
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Sardinian Autonomy Movement (MAS): a 
Sardinian separatist organization 
founded in Italy around 1971, its goal is 
to establish an independent Sardinia. 
MAS is suspected of being reestablished 
in 2002 and has been inactive since. 
Save Kashmir Movement: founded in 2002 
in India as a Kashmiri separatist 
organization but appears to have been 
inactive since 2002.  
Sayf al-Islam Brigades: see Saraya al-Quds  
SENRAK: the first of several Tripura 
resistance groups founded around 1965 
in retaliation against migrants settling in 
reserved tribal areas. SENRAK was 
neutralized in 1968.  
 Shahin: also known as Falcon: founded in 
Iran around 1992 as a Kurdish separatist 
organization, Shahin has been inactive 
since 1992. 
Shamil People’s Front: founded in 1990 by 
Avars in Russia, while little information 
of them is available, many Avars are 
active separatists possibly contributing 
to the pursuance of sovereignty from 
Russia and Chechnya. 
Shanti Bahini: founded as the military 
branch of the Lamba faction following a 
split in the PCJSS in 1983, its goal is to 
gain independence in the Chittagong Hill 
Tracts and expel the Bengali Muslims 
from the region. 
Sharq azat Turkistan, “East Turkistan 
Liberation Organization (ETLO):” also 
known as Dogu Turkistan Kurtulush 
Orgutu; founded around 1998 by Uyghur 
separatists, its goal is to establish an 
Islamic East Turkistan in China’s 
Xinjiang province.  
Sinh National Alliance (SNA): a Sindhi 
separatist organization founded in 1988, 
active in Pakistan and led by M. G. 
Syed, SNA has uses terrorism as a 
primary tactic in its quest for Sindhi 
Independence.  
Social Democratic Front of Tripura (SDFT): 
a Tripura separatist organization and 
splinter of NLFT, possibly founded 
during the 1990s, its goal was the 
liberation of the tribal areas in 
northeastern India and creation of an 
independent state of Tripura, although 
rumored as having more to do with 
organized crime. SDFT is no longer 
active.   
Socialist Party of National Liberation-
Provisional: see Partit Socialista 
d’Alliberament Nacional-provisional  
Somali Coast Liberation Front: see Front for 
the Liberation of the French Somali 
Coast  
Southern Sudan Independence Movement 
(SSIM): founded by Riak Machar in 
1991 as a breakaway faction of SPLA. 
Although it moved towards secession 
from Sudan, in 1996 SSIM signed the 
Sudanese Peace Pact, subsequently 
integrating with Sudanese forces to form 
the Southern Sudan Defense Force 
(SSDF). 
Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR): 
founded by Arbi Barayev in Russia in 
1996. Its goal is to establish an 
independent Chechen Islamic state. 
Sri Nakharo: founded in 2001 as a splinter 
of Mujahideen Pattani, active in northern 
Malaysia and southern Thailand, its goal 
is to establish an independent Malay 
state of Pattani, but appears inactive 
since 2001.  
Sudan Liberation Army (SLA): see 
Sudanese Liberation Movement  
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA): 
also known Sudan People's Liberation 
Movement; an ethnic-Dinka movement 
founded by John Garangg in 1983, in 
opposition to Sudanese enforcement of 
Sharia law, waging a military campaign 
as well as committing terrorism, its goal 
was to unite and democratize Sudan. In 
1991, a faction broke off to form SSIM, 
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and by 2005, SPLA recognized a peace 
agreement and now works as a political 
organization.  
Sudan People's Liberation Movement: see 
Sudan People’s Liberation Army 
Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM): also 
known as Sudan Liberation Army 
(SLA): formed in the Sudan in 2003 as a 
continuation of the DLF and led by Mini 
Arkoi Minawi, SLM replaced DLF 
separatism in favor of democratization.  
Sword of Islam: founded around 1998 by 
Chechen separatists, its goal was to 
liberate Chechnya and establish an 
Islamic state but has been inactive since 
2001. 
Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization 
(TELO): also known as Tamil Liberation 
Organization; founded Sri Lanka in 1974 
by Selvarajah Yogachandran and 
Nadarajah Thangathurai, its goal was to 
establish an independent Tamil state. In 
the late 1980s, LTTE killed most of the 
TELO, leading to its disintegration. 
Tamil Liberation Organization: see Tamil 
Eelam Liberation Organization    
Tamil New Tigers: founded in 1972 by Sri 
Lankan separatists, its goal was to 
establish an independent Tamil state, 
Tamil Eelam. In 1976, it became the 
LTTE.  
Tantra Jihad Islam (TJI): founded in 
Thailand in 1993 by factionalized 
members of BRN and PULO, little 
information about them is available, TJI 
likely shares BRN’s and PULO’s goal of 
establishing an independent Pattani state 
in southern Thailand and northern 
Malaysia.  
Tanzim, “Organization:” founded in Israel in 
1993 by Marwan Barghouti and other 
factionalized members opposed to the 
autocratic control of al-Fatah, it pursues 
Palestinian liberation while opposing the 
Palestinian Authority (PA). 
Tehrik Ul-Furqaan: see Jaish-e-Mohammed  
Terra Lliure (TL), “Free Land:” also known 
as Terra Uivre; founded during the 
1970s in Spain by Catalan separatists. 
TL has been inactive since the 1990s. 
Terra Uivre: see Terra Lliure  
Terrorist Group of Assam: see Bodo 
Liberation Tigers  
The Federated Niger Delta Izon 
Communities: an Ijaw separatist 
organization founded in Nigeria in 1998, 
the Ijaw movement is pursuing self-
determination and sovereignty over 
Ijawland the Niger-Delta.  
The Islamic Resistance: see Hezbollah  
Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC): founded in 
1970 by Sonam Topgyal, Tenzin Geyche 
Tethong, Tenzin N. Tethong, and Lodi 
G. Gyari, TYC is an international 
organization seeking Tibetan 
independence from China. TYC began 
using terrorism in 1977, although it is 
not their primary focus, and it is unclear 
whether they still use violence.  
Tripura Humkurai Sepoy (THS): a Tripura 
separatist organization and splinter of 
NLFT, possibly founded during the 
1990s, its goal was the liberation of the 
tribal areas in northeastern India and 
creation of an independent state of 
Tripura, although rumored as having 
more to do with organized crime. THS is 
no longer active.    
Tripura Liberation Organization (TLO): a 
Tripura separatist organization founded 
in India in 1992 as a splinter of ATTF, 
its goal was the liberation of the tribal 
areas in northeastern India and creation 
of an independent state of Tripura but is 
no longer active. 
Tripura Lion Force (TLF): a Tripura 
separatist organization and splinter of 
ATTF, possibly founded during the 
1990s, its goal was the liberation of the 
tribal areas in northeastern India and 
creation of an independent state of 
Tripura, although rumored as having 
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more to do with organized crime. TLF 
no longer exists.  
Tripura National Army (TNA): a Tripura 
separatist organization and splinter of 
ATTF, possibly founded during the 
1990s, its goal was the liberation of the 
tribal areas in northeastern India and 
creation of an independent state of 
Tripura, although rumored as having 
more to do with organized crime. TNA 
no longer exists.  
Tripura National Liberation Front (TNLF): a 
Tripura separatist organization and 
splinter of NLFT, likely founded during 
the 1990s, its goal was the liberation of 
the tribal areas in northeastern India and 
creation of an independent state of 
Tripura, although rumored as having 
more to do with organized crime. TNLF 
is no longer active.   
Tripura National Sengkrak Force (TNSF): a 
Tripura separatist organization and 
splinter of NLFT, possibly founded 
during the 1990s, its goal was the 
liberation of the tribal areas in 
northeastern India and creation of an 
independent state of Tripura, although 
rumored as having more to do with 
organized crime. TNSF is no longer 
active.   
Tripura National Volunteer Force (TNVF): 
see Tripura National Volunteers  
Tripura National Volunteers (TNV): also 
known as Tripura National Volunteer 
Force (TNVF); a Tripura separatist 
organization originally founded in India 
by Amra Bengali in 1978, revived by 
Bijoy Harankhwal in 1982, and also 
thought to have been revitalized in 1999, 
its goal was the liberation of the tribal 
areas in northeastern India and creation 
of an independent state of Tripura. 
Tripura National Volunteers (TNV): 
founded by B. K. Hrangkhawal in India 
in 1978, its goal was the liberation of the 
tribal areas in northeastern India and 
creation of an independent state of 
Tripura but disintegrated in the 1980s; 
many members joined other Tripura 
movements.   
Tripura Regimental Force (TRF): a Tripura 
separatist organization and splinter of 
NLFT, possibly founded during the 
1990s, its goal was the liberation of the 
tribal areas in northeastern India and 
creation of an independent state of 
Tripura, although rumored as having 
more to do with organized crime. TRF is 
no longer active.   
Tripura Resurrection Army (TRA): a 
Tripura separatist organization founded 
in India in 1994 by Dhananjoy Reang, a 
former leader of TNV and NLFT, its 
goal was the liberation of the tribal areas 
in northeastern India and creation of an 
independent state of Tripura but 
surrendered to authorities in 1997.  
Tripura Tribal Action Committee Force 
(TTACF): a Tripura separatist 
organization and splinter of NLFT, 
possibly founded during the 1990s, its 
goal was the liberation of the tribal areas 
in northeastern India and creation of an 
independent state of Tripura, although 
rumored as having more to do with 
organized crime. TTACF is no longer 
active.   
Tripura Tribal Democratic Force (TTDF): a 
Tripura separatist organization and 
splinter of NLFT, possibly founded 
during the 1990s, its goal was the 
liberation of the tribal areas in 
northeastern India and creation of an 
independent state of Tripura, although 
rumored as having more to do with 
organized crime. TTDF is no longer 
active.   
Tripura Tribal Volunteer Force (TTVF): a 
Tripura separatist organization and 
splinter of NLFT, founded around 1995, 
its goal was the liberation of the tribal 
areas in northeastern India and creation 
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of an independent state of Tripura, 
although rumored as having more to do 
with organized crime. TTVF is no longer 
active.    
Tripura Tribal Youth Force (TTYF): a 
Tripura separatist organization and 
splinter of ATTF, possibly founded 
during the 1990s, its goal was the 
liberation of the tribal areas in 
northeastern India and creation of an 
independent state of Tripura, although 
rumored as having more to do with 
organized crime. TTYF no longer exists.  
Tripura Young Rifle (TYR): a Tripura 
separatist organization and splinter of 
ATTF, possibly founded during the 
1990s, its goal was the liberation of the 
tribal areas in northeastern India and 
creation of an independent state of 
Tripura, although involved with on 
organized crime. TYR no longer exists.   
True IRA: see Oglaigh Na hEireann  
United Front for the Independence of 
Pattani: see Barisan Bersatu Merdeka 
Pattani  
United Liberation Front of Asom: see 
United Liberation Front of Assam   
United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA): 
also known as United Liberation Front 
of Asom: formed in 1979 in Assam, 
India, its goal is to establish an 
independent communist state in 
northeastern India. 
United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF): 
founded by Chittagong separatists in 
Bangladesh in 1998, comprising 
members of the Hill Women’s 
Federation, Hill People's Council, and 
Hill Student Council, and has links to 
PCJSS, its goal is to gain independence 
in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. 
United People's Democratic Solidarity 
(UPDS): founded in 1999 by Assam 
separatists, primarily comprising the 
Karbi tribe, it seeks to establish a 
sovereign tribal state in northeastern 
India. 
Ushtria Clirimtare E Koseves (UCK): see 
Kosovo Liberation Army  
Warring Ijaw Youths: see Egbesu Boys  
Yaketi Nishtimani Kurdistan (PUK), 
“Patriotic Union of Kurd:” formed in 
1975 as a splinter group of the KDP, its 
goal was to establish a sovereign 
Kurdish state. PUK is now a legitimate 
political organization in Iraq.   
Yoruba O'odua Peoples' Congress: see Odua 
People's Congress    
Young Liberators of Pattani: established 
around 2002 in Thailand, its goal is an 
independent Malay state of Pattani but 
appears inactive since 2002. 
 
* Groups seeking autonomy are not included in the dependent variable; however, this glossary 
includes the descriptions of some autonomy seeking groups whose information pertains to 
movements included in the dependent variable.
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APPENDIX C: Countries and Minority Populations  
 
Afghanistan 
Hazaras  
Pashtuns  
Tajiks  
Albania 
Greeks  
Angola 
Berbers  
Bakongo  
Cabinda 
Ovimbundu 
Argentina 
Indigenes  
Jews  
Australia 
Aborigines  
Azerbaijan  
Armenians 
Lezgins 
Russians  
Bangladesh  
Biharis  
Chittagong-
Hill Tribes 
Belarus  
Poles  
Russians  
Bhutan  
Lhotshampas  
Bolivia  
Indigenes  
Bosnia  
Croats-
Muslims  
Serbs  
Botswana  
San Bushmen  
Brazil  
Afro-
Brazilians  
Indigenes  
Bulgaria  
Roma  
Turks  
Burma  
Hill Tribes 
Kachins  
Karens  
Mons  
Rohingya  
Shans  
Zomis   
Burundi  
Hutus  
Cambodia  
Vietnamese 
Cameroon  
Bamileke  
Kirdis  
Westerners  
Canada  
Fr. Canadians 
Indigenes  
Quebecois  
Chad  
Southerners  
Chile  
Indigenes  
China  
Tibetans  
Turkmen  
Colombia  
Blacks  
Indigenes  
Costa Rica  
Antillean-
Blacks 
Croatia  
Roma  
Serbs  
Cyprus  
Turkish-
Cypriots  
Czechoslovakia  
Hungarians  
Slovaks  
Czech Republic  
Roma  
Slovaks  
Dem. Rep/Congo  
Hutus  
Luba  
Lunda  
Ngbandi  
Tutsis  
Djibouti  
Afars  
Dominican Rep.  
Haitian Blacks 
Ecuador  
Blacks  
Indigenes   
El Salvador  
Indigenes   
Eritrea  
Afars  
Estonia 
 Russians 
Ethiopia  
Afars  
Amhara  
Eritreans  
Nilo-Saharans  
Oromo  
Somalis  
Tigreans   
Fiji  
East Indians  
Fijians  
France  
Basques  
Bretons  
Corsicans  
Non-French-
Muslims  
Roma  
Georgia  
Abkhazians  
Adshars  
South-
Ossetians  
Russians  
Ghana  
Ashanti  
Ewe  
Mossi-
Dagomba  
Greece  
Roma  
Guatemala  
Indigenes   
Guinea  
Fulani  
Malinka  
Susu  
Guyana  
Africans  
East Indians  
Honduras  
Black  
Karibs  
Indigenes   
Hungary  
Roma  
India  
Assamese  
Bodos  
Kashmiris  
Mizos  
Nagas  
Santals  
Scheduled-
Tribes  
Sikhs 
Tripuras  
Indonesia  
Acehnese  
Chinese  
East Timorese  
Papuans  
Iran  
Arabs  
Azerbaijanis  
Bakhtiari  
Baluchis  
Kurds  
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Turkmen  
Iraq  
Kurds  
Israel  
Arabs  
Palestinians  
Italy  
Roma  
Sardinians  
South-
Tyroliennes  
Cote d'Ivoire  
Lebanese  
Japan  
Koreans  
Jordan  
Palestinians  
Kazakhstan  
Germans  
Russians  
Kenya  
Kalenjins  
Kikuyu  
Kisii  
Luhya  
Luo  
Maasais  
Rendille  
Somalis  
Turkana  
Kyrgyzstan  
Russians  
Laos  
Hmong  
Latvia  
Russians  
Lebanon  
Druze  
Maronite  
Christians  
Palestinians  
Liberia  
Americo-
Liberians  
Lithuania  
Poles  
Russians  
Macedonia 
Albanians  
Roma  
Serbs  
Madagascar 
Merina  
Malaysia  
Chinese  
Dayaks  
East Indians  
Kadazans  
Mali  
Tuareg  
Mauritania  
Blacks Moors  
Kewri  
Mexico  
Mayans  
Indigenes  
Zapotecs   
Moldova  
Gaguaz  
Slavs  
Morocco  
Berbers  
Saharawis  
Namibia  
Basters  
East-
Caprivians  
Europeans  
San Bushmen  
New Zealand  
Maori  
Nicaragua 
Indigenes  
Niger  
Djerema-
Songhai  
Hausa  
Tuareg  
Nigeria  
Ibo  
Ijaw  
Ogani  
Yoruba  
Pakistan  
Baluchis  
Mohajirs  
Pashtuns  
Sindhis  
Panama  
Blacks  
Chinese  
Indigenes   
Papua N. Guinea  
Bouganvillean  
Peru  
Afro-
Peruvians  
Indigenes  
Philippines  
Igorots  
Moros  
Republic/Congo  
Lari  
M’Boshi  
Romania  
German  
Magyars  
Roma  
Russia  
Avars  
Buryat  
Chechens  
Ingush  
Karachay  
Kumyks  
Lezgins  
Roma  
Tatars  
Tuvinians  
Yakut  
Rwanda  
Hutus  
South Korea  
Honamese  
Senegal 
Diolas- 
Casamance  
Sierra Leone  
Creoles  
Limba  
Mende  
Singapore  
Malays  
Slovakia  
Hungarians  
Roma  
Somalia  
Issaq  
South Africa  
Asians  
Black- 
Africans  
Coloreds  
Europeans  
Xhosa  
Zulus  
Spain  
Basques  
Catalans  
Roma  
Sri Lanka  
Indian Tamils  
Ceylon Tamils  
Sudan  
Darfur Black-
Muslims  
Nuba  
Southerners  
Switzerland  
Foreign-
Workers  
Jurassians  
Syria  
Alawi  
Kurds  
Taiwan  
Aboriginal  
Taiwanese  
Mainland- 
Chinese  
Taiwanese  
Tajikistan  
Russians  
Tanzania  
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Zanzibaris  
Thailand  
Chinese  
Malay-
Muslims  
Northern-Hill 
Tribes  
Togo  
Ewe  
Kabre  
Turkey  
Kurds  
Roma  
Turkmenistan  
Russians  
Uganda  
Acholi  
Ankole  
Baganda  
Kakwa  
Karamojong  
Konjo  
Langi  
Lugbara  
Nyarwanda  
United Kingdom  
Afro-
Caribbeans  
Asians  
Irish 
Scottish  
Ukraine  
Crimean  
Russians  
United States  
African-
Americans  
Hispanics  
Indigenes   
Soviet Union  
Armenians  
Estonians  
Georgians  
Germans  
Jews  
Letts  
Lithuanians  
Moldavians  
Tatars  
Ukrainians  
Uzbekistan  
Russians  
Tajiks  
Venezuela  
Blacks  
Indigenes  
Vietnam  
Chinese  
Montagnards  
Germany  
Turks  
Yugoslavia  
Croats  
Hungarians  
Kosovo-
Albanians  
Roma  
Serbs  
Slovenes  
Zaire  
Bakongo  
Kivu  
Lingala  
Zambia  
Bemebe  
Lozi  
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